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Abstract
While the rapid adoption of legislation has played an important role in
advancing China’s reform agenda, it has also produced a large number of
legislative conflicts. This legislative disorder has posed challenges for China’s
economic and legal modernization efforts. China addresses legislative conflicts
primarily through a system of filing and review of legislation at different levels
of government. Despite the severity of China’s legislative disorder, state organs
with formal authority to annul or amend conflicting lower-level legislation
rarely if ever exercise this authority. Citizens enjoy the right to raise proposals
for the review of legislative conflicts, but central filing and review organs never
respond to these proposals. On the other hand, the people’s courts, which
have no formal authority to review legislation, engage in a form of limited
judicial review when they choose the legislation to apply in individual cases.
To explain such phenomena, we must recognize that the core problem shaping
the design and operation of the filing and review system is a multidimensional
problem of capacity. Legislative institutions have accommodated limited
judicial review of legislation and empowered citizens to raise review proposals
primarily because they lack the capacity to carry out their basic functions.
These mechanisms should be understood as components of an integrated,
multilayered system for supervising legislation. Understanding China’s system
in this way reveals both likely limitations and opportunities in future reform
efforts. Reforms are more likely to succeed if they acknowledge core capacity
limitations, take account of existing patterns of institutional interaction, and
effectively leverage the roles of courts and citizens to improve the capacity of
the system as a whole. Specifically, reformers should explore ways to
strengthen communication links between filing and review organs and
people’s courts, encourage citizens to raise concerns about legislative conflicts
during the legislation drafting stage, and focus first on addressing conflicts
involving lower-level legislation rather than on the sensitive and politicized
issue of constitutional review.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) embarked on the path of
reform and opening in 1978, it has undertaken one of the most remarkable
legal construction efforts in human history. The enactment of legislation and
the devolution of legislative authority to local levels have been core elements
of a national effort to construct a socialist legal system and advance reform.1
As a result, China has experienced an explosion of legislation.2 At the end of
2011, 239 national laws; 714 State Council administrative regulations; 8,921
local, autonomous, and separate regulations; and approximately 12,000
departmental and provincial people’s government rules were in effect.3 The
number of other “normative documents” (binding official documents that do
not fall into the categories of legislation above) is vastly larger and by some
estimates is in the millions.4
While decentralization and rapid legislation advanced China’s reform
agenda, they also produced severe legislative disorder. The Chinese legal

1

Information Office of the State Council of China, White Paper: China’s Efforts
and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, § II (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter
China’s Efforts and Achievements]. Decentralization of lawmaking activity was deemed
essential to accommodate local conditions in a large, rapidly developing state. China’s
Current Legislation Structure, The Legislative System of China, Zhongguo Wang (
)
[China Online], Sept. 28, 2003. NPCSC Chairman Peng Zhen was an early advocate for
decentralizing legislative authority. Kevin J. O’Brien & Laura M. Luehrmann,
Institutionalizing Chinese Legislatures: Tradeoffs Between Autonomy and Capacity, 23
Legis. Stud. Q. 91, 95–97 (1998).
2 From 1979 to 2005, state organs adopted a total of more than 805 National
People’s Congress (“NPC”) and National People’s Congress Standing Committee
(“NPCSC”) laws and decisions, 4,156 State Council administrative regulations and
normative documents, 58,797 department rules and normative documents, and 115, 369
local regulations and rules. Zhu Jingwen (
), Zhongguo Falü Fazhan Baogao (
) [Report on China’s Legal Development] 2 (2007).
3

For currently effective laws, administrative regulations, and local, autonomous,
and separate regulations, see Zhongguo Fazhi Jianshe Niandu Baogao (2011)
(
2011 ) [CHINA RULE OF LAW CONSTRUCTION ANNUAL REPORT
(2011)] § 1, July 17, 2012 [hereinafter 2011 RULE OF LAW REPORT]. For department and local
rules, see Li Li (
), Guizhang Qingli Tuijin Fazhi Tongyi (
)
[Clean-up of Rules Promotes Unity of the Legal System], Fazhi Ribao (
) [LEGAL
DAILY ONLINE], May 6, 2010.
4

Li Li (
), Woguo Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Zhidu Tixi Chucheng
(
) [Preliminary Establishment of China’s System
for Filing and Review of Normative Documents], Fazhi Ribao (
) [LEGAL DAILY
ONLINE], Nov. 5, 2007 (citing estimates of “no fewer than two million normative
documents nationwide”).
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system faces large numbers of legislative conflicts at all levels.5 The problem of
local governments issuing ultra vires or conflicting legislation, often to protect
local industries or to generate revenue through fees or license requirements,
has been particularly acute. 6 These problems are exacerbated by unclear
delineations of legislative authority, vague drafting in national laws, and the
need to respond to rapidly changing national or local conditions.7 In some
cases, state organs fail to amend lower-level implementing regulations after
the laws they are based on are amended or annulled.8 Chinese commentators
express concern that legislative conflicts pose a challenge to the ideology of a
unified socialist legal system, slow economic development, weaken the
authority of the legal system in the eyes of China’s citizens and foreign
investors, create uncertainty about legal rules, and generate unnecessary
disputes that undermine stability.9 Such concerns intensified in the 1990s, as
China prepared for accession to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),
began constructing a “socialist market economy,” and made new
commitments to build a “socialist rule of law” state.10 In short, legislative

5

Cai Dingjian (
), Falü Chongtu Ji Qi Jiejue de Tujing
(
) [Legislative Conflicts and Channels for Resolving Them],
Zhongguo Faxue (
) [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.], no. 3, 1999, at 53. See also Jianfu Chen,
Unanswered Questions and Unresolved Issues: Comments on the Law on Lawmaking, in
LAWMAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 246–47 (Jan Michiel Otto et. al. eds.,
2000).
6
Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 369, 400, 411, 423 (2002); Laura Paler, China’s Legislation Law and the Making
of a More Orderly Legislative System, 182 CHINA Q. 305 (2005).
7

Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency, and the Limits of Law:
Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 BERK.
J. INT’L L. 161, 205–07 (2001).
8

Jiang Bixin (
), Xingzheng Susongfa Lilun yu Shiwu (
)
[ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE] 1085 (2011) (noting this as a
common problem).
9

For the ideological importance of legislative unity, see Qiao Xiaoyang (
),
Wanshan Woguo Lifa Tizhi, Weihu Guojia Fazhi Tongyi (
) [Perfect China’s Legislative System, Ensure the Unity of the State
Legal System], Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], June 15, 2003;
Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Zhidu: Lilun yu Shiwu (
) [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REGULATORY DOCUMENT FILING AND REVIEW] 21
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 FILING AND REVIEW]. The PRC Constitution provides that the
state “upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.” Xianfa (
)
[Constitution] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982, effective Dec. 4, 1982,
amended Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 15, 1999, and Mar. 14, 2004) art. 5, 2004
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 77 [hereinafter Constitution].
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conflicts posed a threat to China’s economic and legal modernization
program.11
The famous Luoyang Seed Case provides an example of the types of
problems that legislative conflicts generate. The case (discussed in detail in
Part IV) involved a civil dispute over a seed contract. A national law and a local
regulation contained conflicting provisions on seed prices, and the potential
compensation in the case differed significantly depending on the provision
applied. Economic actors faced with such conflicts may reach contractual
agreements on the basis of different assumptions about the prices of products
and the costs of breach. They also may be less likely to reach quick settlements
once disputes arise, as both parties may believe that the law is on their side.
When a Luoyang court attempted to address the conflict by declaring the local
regulation invalid (rather than initiating the inefficient process of seeking a
ruling from the relevant legislative organs), it triggered a constitutional crisis.
Another type of legislative conflict involves legislation that establishes
license requirements or administrative penalties in violation of national law or
administrative regulations. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) and its Standing Committee adopted several national laws
that limited the authority of ministries and local governments to impose
license requirements and penalties. These laws were designed to clear the
thicket of regulatory requirements and penalties at lower levels and to contain
related corruption and abuse.12 In many cases, ministries or local governments
have continued to adopt such provisions in violation of national law. For
example, in 2007 the Suzhou Salt Bureau seized industrial salt from a local
import company and levied a fine because the company failed to obtain a local
transport license. In a 2011 reply, the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”)
concluded that the local transport license requirement and the administrative
10

See, e.g., Lifa Fa Qicao Gongzuo Yantaohui Zongshu (
)
[Summary of Roundtable on Legislation Law Drafting Work], Zhongguo Faxue
(
) [CHINESE LEGAL SCI.], no. 3, 1997, at 123 [hereinafter Legislation Law
Roundtable]; Cai, supra note 5, at 49–51; 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 4–5, 21;
Falü Chongtu Ji Qi Jiejue Tujing (
) [Legislative Conflicts and
Channels for Resolving Them], Renmin Fayuan Bao (
) [CHINA COURT DAILY
ONLINE], Oct. 29, 2001 [hereinafter Legislative Conflict Resolution Channels] (comments
of Cai Dingjian). The Party’s decision to establish a socialist market economy and
construct a socialist rule of law state strengthened commitments to legal and market
unity. JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 56–64 (2008). For WTO
commitments related to legal harmonization, see Julia Ya Qin, Trade, Investment, and
Beyond: The Impact of WTO Accession on China’s Legal System, 191 CHINA Q. 720–21
(Sept. 2007).
11

Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994); Paler,
supra note 6, at 301.
12

The adoption of laws such as the PRC Administrative Punishment Law and
Administrative Licensing Law limited local regulatory discretion and more clearly
defined legislative authorities related to penalties and licensing.
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penalties exceeded the scope of licenses and penalties established under
national law and administrative regulations.13 These types of local measures
create a confusing and unpredictable regulatory environment, impose
significant regulatory burdens on economic actors, and force such actors to
pursue unnecessary litigation to challenge the application of unlawful
provisions. For central leaders focused on maintaining economic growth and
social stability, such conflicts are undesirable.
Despite more than three decades of efforts to address such problems,
legislative conflicts remain a core concern in the Chinese political-legal
system. From 2009 to 2010, state organs at all levels engaged in a
comprehensive legislative “clean-up” campaign as part of an effort to complete
the construction of a unified socialist rule of law state by 2010.14 For the past
six years, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (“NPCSC”) has
worked with the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”) and the
European Union on projects related to legal harmonization.15 Scholars at the
Chinese Academy of Governance (formerly known as the National School of
Administration) are engaged in a multi-year research program on legislative
conflicts and organized six research meetings on conflict resolution
mechanisms and related issues in late 2011 and 2012.16 A 2011 government white
13

Sifa Panjue Dapo Gongyeyan Xingzheng Longduan (
) [Judicial Decision Breaks Industrial Salt Administrative Monopoly], Caixin Wang
(
) [CAIXIN], June 9, 2011. For the SPC’s reply, see Guanyu Jingying Gongye Yong
Yan Shifou Xuyao Banli Gongyeyan Zhunyunzheng Deng Qingshi de Dafu (
) [Reply on Whether it is Necessary
to Have Transport Licenses for Engaging in Business in Industrially-Used Salt]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 17, 2011, effective Jan. 17, 2011) (Chinalawinfo)
[hereinafter 2011 Jiangsu Salt Case Reply].
14

Info. Office of the State Council, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF LAWS WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS, § I (Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF LAWS].
15

In March 2012, senior Chinese officials held two international conferences in
connection with this program. The conferences in Anhui and Hunan provinces focused
on the filing and review system and judicial review.
16
These meetings involved both senior scholars and officials. For summaries of
three of the meetings, see Falü Guifan de Shencha Biaozhun Bitan
(
) [Discussion of Review Standards for Legal Norms],
Xingzheng Guanli Gaige (
) [ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT REFORM], Mar.
23, 2012 [hereinafter Discussion of Review Standards]; Xiaweifa yu Shangweifa Xiang
Dichu de Jiejue Zhidao (
) [Channels for Resolving
Conflicts between Upper-Level and Lower-Level Law], Xingzheng Guanli Gaige
(
) [ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT REFORM], May 21, 2012 [hereinafter
Channels for Resolving Conflicts]; Hengxiang Falü Guifan Chongtu Ji Qi Jiejue
(
) [Horizontal Legislative Conflicts and Their Resolution],
Xingzheng Guanli Gaige (
) [ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT REFORM], Oct.
24, 2012 [hereinafter Horizontal Legislative Conflicts].
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paper on the legal system also lists legislative consistency and the
development of related supervision mechanisms as ongoing priorities. 17
China’s authoritarian leaders have emphasized the importance of enhancing
their governance capacity and minimizing incompetence and corruption to
ensure that the Communist Party maintains its ruling party status.18 Ongoing
efforts to address legislative conflicts and related problems are consistent with
these leadership objectives.
This article explores the design, evolution, and operation of China’s
system for supervising legislation and addressing legislative conflicts
(“legislative supervision”).19 As a general matter, such systems may be divided
into those that operate during the legislative drafting process and those that
operate after promulgation. For example, legislative drafting in China involves
lengthy processes of deliberation, consensus building, and public
participation.20 In some cases, state organs review and approve lower-level
legislation before it becomes effective.21 These and other processes provide

17

THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF LAWS, supra note 14, at § I.

18

For a recent statement of these objectives, see Hu Says CPC Must Strengthen
Governance Capacity, Xinhua Wang (
) [XINHUA], Nov. 8, 2012.
19

In other contexts, the term “legislative supervision” can refer to people’s congress
supervision of a range of state and judicial activities. In this article, the term refers to
the supervision of legislation. People’s congresses and administrative organs that
supervise legislation do so not only to address legislative conflicts (the core focus of
this article) but also to correct “inappropriate” legislation. See infra Part II(A).
20

For a discussion of the strong emphasis on consultation and deliberation in
China’s legislative process, see MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN
CHINA (1999); Michael Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of
Constitutional Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 162–
82 (2002). In recent years, China has encouraged public participation in lawmaking at
all levels. See generally, Jamie Horsley, The Development of Public Participation in the
People’s Republic of China, in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA 289–
308 (Ethan J. Leib & Baogang He eds., 2010).
21

Lifa Fa (
) [Legislation Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15,
2000, effective July 1, 2000), arts. 63, 66, 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., 112. Difang Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Renmin Zhengfu Zuzhifa
(
) [Organic Law of the Local People’s
Congresses and Local People’s Governments at All Levels] (promulgated by Nat’l
People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective July 1, 1979, amended Dec. 10, 1982, Dec. 2, 1986,
Feb. 28, 1995, and Oct. 27, 2004), art. 7, 2004 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
GAZ., 659 [hereinafter Local Organic Law]. Many department and provincial
government rules are reported to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office for
approval prior to promulgation. Fan Zhongxin (
), Zhongguo Weixian Shencha yu
Lifa Chongtu Jiejue Jizhi (
) [China’s Mechanism for
Constitutional Review and Resolving Legislative Conflicts], Falü Kexue (
) [LEGAL
SCI.], no. 6, 2001, at 48–49.
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channels for preventing some conflicts prior to the promulgation of
legislation.
This article explores core elements of China’s post-promulgation
legislative supervision system. Specifically, the article focuses on China’s
system for filing and review of legislation (
) (bei’an shencha)22 and
judicial practices related to legislative conflicts that provide an important
supplement to the filing and review system.23 Although foreign scholars have
explored China’s lawmaking system and the problem of legislative disorder in
detail, existing English-language studies present only a tentative and
incomplete picture of filing and review and the important roles that both
courts and citizens play in supplementing this core system.24 This article
22

Filing and review refers to the practice of legislative organs filing legislation with
higher-level legislative organs. The higher-level legislative organs in turn review the
legislation for consistency with higher-level legislation and for other problems.
23
Filing and review is the principal, but not the only, mechanism for postpromulgation supervision of legislation. Under the Administrative Reconsideration
Law, administrative organs may assess the legality of certain normative documents that
provide the basis for concrete administrative acts. Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (
)
[Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) art. 7, 1999 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 225. Under the Administrative Supervision Law, administrative
supervision organs may correct normative documents that conflict with higher-level
norms. Xingzheng Jiancha Fa (
) [Administrative Supervision Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997, amended June
25, 2010) art. 23, 2010 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 468. For an early
negative assessment of the effectiveness of these systems, see Peerenboom, supra note
7, at 211–12, 229–34. China is also experimenting with new systems for postpromulgation evaluation of legislation. These systems remain undeveloped. Yu
Ronggen (
), Lifa Hou Pinggu: Falü Tixi Xingcheng Hou de Yixiang Zhongyao
Gongzuo (
) [Post-Promulgation
Evaluation: An Important Task after the System of Laws Takes Form], Xinan Zhengfa
Daxue Xuebao (
) [J. SW. U. POL. & L.], no. 1, 2011, at 3–10.
24

Foundational English-language studies on the legislative system and related
disorder include TANNER, supra note 20, Keller, supra note 11; Michael Dowdle, The
Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People’s Congress, 11 COLUM.
J. ASIAN L. 1 (1997); LAWMAKING IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jan Michiel Otto, et.
al. eds., 2001); Peerenboom, supra note 7 (focusing on administrative law); Corne, supra
note 6; ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 123–171 (4th ed. 2012). Peerenboom’s thoughtful study on
administrative law discusses a range of conflict resolution mechanisms, but it provides
only a preliminary assessment of the Legislation Law and judicial review. It does not
address the filing and review system in detail. Peerenboom, supra note 7, at 209–13,
241–45. Keyuan Zou addresses conflicts between local and national legislation in a 2006
volume, but he discusses conflict resolution mechanisms only in general terms. KEYUAN
ZOU, CHINA’S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 87–105 (2006). Guobin Zhu
provides a general introduction to the NPCSC filing and review system. Guobin Zhu,
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represents a step toward filling that gap. It draws on a wide range of Chinese
sources, including recently published academic articles; national and local
reports on filing and review work; case judgments; abstracts of court cases;
local court requests for instruction; SPC interpretations and replies; citizen
review proposals; and meetings with Chinese legislators, judges, and scholars,
to provide a current and comprehensive empirical account of this multilayered
system.25
At first glance, aspects of this system appear aberrational or even
dysfunctional. State organs at all levels possess the constitutional authority to
annul or revise conflicting or problematic lower-level legislation, but they
rarely if ever exercise this formal authority. Conversely, while people’s courts
do not exercise the formal power to review legislation, courts play an
important role in addressing legislative conflicts when they choose the
legislation to apply in individual cases. The NPCSC, State Council, and local
state organs have created citizen rights to submit proposals for the review of
legislative conflicts. However, at least at the national level, these organs do not
issue formal responses to such citizen proposals or publish the results of
reviews. This institutional silence has generated citizen criticism and
disenchantment.
Such dynamics raise many questions. If legislative conflicts are a severe
problem, why are state organs reluctant to exercise their formal review
authority? If, as we will see, legislators have reacted strongly even to modest
court efforts to discuss the validity of legislation, why have they
accommodated what in practice is a limited form of judicial review? If state
organs had no intention of responding to citizen review proposals, why did
they create citizen proposal mechanisms at all? Why risk the public
disenchantment and legitimacy questions generated by unfulfilled
expectations and raise new doubts about the leadership’s commitment to
genuine citizen participation?
It might be tempting to dismiss China’s legislative supervision system as a
dysfunctional mess. The following pages certainly highlight many problems in
the system. However, as scholars of China’s legal system have argued, such
assessments are often grounded in misplaced assumptions about the role of
legal institutions in China or China’s reform trajectory.26 Legal institutions
Constitutional Review in China: An Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage? 43 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 625 (2010).
25

The observations and analysis presented in this article are informed by
exchanges with more than twenty-five Chinese legislative officials, judges, scholars, and
others in 2012, including senior legislative officials at the NPCSC and local people’s
congresses in Hunan and Shanghai; judges at the central and local level; Chinese
constitutional and administrative law scholars in two major cities, and staff members at
an international agency working on legislative harmonization in China.
26

For discussions of this problem, see STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE 298–319
(1999); Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just a
Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 93–121 (Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
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that outsiders dismiss as dysfunctional may in fact be operating as intended.
By analyzing them from this perspective, we may achieve a better
understanding of China’s legal system.27
This type of nuanced understanding provides a foundation for developing
more pragmatic and effective legal reform proposals. International agencies
promoting legal reform in developing countries have recognized the need to
eschew simplistic transplants and “one size fits all” models in designing legal
development programs. Instead, they have emphasized the need to take
account of local cultural, institutional, and political dynamics.28 In the China
context, scholars such as Michael Dowdle and Randall Peerenboom have long
stressed the need for pragmatic approaches to legal development that
recognize the practical limitations of local institutions and legal contexts;
leverage existing patterns of institutional interaction; and encourage
experimentation, adaptation, and learning.29 Along these lines, Dowdle has
demonstrated the importance of consensus building and consultative
dynamics in China’s legislative process.30
These perspectives provide a useful framework for understanding the
institutions and procedures designed to address legislative conflicts and for
thinking about how they might be improved. The key in this context is to
recognize that the core problem shaping both the design and operation of
these systems is a multidimensional problem of capacity. Filing and review
organs are simply incapable of reviewing the large volume of legislation in
China and identifying and addressing legislative conflicts on their own. The
capacity of filing and review organs to carry out their basic functions is limited
by human and resource constraints, power disparities, and political-legal
conventions that emphasize consultation, consensus building, and unity under
Party leadership.
Recognizing this multidimensional problem of capacity provides an
essential foundation for understanding the filing and review system and the
way in which other parts of China’s legal system supplement and interact with
it. As this article will demonstrate, Chinese courts regularly engage in limited
review of legislation in the course of adjudicating individual cases. Although
this judicial practice creates tensions in China’s constitutional framework,
27

Clarke, supra note 26.

28

David Trubek, The Rule of Law and Development Assistance: Past, Present, and
Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 89–94
(David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
29

See Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned about Law and Development?
Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 823,
862–71 (2006); Michael Dowdle, The WTO as an Obstacle to Legal Development: The
Need for A More Pragmatic Conceptualization of Development Processes, in CHINA AND
THE WTO: GOING WEST 35–43 (David Smith & Guobin Zhu eds., 2002).
30

Dowdle, supra note 20, at 162–82.
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other legal actors have accommodated and even encouraged it because limited
judicial review provides a necessary supplement to the work of overwhelmed
filing and review organs. Similarly, the establishment of citizen review
proposal mechanisms was a response to capacity problems. These mechanisms
are designed to help review organs prioritize their work by alerting them to
legislative conflicts that are difficult to detect or are generating collective
concern. Filing and review organs do not formally respond to such proposals
because the mechanism was intended as a one-way information channel rather
than as a litigation mechanism. In addition, central filing and review organs
lack the capacity to resolve many of the sensitive constitutional and political
claims that citizens raise.
Each layer in this structure provides a kind of spillover capacity that
compensates for capacity limitations in the layer above it. Filing and review
organs receive large volumes of legislation and identify and address a small
number of conflicts. However, many conflicts are never discovered, much less
eliminated. Limited judicial review provides a partial remedy for conflicts in
the context of individual cases. It also signals to filing and review organs that
there is a conflict that requires attention. Citizen review proposal mechanisms
provide a spillover channel for conflicts that courts have not or cannot
effectively address, such as collective claims, claims for the repeal or
amendment of legislation, constitutional claims, or claims that involve
politically sensitive legislative conflicts. Both courts and citizens have
leveraged the space created by responses to capacity problems. Courts have
expanded their institutional authority, while citizens have used review
proposal mechanisms to challenge the Party-state and advance reform
agendas.
These findings have important implications for domestic and international
efforts to promote legislative consistency in China. As Thomas Carothers and
other scholars have argued, while international agencies have recognized the
failures of past development efforts on paper, they face knowledge deficits that
impede their ability to apply these lessons in practice.31 An integrated analysis
of China’s system for supervising legislation and the unwritten conventions
that shape it can help to address such knowledge deficits. In the authoritarian
Chinese state, there are significant gaps between authorities and procedures
set out in the law and the often opaque processes through which legislation is
adopted and rationalized in practice. An exploration of these dynamics reveals
both likely limitations and untapped synergies in ongoing reform efforts. For
example, the results of one-dimensional reform efforts focused primarily on
enhancing the organizational capacity of filing and review organs and their
subordinate departments are likely to be disappointing. Similarly, efforts to
establish a more robust form of judicial review or to promote constitutional
review are likely to have limited impact and could be counterproductive.
31

Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, and Wade Channell, Lessons Not
Learned about Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 23–27, 149–59 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
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Reformers and international agencies working on the issue of legislative
conflicts should focus on more nuanced approaches that take account of
capacity limitations in the filing and review system. They should explore ways
to more effectively leverage existing patterns of institutional interaction and
the supplementary roles of courts and citizens to improve the capacity of the
entire multilayered system. Specifically, they should strengthen
communication links between filing and review organs and people’s courts,
encourage citizens to raise concerns about legislative conflicts during the
legislation drafting stage, and focus on addressing conflicts involving lowerlevel legislation rather than on the sensitive and politicized issue of
constitutional review. The ongoing evolution of this multilayered system
demonstrates that incremental reform progress on legislative conflicts is
possible even within the constraints of the authoritarian state.
After addressing several definitional issues, Part II discusses the problem
of capacity and its multiple dimensions. It then explores the evolution of the
filing and review system at both the central and local levels. Part III analyzes
key features of the filing and review system and argues that these features can
be understood as the products of core capacity challenges. Part IV examines
the role of courts in policing legislative conflicts. It demonstrates that in
practice, Chinese courts engage in limited judicial review of legislation. As
efforts to develop the filing and review system have progressed and the
limitations of the system have become apparent, these judicial practices have
become embedded more firmly in Chinese political-legal practice. Part V
argues that filing and review, limited judicial review, and citizen review
proposals should be understood as components of a multilayered system. It
argues that parties seeking to improve this multilayered system should
embrace and leverage existing institutional roles and patterns of interaction to
increase the capacity of the entire system.

II.

THE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S FILING AND REVIEW
SYSTEM

A. Definitions
Before proceeding with a discussion of the filing and review system, it is
necessary to define several key terms. Unless otherwise indicated, the term
“legislation” will refer collectively to the categories of legislation established in
the Legislation Law and to “normative documents.” The Legislation Law
establishes laws, administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous
and separate regulations, special economic zone (“SEZ”) regulations, and
ministry and provincial people’s government rules as formal categories of
legislation. Although there is some debate about whether rules have the status
of formal legislation, they are included in the Legislation Law and are referred
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to as such here.32 In this context, both people’s congresses and administrative
organs may enact “legislation.” Unless otherwise indicated, the term
“legislators” or “legislative organs” may refer to people’s congresses and
administrative organs.
The term “normative documents” is widely used in China, but it is not
defined in national law or administrative regulation. Provincial people’s
congresses and people’s governments generally define normative documents
as documents that (1) relate to the legal rights or duties of citizens or legal
persons; (2) have general binding force; (3) are public; and (4) can be applied
repeatedly.33 Chinese scholars offer similar definitions.34 State organs at all
levels of the system may enact normative documents. Under the broad
definition provided above, both the types of legislation established in the
Legislation Law and many SPC interpretations may be considered normative
documents. 35 Examples of other normative documents include people’s
congress “resolutions,” State Council “notices,” and local government
“decisions” and “orders.” In analyzing the problem of legislative conflicts, there
is some value in distinguishing legislation established under the Legislation
Law, SPC interpretations, and other normative documents.36 Unless otherwise
indicated, the term “normative documents” will refer to normative documents

32

Jiang, supra note 8, at 1039–43.

33

There are some minor variations at the local level. 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra
note 9, at 90–91.
34

See, e.g., Wang Kai (
), Bei’an Shencha: Zhongguo de Weixian Shencha?
(
) [Filing and Review: China’s Constitutional Review?], in
Xianfa Quanli yu Xianzheng (
) [CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM] 281–82 (Fu Hualing (
) & Zhu Guobin (
) eds., 2012).
35

Id., at 285–86, 291–92. Guanyu Caipan Wenshu Yinyong Falü, Fagui Deng
Guifanxing Falü Wenjian de Guiding (
) [Provisions on the Citation of Laws, Regulations, and Other
Normative Legal Documents in Judicial Judgments] (promulgated by the SPC, July 13,
2009, effective Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter SPC Provisions on Legal Citation].
36

For example, Chinese legislators have promulgated concrete measures related to
the filing and review of formal legislation and other normative documents in separate
stages. As noted in Part IV(C), courts are not obligated to cite to or apply normative
documents. Admittedly, government “rules” occupy a middle ground. The Legislation
Law provides for “rules,” but courts are only obligated to consult rules for reference in
deciding cases. Many judicial interpretations are legislative in both form and effect.
Courts are obligated to cite to relevant interpretations in judgments. SPC Provisions on
Legal Citation, supra note 35, arts. 3–5. However, the SPC has no formal power to
promulgate legislation.
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other than the formal categories of legislation established under the
Legislation Law and SPC interpretations.37
Chinese laws and regulations use a somewhat confusing range of terms to
refer to conflicts. For example, various legal provisions refer to legislation that
contravenes (
) (weifan) higher-level legislation, legislation that conflicts
with (
) (xiang dichu) higher-level legislation, inconsistent (
) (bu
yizhi) legislation, and legislation that violates (
) (weibei) legal
38
procedure. There is no formal definition of the term “legislative conflict” or
the specific terms above in the text of the Constitution, laws, or administrative
39
or local regulations. In practice, there does not appear to be a significant
difference between “contravene” and “conflict with”; both terms are used to
refer to conflicts involving legislation with different ranks in the legislative

37

The term “guifanxing wenjian” (
) is used in the titles of numerous
Chinese sources cited herein and will be translated as “normative documents.” In this
context, the term “normative documents” may refer to all legislation.
38

Many examples could be cited here. See, e.g., Constitution, supra note 9, arts. 65,
100; Legislation Law, supra note 21, arts. 87–92; Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Changweihui Jiandufa (
) [Law on Supervision by the
Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at All Levels] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), 2006
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 536 [hereinafter Supervision Law].
39

The NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission (“NPCSC LAC”) and the SPC have
offered definitions of the key term “conflict with” (
) (xiang dichu). The NPCSC
LAC explains that lower-level legislation “conflicts with” higher-level legislation when
(1) the provisions of higher and lower-level legislation are “contrary to each other”
(
) (xiangfan de); (2) provisions are not “contrary to each other,” but provisions of
lower-level legislation “cancel out” (
) (dixiao) those of higher-level legislation; (3)
there is no clear provision in higher-level legislation, but the provisions of lower-level
legislation are “contrary to” the spirit of higher-level legislation; (4) the lower-level
legislative entity “violates” provisions limiting legislative power; or (5) lower-level
legislation exceeds the scope or type of penalty provided for in higher-level legislation.
As discussed in Part II(D), while NPCSC LAC explanations are given considerable
weight in China’s political-legal system, they are not binding. In a 2004 document on
administrative disputes, the SPC offered a different and more specific list of over ten
circumstances in which lower-level legislation may be considered to “conflict with”
higher-level legislation. Under the SPC document, if lower-level legislation “limits or
deprives” rights established in higher-level legislation, expands or lessens “obligations”
established in higher-level legislation, or exceeds the scope, type, or form for coercive
measures provided for in higher-level legislation, there is a conflict and the lower-level
legislation should not be applied. For the NPCSC LAC and SPC definitions and related
discussion, see Wang Kai (
), Lun Difang Lifa Quan (
) [On Local
Legislative Authority], Dongwu Faxue (
) [SOOCHOW L. REV.], no. 22, 2011, at 70–
72.
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40

hierarchy. The term “inconsistent” is generally used in the context of
conflicts between provisions that have equal rank in the legislative hierarchy
(or in situations where the Legislation Law does not provide a clear
41
hierarchy). In some cases, the term “violate” is used to refer to a violation of
the procedures for promulgating legislation. In other cases, it is used in the
42
same context as the terms “contravene” or “conflict with.” Chinese scholars
have criticized legislators for failing to include clear statutory definitions of
43
such terms.
The legislative supervision process may address not only direct or explicit
conflicts in legislation but also a much broader range of soft or implied
conflicts, inconsistencies, and ultra vires legislation. The article treats all of
these problems as “legislative conflicts.” The Constitution and legislation at
various levels also empower certain state organs to amend or annul
“inappropriate” legislation. The category “inappropriate” is broad and includes
the other categories discussed above. For example, legislation may be
“inappropriate” if it conflicts with higher-level legislation, improperly alters
citizen rights and obligations, or is adopted in violation of statutory authority
or procedures.44
40

SPC Justice Jiang Bixin confirms that “conflict with” is used in the context of
conflicts involving legislation with different ranks. Jiang, supra note 8, at 1079.
41

This pattern is evident from a reading of the relevant provisions of the
Legislation Law. For an example of a discussion in which a senior Chinese jurist uses
the term “bu yizhi” (
) consistently in this context, see id., at 1082.
42

Compare Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 87(5) with art. 88(2). Jiang Bixin
uses the terms interchangeably to describe one particular conflict involving higher and
lower-level legislation. Jiang, supra note 8, at 1082.
43

See, e.g., Cai, supra note 5, at 50, 52; Chen, supra note 5, at 247; Legislation Law
Roundtable, supra note 10, at § 6(3); Wang Lei (
), Faguan dui Falü Shiyong de
Xuanze Quan (
) [The Power of Judges to Decide on Application
of the Law], Faxue (
) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 4, 2004, at 124; Jue Huang, Explanations on
the Proposed Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND CHINA 228 (Buyun Li et al, 2006); Wang Quansheng (
), “Shangweifa Youyu
Xiaweifa” Shiyong Guize Chuyi (
”
) [Humble Opinion on
Rule of Legal Application that “Higher Law Takes Priority Over Lower Law”], Xingzheng
Faxue Yanjiu (
) [ADMIN. L. STUD.], no. 4, 2005, at § 2.
44

For definitions of “inappropriate,” see Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa
Shiyi (
) [EXPLANATION OF THE PRC LEGISLATION LAW] 249
(Zhang Chunsheng (
) ed., 2000) [hereinafter LEGISLATION LAW EXPLANATION];
Supervision Law, supra note 38, art. 30 (defining “inappropriate” normative documents
broadly to include documents that are issued in violation of statutory authority; restrict
or deprive citizens or legal organizations of their lawful rights; impose obligations on
citizens, legal persons, or other organizations; conflict with laws or regulations; or
involve “other inappropriate circumstances”).
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Finally, in most cases, legislation must be filed with the state organs that
exercise the authority to review and annul or amend it. However, in some
cases, not all of these authorities are merged in the same entity. For example,
local regulations must be filed with the State Council. While the State Council
may review such regulations and identify problems, it does not exercise the
authority to amend or annul them.45 In other cases, laws provide that state
organs exercise the authority to review and annul or amend legislation, but
they do not mandate the filing of such legislation.46 In short, the authority to
amend or annul does not depend on prior filing. Despite these occasional
disparities, most Chinese sources refer to state organs that exercise the
authority to receive for filing, review, and annul and amend legislation as
“filing and review organs.” The article adopts this terminology. Specialized
filing and review offices within such organs are referred to as “filing and review
offices.”

B. The Problem of Capacity as Both a Challenge and an Opportunity
Capacity problems are a core focus of the international development
community. The UNDP defines capacity as “the ability of individuals,
institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and
achieve objectives in a sustainable manner.”47 Capacity development is shaped
by interrelated factors that include human and financial resources;
organizational arrangements; the skills, experiences, and incentives of
individuals tasked with carrying out an organization’s functions; and the
constraints of the socio-political environment in which organizations
operate.48 International agencies have emphasized capacity development as a
45

For example, the State Council reviews local regulations but may not amend or
annul such regulations. Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 89.
46

For example, under the Constitution and the Supervision Law, the NPCSC may
annul or amend State Council “decisions” and “orders.” Constitution, supra note 9, art.
67(7); Supervision Law, supra note 38, art. 29. However, these sources of law do not
mandate the filing of such decisions and orders with the NPCSC.
47

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: MEASURING
CAPACITY 2 (2010). The OECD has adopted a similar definition of capacity as “the ability
of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully.”
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION, THE CHALLENGE OF
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: WORKING TOWARDS GOOD PRACTICE 12 (2006).
48
Development agencies have slightly different formulations of the same basic set
of factors. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION,
supra note 47; The WORLD BANK, THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS FRAMEWORK 9–11
(June 2009); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT
PRACTICE NOTE (Aug. 2008).
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key to the realization of economic development and governance goals. They
have also stressed the importance of local ownership and the need to consider
local socio-political contexts in designing aid programs.49
Such priorities have shaped international legal reform initiatives. In the
1990s, the World Bank, UNDP, and other agencies began to promote “rule of
law” as a core component of their development agendas.50 These efforts have
focused heavily on institution building. International agencies have worked
with governments to promulgate legislation; strengthen courts and alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms; train judges and administrators; and build the
capacity of the legal profession and civil society organizations. 51 Projects
related to legislative conflicts have been no exception, with international
agencies such as the UNDP stressing the need to “enhance the capacities” of
courts and local filing and review organs.52
Efforts to cope with capacity problems may catalyze legal innovation and
prompt deviations from existing legal norms. In the United States, the capacity
limitations of enforcement agencies are cited as one rationale for “private
attorney general” provisions that empower citizens to bring enforcement
claims in a variety of legal contexts.53 The limited capacity of Congress to
address the many specialized regulatory issues that arise in a complex
economy has prompted legislators to delegate substantial authority to

49

See, e.g., “Monterrey Must Be a Success,” Keynote Address of IMF Director
Michael Camdessus, Conference on “Financing for Development: Regional Challenges
and the Role of Regional Development Banks,” Wash. D.C., Feb. 19, 2002; THE WORLD
BANK, PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS, Mar. 2, 2005; THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 48, at 9–11.
50

See generally, Trubek, supra note 28; Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival,
in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 3–13 (Thomas
Carothers ed., 2006).
51

THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 1–4 (2002); Carothers,
supra note 50, at 7–8; Trubek, supra note 28, at 86–93. Of course, many of these efforts
have been criticized. Common critiques include continued knowledge deficiencies;
overemphasis on legal transplants and top-down institutional reforms; overemphasis
on courts and judicial training; the application of “one size fits all” best practices; and
the failure to cultivate local ownership of reforms. See generally, Trubek, supra note 28;
Carothers, supra note 31; Channell, supra note 31, at 137–59; Randall Peerenboom,
Michael Zurn & Andre Nollkaemper, Conclusion: From Rule of Law Promotion to Rule of
Law Dynamics (posted to the Social Science Research Network on Oct. 15, 2011).
52

See, e.g., EC-UNDP Governance for Equitable Development Programme
Strengthens Rule of Law in China, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, June 25,
2012.
53

William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is and Why it
Matters, 57 VANDERBILT L. REV. 2129, 2149–52 (2004).
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unelected regulators. 54 Overburdened law enforcement agencies rely on
constructive community relationships for effective policing. This dynamic has
been cited as one rationale for promoting diversity in law enforcement and for
not inquiring about the immigration status of individuals who report crimes.55
Outside of the United States, the complexity of enforcing constitutional socioeconomic rights provisions through formal adjudication has prompted the
South African Constitutional Court to order parties to reach negotiated
settlements in such cases.56 These are but a few of many examples that could
be cited.
Capacity challenges shape law and governance in China in important
ways. The large, complex Chinese state has long been plagued by problems of
capacity and information flow in monitoring lower-level officials and
implementing central legislation and policies.57 In the Mao era, the Partystate58 employed campaign-style mobilization to harness the energy of the
masses, advance the Party’s agenda, and impose ideological discipline.
Although the Party-state has moved away from mass campaigns as a principal
tool for controlling bureaucratism and corruption in the post-Mao era, such
mobilization strategies have persisted in some contexts, as periodic “Strike
Hard” anti-crime campaigns and other campaigns illustrate.59 On a broader
54

Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–94 (1987).
55

David A. Salansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the
New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1228
(2006); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and
Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, § IV
(2012).
56

Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanisms to
Develop Constitutional Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 797,
834–43 (2009).
57

For three thoughtful studies discussing principal-agent problems in China (both
historical and contemporary), see generally Kevin J. O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective
Policy Implementation in Rural China, 31 COMP. POL. 167 (Jan. 1999); Murray Scot Tanner
& Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central Versus Local Control over Policing
and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China, 2007 CHINA Q. 644 (2007) (focusing on control
of local policing); Carl Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of
Local Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INTL. L. 53 (2009) (discussing the role of responsibility
systems in addressing principal-agent problems).
58

The Constitution enshrines the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party.
State institutions are integrated with the Party and subject to Party control. This article
uses the term “Party-state” to refer generally to China’s institutions of governance.
59

For the turn away from mass campaigns, see O’Brien, supra note 57. For the
limited use of campaigns in the Mao era and related post-Mao mobilization strategies,
see LUBMAN, supra note 26, at 41–43, 84–87, 131–35.
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level, post-Mao reforms that decentralized governance and promoted the
development of a socialist market economy were in part the product of an
understanding that the central command economy could not deliver the
economic growth necessary to achieve China’s development goals.60
Efforts to address capacity problems shape the operation of legal
institutions in China. For example, public participation mechanisms allow
lawmakers to tap into the knowledge and preferences of China’s large
population in drafting legislation.61 Public input supplements the work of
central legislative organs with only limited capacity to understand the myriad
of issues, experiences, and local conditions relevant to legislation. China’s
modern letters and visits system is a governance tool designed to provide a
stream of information to higher-level authorities and assist them in the
difficult task of monitoring lower-level officials. 62 Similarly, the 1989
Administrative Litigation Law provided a concrete statutory framework and
specific procedures through which Chinese citizens could challenge a range of
administrative acts in the people’s courts. The law was designed to enlist
courts and citizens in the project of monitoring lower-level officials.63
Some legislation, institutions, and processes designed to address capacity
challenges may generate new complexities and capacity problems. For
example, in the 1980s, the Party-state revived the cadre responsibility system.
Under this system, the center monitors the work of lower-level officials by
requiring them to meet a range of hard economic, stability, and governance
targets. Promotions in the bureaucracy, as well as punishments for poor
performance, are tied to these targets. 64 This system creates competition
among local governments and leaders. As O’Brien and Minzner have
demonstrated, cadre responsibility systems may in practice incentivize lowerlevel officials to engage in behavior (including the adoption of local
legislation) that conflicts with or undermines some central legislation,
policies, or objectives. Local officials do so in order to meet the targets that are
most important in their evaluations.65 The devolution of lawmaking authority

60

BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN 74, 189, 314 (1996).

61

Horsley, supra note 20, at 291–92; Meng Na, Making All Draft Laws Public, a New
Step to Improve Legislation Quality, Xinhua Wang (
) [XINHUA], Apr. 24, 2008.
62

Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 103, 117–18 (2006).
63

Pitman B. Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial Review
and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 288–89 (Pitman
Potter ed., 1994).
64

For discussions of cadre responsibility systems, see generally O’Brien, supra note
57; Minzner, supra note 57, at 56–59, 75.
65

90–98.

O’Brien, supra note 57, at 172–75, 180; Minzner, supra note 57, at 56–59, 66, 75,
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in the post-Mao era has given local officials greater leeway to protect their
interests.
China’s post-promulgation filing and review system is plagued by
interrelated and multidimensional problems of capacity. As we will see below,
filing and review organs face problems of organizational capacity. Specifically,
they lack the financial and human resources necessary to review the large
volume of legislation generated each year in an efficient and comprehensive
manner. Even for the subset of legislation that can be reviewed, filing and
review organs face problems of technical capacity. Staff members responsible
for review may lack the necessary education and training to identify conflicts
effectively. Moreover, many legislative conflicts are difficult to discover in the
abstract and only become clear after the relevant provisions are actually
implemented. Even in situations where staff members are well trained in
specific fields of law and it is feasible to identify conflicts in the abstract, they
may lack detailed and specialized knowledge of the many different fields of
law that would be necessary to review new legislation for conflicts with all
existing legislation. The legal capacity of filing and review organs is also
limited to the review of defined categories of legislation.
Finally, while filing and review organs may in theory have the
constitutional authority to annul or amend conflicting lower-level legislation,
they often lack the political capacity to exercise this formal authority in
practice. The problem of political capacity is itself multidimensional. Political
capacity is limited by power relations that are inconsistent with formal filing
and review authorities, the relationship between state and Party organs, and
the need to maintain the appearance of unity under Party leadership. As we
will see, it is also limited by conventions that place heavy emphasis on
consultation and consensus building, the dependence of filing and review
organs on the voluntary compliance and cooperation of organs they supervise,
and the fact that many legislative conflicts involve sensitive constitutional
issues.
Recognizing the problem of capacity and its multiple dimensions provides
an essential foundation for understanding the structure, development, and
practice of the filing and review system and the ways in which this system
interacts with and empowers other legal actors. As Perry Keller observed in
1994, the operation of China’s formal legislative order is defined by “pragmatic
responses to political and institutional realities.” These adaptations shape a
system that is both “riddled with ambiguities and inconsistencies” and in
which no “single institution” is capable of imposing order.66 As the following
section demonstrates, China’s filing and review system has been shaped by
pragmatic responses to problems of capacity.

66

Keller, supra note 11, at 740.
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C.

The Evolution of the Filing and Review System

The filing and review system has evolved in three major stages. In the first
stage, China established a constitutional infrastructure and a basic filing
system for legislation. The second stage involved the adoption and
implementation of the Legislation Law, a constitutional statute designed to
bring order to China’s legislative system. The third stage began with the
adoption of the PRC Supervision Law, a statute that expanded the scope of
filing and review to judicial interpretations and normative documents. During
this stage, local filing and review mechanisms expanded rapidly.

i. China’s Constitutional Infrastructure and Early Supervision Efforts
Although China’s legislative system has been addressed in detail
elsewhere, a brief overview provides a necessary foundation for this discussion.
The 1982 PRC Constitution, the Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses
and People’s Governments (“Local Organic Law”), the Organic Law of the
NPC, and the Organic Law of the State Council established a basic framework
for the exercise of legislative power in China.67 Under China’s unitary system,
the NPC is the supreme organ of state power and, together with its Standing
Committee, adopts laws and supervises enforcement of the Constitution.68
Within this unitary structure, other state organs, including the State Council
(China’s highest administrative organ), State Council ministries and
commissions, and local people’s congresses and people’s governments (of
provinces, autonomous regions, and large cities) are authorized to issue
different types of legislation, provided that such legislation does not conflict
with legislation at higher levels in the hierarchy.69
The Constitution and organic laws set out a basic system for supervising
this legislative hierarchy. The NPC is empowered to amend or annul
“inappropriate” decisions by its Standing Committee, while the NPCSC is
empowered to annul (1) State Council administrative regulations, decisions,
67

Constitution, supra note 9, art. 5; Local Organic Law, supra note 21; Quanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zuzhifa (
) [NPC Organic Law]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 10, 1982, effective Dec. 10, 1982);
Guowuyuan Zuzhifa (
) [State Council Organic Law] (promulgated by
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 10, 1982, effective Dec. 10, 1982).
68

(
69

Constitution, supra note 9, art. 57; Hu Jinguang (
) & Han Dayuan
), Zhongguo Xianfa (
) [CHINA’S CONSTITUTION] 375–76 (2007).

Constitution, supra note 9, arts. 61, 62, 67, 89, 90, 99, 100, 107; Local Organic
Law, supra note 21, arts. 7, 60; State Council Organic Law, supra note 67, art. 10. The
framework for local legislation (including local regulations issued by people’s
congresses at the large city level and all local rules) was expanded gradually and did not
take complete form until 1995. 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 8–9.

Understanding China’s System for Addressing Legislative Conflicts

161

and orders that conflict with the Constitution or law and (2) local regulations
or decisions of provincial-level people’s congresses that conflict with the
Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations. The State Council is
empowered to amend or annul (1) inappropriate orders, directives, and rules
issued by its ministries and commissions and (2) decisions and orders issued
by local people’s governments at various levels. 70 This basic structure is
replicated at lower levels of the system.71
In the 1980s, formal reporting and review of legislation was limited. Early
provisions set out only general filing requirements. The Constitution and Local
Organic Law provided for the reporting of local regulations and local rules to
higher-level organs. 72 Provincial-level people’s congresses began reporting
local regulations to the NPCSC in 1979.73 In practice, various divisions of the
NPCSC General Office coordinated supervision work for the filed regulations.74

70
For this central-level structure, see Constitution, supra note 9, arts. 62(11), 67
(7)–(8), 89(13)–(14). Unless otherwise indicated, references to “provincial-level” people’s
congresses or people’s governments include people’s congresses and people’s
governments of provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally administered
municipalities.
71

Local people’s congresses are empowered to alter or annul “inappropriate”
decisions of their standing committees, while local people’s congress standing
committees are empowered to alter or annul (1) “inappropriate” decisions and orders by
people’s governments at the corresponding level or (2) inappropriate resolutions issued
by people’s congresses or their standing committees at the next lower level.
Constitution, supra note 9, arts. 99, 104; Local Organic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 9, 44.
Finally, people’s governments at the local level are empowered to alter or annul
“inappropriate” decisions of their subordinate departments and people’s governments
at the next lower level. Constitution, supra note 9, art. 108; Local Organic Law, supra
note 21, art. 59. There is some inconsistency in the Constitution and the Local Organic
Law here. The Local Organic Law refers to the power of local people’s governments to
annul or amend orders or directives of their subordinate departments and decisions
and orders of people’s governments at lower levels.
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Constitution, supra note 9, art. 100 (local regulations adopted by local people’s
congresses shall be reported to the NPCSC); Local Organic Law, supra note 21, art. 60.
Such legislation was reported “for the record.” On its face, these provisions suggest that
legislation was filed primarily for recording purposes. However, other provisions of the
Constitution and Local Organic Law provide for the annulment and amendment of
conflicting lower-level legislation. Moreover, the NPC Organic Law provides that NPC
special committees should examine and submit reports on lower-level legislation that
violates the Constitution or law. NPC Organic Law, supra note 67, art. 37(3). As such,
NPC organs could engage in a review of legislation filed for the record.
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2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 17.

According to Cai Dingjian, the General Office Coordination Bureau and the
General Office Secretariat coordinated filing and review work under the 7th and 8th
National People’s Congresses, respectively. Cai Dingjian (
), Fagui Bei’an Shencha
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The NPCSC reviewed local legislation in 1982 and uncovered a small number
of conflicts, the majority of which promulgating organs corrected. The NPCSC
later suspended this work after the adoption of the NPC Organic Law created
uncertainty about the scope of its supervision authority.75
More systematic filing and review work began in the late 1980s. In 1987,
the NPCSC and State Council issued terse notices requiring local regulations
and rules to be reported within set time periods.76 In 1993, the NPCSC resumed
active review of local regulations. This work was coordinated by the NPCSC
General Office and carried out by NPC special committees. NPC special
committees received 6,300 local regulations for review from 1993 to mid-2000.
They completed review of 3,100 regulations and identified 90 that conflicted
with higher-level legislation. Such conflicts were addressed primarily through
consultation with promulgating organs. Local people’s congresses were not
very cooperative, however, replying with feedback on only eight regulations
and correcting only one. In most cases, if local people’s congresses refused to
amend the conflicting provisions, the NPCSC simply dropped the matter.77
The State Council established a separate filing and review system. The
State Council mandated the reporting of rules in 1987, but it did not establish
detailed procedures for review work until it issued the Provisions on Filing of
Regulations and Rules in 1990 (“1990 Filing Provisions”).78 The 1990 Filing
Provisions set out the scope of local regulations and rules to be reported,
established the State Council Legislative Affairs Bureau as the principal office
Bu Shi Weixian Shencha (
) [Filing and Review of Regulations
Is Not Constitutional Review], Zhongguo Mingshang Falü Wang (
)
[CHINA CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW ONLINE], June 16, 2007.
75

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 17; Zhu, supra note 2, at 132.
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Guanyu Difang Zhengfu he Guowuyuan Ge Bumen Guizhang Bei’an Gongzuo de
Tongzhi (
) [Notice on Local
Government and State Council Department Filing Work for Rules] (promulgated by
State Council General Office, Mar. 7, 1987, effective Mar. 7, 1987) (Chinalawinfo)
[hereinafter 1987 Filing Notice]; Guanyu Difangxing Fagui Bei’an Gongzuo de Tongzhi
(
) [Notice on Local Regulation Filing Work]
(promulgated by NPCSC General Office, State Council General Office, May 25, 1987,
effective May 25, 1987) (Chinalawinfo).
77

For these early NPCSC efforts, see Cai, supra note 5, at 52–54; Zhu, supra note 24,
at 637 (citing Cai Dingjian); and Wen Ye (
) & Zhang Yixuan (
), Quanguo
Renda Fagongwei Shencha Bei’an Shi de Xinzhang, Bing Bu Biaozhi zhe Zhongguo
Weixian Shencha Jizhi de Qidong (
) [NPCSC LAC Review and Filing Office Establishment Does
Not Mark the Initiation of Constitutional Review in China], Xinwen Zhoukan (
)
[NEWS WEEKLY ONLINE], June 29, 2004.
78

Cai, supra note 5, at 54; Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Guiding (
)
[Provisions on the Filing of Regulations and Rules] (promulgated by St. Council, Feb.
18, 1990, effective Feb. 18, 1990) (Chinalawinfo).
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responsible for filing and review work, and set out procedures and standards
for reporting and review. As of June 2002, the State Council had received a
total of 29,000 local regulations, autonomous regulations, and rules for filing.79
During this period, the State Council resolved most conflicts through
consultation.80
While establishing a rudimentary framework for filing and review, these
early efforts did little to address China’s growing legislative disorder. The
respective legislative powers of state organs were not clearly defined, making it
difficult to resolve conflicts.81 The supervision system also suffered from severe
capacity problems. Some organs failed to report promulgated legislation (or to
report it in a timely manner).82 The NPCSC and State Council did not have the
organizational capacity to review the flood of legislation that lower-level
organs filed annually, much less discipline organs that failed to report
legislation or resolve difficult conflicts under the existing framework.83 The
State Council office responsible for filing and review had only twenty staff
members and was forced to abandon active review of all filed legislation.
Instead, it decided to review legislation only when other state organs or
citizens complained about conflicts.84 NPC special committees, which faced
heavy legislative drafting burdens, could not conduct review work in a
systematic manner.85 Despite early efforts to address such deficiencies, the
problem of legislative conflicts only grew worse. As of 1997, the NPCSC had yet
to complete its review of local regulations reported in 1994!86 In a speech
several years later, NPCSC Chairman Li Peng acknowledged that special
committees lacked the capacity to handle all filed legislation.87 Moreover, as
indicated above, promulgating organs sometimes refused to amend or annul
even the small number of conflicts that were discovered.
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Zhu, supra note 2, at 161.
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Cai, supra note 5, at 54.
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Jihong Mo, The Constitutional Law of the People’s Republic of China, 23 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 139, 181–82 (2008).
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Zhu, supra note 2, at 167; Legislative Conflict Resolution Channels, supra note 10
(comments of Xu Zhiqun).
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Keller, supra note 11, at 18; Yahong Li, The Law-making Law: A Solution to the
Problems of the Chinese Legislative System?, 30 H.K. L. J. 120, 124–25 (2000).
84

Zhu, supra note 2, at 167; Cai, supra note 5, at 54.
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Huang, supra note 43, at 225–26.
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Cai, supra note 5, at 53–54.
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ZOU, supra note 24, at 100 (citing Li Peng speech published in the People’s Daily).
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ii. The PRC Legislation Law

As China’s legislative disorder intensified in the 1990s, the NPC began
work on a comprehensive law on legislation. The principal objectives for the
law were to delineate legislative powers more clearly, establish a detailed
legislative procedure, clarify the hierarchy of legislation and rules of
application in the event of conflicts, and strengthen the filing and review
system.88 At their core, all of these elements were designed to deal with
legislative disorder and promote administration in accordance with law.89
Initiated in 1993, the drafting of the Legislation Law took seven years and was
delayed by fierce intrastate bargaining and debate.90 Although weakened by
compromise and limited in scope, this constitutional statute was promulgated
in 2000 and catalyzed new development in the filing and review system.
The Legislation Law clarifies the categories of formal legislation and
corresponding legislative authorities in China. Under the Legislation Law
framework, the NPC (meeting in its annual plenary session) adopts “basic
laws” (
) (jiben falü) (laws governing “criminal offenses, civil affairs,
state organs, and other matters”) and “laws” (
) (falü); the NPCSC adopts
laws (
) (falü) and may supplement or amend laws adopted by the NPC;
the State Council adopts administrative regulations (
) (xingzheng
fagui); provincial-level people’s congresses, the people’s congresses of
comparatively large cities, and the standing committees of these people’s
congresses adopt local regulations (
) (difangxing fagui);
autonomous regions adopt autonomous regulations (
) (zizhi tiaoli) or
separate regulations (
) (danxing tiaoli); special economic zones
(SEZs) adopt regulations (
) (fagui); and State Council ministries and
commissions, as well as provincial-level people’s governments, issue rules (
) (guizhang).91 The Legislation Law reserved exclusive legislative authority
88

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 4; Zhiding “Lifa Fa” Quebao Lifa
“
”
) [Promulgate the Legislation
Huodong Gengjia Guifan (
Law, Ensure that Legislative Activities Are More Standardized], Renmin Wang (
)
[PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Mar. 9, 2000.
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Lianghui Zhuanti: “Lifa Fa” Jiejue Fa yu Fa de Chongtu (
: “
”
) [Two Meetings Special Topic: the “Legislation Law” Resolves
Conflicts of Law], Beijing Chenbao (
) [BEIJING MORNING NEWS ONLINE], Mar. 12,
2000; Li, supra note 83.
90

The drafting process was marked by debates between the NPC and State Council
and between central and local state organs. For excellent accounts of the difficult
drafting process, see generally Paler, supra note 6, and Li, supra note 83.
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Legislation Law, supra note 21, arts. 2, 7, 56, 63, 65, 66, 71, 73. With regard to the
legislative authority of the NPC, the Legislation Law refers only to the authority to
promulgate “basic laws” in Article 7. However, as the NPCSC Legislative Affairs
Commission explains, this provision does not imply that the full NPC cannot adopt
laws other than basic laws. LEGISLATION LAW EXPLANATION, supra note 44, at 25.
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for the NPC and NPCSC on a range of matters. It delineated the respective
legislative powers of the NPC and State Council and the central and local
governments more clearly.92 It also expanded the scope of entities authorized
to enact rules.93 With minor modifications and clarifications, the Legislation
Law largely confirmed the existing structure of legislative authority established
under the Constitution and the organic laws. The Legislation Law applied only
to the categories of legislation above and did not address the broader range of
normative documents that were contributing to China’s legislative disorder.94
Chapter Five of the Legislation Law establishes three related but distinct
mechanisms for resolving legislative conflicts. First, it clarifies China’s
legislative hierarchy and lays down rules for applying legislation in the event
two effective legislative provisions conflict (“conflicts rules”). Under these
rules, the legal effect of the Constitution is highest; the legal effect of laws is
higher than that of administrative regulations, local regulations, and rules; the
legal effect of local regulations is higher than that of provincial-level people’s
government rules; and the legal effect of provincial-level people’s government
rules is higher than that of rules issued by the people’s governments of
comparatively large cities.95 The law also sets out rules for determining the
92

Legislation Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 9, 10, 63–67, 77; Paler, supra note 6, at
306–10.
93

The Constitution provides only that ministries and commissions may enact
rules. The Legislation Law expanded rulemaking authority to “State Council ministries
and commissions, the People’s Bank of China, the National Audit Office, and other
organs directly under the State Council that are endowed with administrative
functions.” The Legislative System of China, supra note 1 (“Regulation Making by
Departments of the State Council”); Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 71.
94

Chen, supra note 5, at 245–46; Huang, supra note 43, at 208. An early draft of the
Legislation Law addressed normative documents. Legislation Law Roundtable, supra
note 10, at 124.
95

Legislation Law, supra note 21, arts. 78–80. According to the Legislation Law,
“comparatively large cities” include provincial capitals, SEZs, and cities designated as
such by the State Council. Presently, there are 49 comparatively large cities in China.
For a list and related discussion, see “Jiao Da de Shi” Lifa Youguan Qingquang Zongshu
(“
”
”) [Summary of the Relevant Legislative Status of
“Comparatively Large Cities”], Zhongguo Renda Wang (
) [THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG. ONLINE], Apr. 14, 2009. It should be noted here that while the NPC exercises the
authority to amend or annul laws adopted by the NPCSC, basic laws (adopted by the
NPC meeting in its plenary session) and other laws (adopted by the NPCSC) have equal
status in the legislative hierarchy. Conflicts between basic laws and other laws are
considered horizontal conflicts. Horizontal Legislative Conflicts, supra note 16
(statements of Fang Jun, Vice Head of the State Council Legal Affairs Office
Administrative Reconsideration Department; Li Guangyu, Vice Head of the SPC
Administrative Tribunal; Huang Haihua, Vice Head of the Administrative Law Office of
the NPCSC LAC).
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legal effectiveness of conflicting provisions enacted by the same entity. For
example, if two such provisions are inconsistent, special provisions take
priority over general provisions and new provisions take priority over old
provisions.96 There are some limited exceptions to these general conflicts
rules.97
Second, Chapter Five establishes a procedure and delineates the related
authorities for adjudicating conflicts when the conflicts rules are difficult to
apply or do not establish a clear priority. For example, the relative status of
local regulations and the rules of State Council ministries is not clearly set out.
In the event of a conflict or inconsistency, the State Council makes a
recommendation. In the event the State Council recommends prioritizing the
ministry rule, the NPCSC ultimately determines the provision that should
apply. In the event of an inconsistency between rules governing the same
matter, the State Council determines the rule that applies. Other procedures
address inconsistencies between new general and old specific laws and other
difficult conflicts.98
The final part of Chapter Five (Articles 87–92) provides concrete rules and
procedures for (1) the filing and review of legislation and (2) the annulment or
amendment of conflicting or inappropriate legislation. Article 89 sets out the
filing requirements for each type of legislation. Article 87 sets out the
circumstances in which filing and review organs may amend or annul lowerlevel legislation. These include situations in which promulgating organs
exceed their legislative powers; legislation at a lower level contravenes that at
higher levels; there are inconsistent provisions or rules and it is determined
that one rule should be amended or annulled; rules are “inappropriate”; or
promulgating organs violate legal procedures. Article 88 sets out the
authorities for amending or annulling such problematic legislation. 99 This
96

Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 83.

97

For example, autonomous regions and prefectures may enact autonomous and
separate regulations. Such regulations may contain “flexible” (
) (biantong)
provisions that alter the effect of laws and administrative regulations to take account of
the characteristics of local nationalities. However, such provisions may not contravene
the basic principles of higher-level legislation. Such regulations must be submitted to
the NPCSC for approval. Id. at arts. 66–67, 81. If a provincial-level people’s government
rule is authorized by law or administrative regulation and it is inconsistent with a local
regulation, the local regulation does not automatically have higher legal effect. If the
local regulation conflicts with the authorizing law or administrative regulation, it
should not be applied. LEGISLATION LAW EXPLANATION, supra note 44, at 233. The
Legislation Law also allows for some inconsistency between rules if application of the
rule in question can be confined to the specific jurisdiction of the ministry or local
government that issued it. Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 82.
98
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Id. at arts. 83, 85, 86.

Under Article 88, the NPC is empowered to amend or annul “inappropriate”
NPCSC laws and autonomous or separate regulations approved by the NPCSC that
contravene the Constitution or Article 66(2) of the Legislation Law; the NPCSC is
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provision largely confirms the basic division of legislative supervision
authority set out in the Constitution.100 Although scholars pressed for the
establishment of a constitutional supervision committee to carry out these
supervisory functions, such efforts ultimately failed.101
Articles 90 and 91 establish a basic procedure for the review of legislation.
Article 90(1) provides that certain state organs at the central and local level
may submit requests to the NPCSC for the review of administrative
regulations, local regulations, or autonomous or separate regulations if they
believe such legislation conflicts with the Constitution or law. Article 90(2)
provides that other state organs, public organizations, enterprises, or citizens
may submit proposals to the NPCSC for review of the same legislation. Formal
review of Article 90(1) requests is mandatory, while formal review of Article
90(2) proposals is discretionary. Article 91 lays out a basic procedure for the
NPCSC and NPC special committees to review lower-level legislation. It also
provides that other state organs with review authority shall formulate their
own procedures.
These sections contain some inconsistencies and ambiguities. For
example, the NPCSC is empowered to “amend or annul” local regulations of
provincial-level people’s congresses or their standing committees that “conflict
with” higher-level legislation, but it is only empowered to “annul” autonomous
regulations or separate regulations that “violate” the Constitution or Article 66
of the Law. As noted in Part II(A), the law does not include definitions of these
terms. Confusingly, Article 87 provides that organs authorized to amend or
annul legislation under Article 88 may do so “in accordance with the limits of
their power.” However, the provisions in Article 88 that define the limits of
supervisory power are not entirely consistent with the standards for
empowered to annul administrative regulations that conflict with the Constitution and
laws, local regulations that conflict with the Constitution, laws, or administrative
regulations, and autonomous or separate regulations approved by standing committees
of provincial-level people’s congresses that contravene the Constitution or Article
66(2); the State Council is empowered to alter or annul “inappropriate” rules issued by
its ministries and commissions and “inappropriate” local government rules; provinciallevel people’s congresses are empowered to alter or annul “inappropriate” local
regulations issued by their standing committees; standing committees of local people’s
congresses are empowered to alter or annul “inappropriate” rules issued by local
governments at the same level; provincial-level people’s governments are empowered
to alter or annul “inappropriate” rules issued by people’s governments at the next lower
level; and authorizing organs are empowered to alter or annul regulations promulgated
by the authorized organ. Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 88.
100

There are some disparities in language and scope. For example, the Legislation
Law empowers the NPC to alter or annul “laws” rather than “decisions” adopted by its
Standing Committee. The State Council is empowered to alter or annul local
government rules rather than “orders” or “decisions.”
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Li, supra note 83, at 134–36.
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amendment or annulment set out in Article 87.102 To an outside observer, such
internal inconsistency and ambiguity is puzzling given the core purpose of the
Legislation Law.103
Although observers sometimes conflate the various conflict resolution
mechanisms set out in Chapter Five, it is important to recognize that these
mechanisms are distinct. As the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission
explains, the conflicts rules are designed to provide a framework for choosing
and applying legislative provisions according to their relative rank.104 The
adjudication provisions establish a mechanism for determining the legislation
that controls when the conflicts rules do not establish a clear priority or are
difficult to apply. 105 Finally, provisions on filing, review, and correction
(amendment or annulment) establish authorities and procedures for the
systematic tracking, evaluation, and elimination of legislative conflicts.
Chinese officials refer to these as distinct conflict resolution mechanisms.106

iii. The PRC Supervision Law
In 2006, the NPC promulgated the PRC Law on Supervision by the
Standing Committees of People’s Congress at All Levels.107 The Supervision
Law is one part of a long-term effort to strengthen the people’s congress
system. 108 Vague constitutional and legal provisions on people’s congress
supervision had undermined the ability of people’s congresses to fulfill their

102

For example, Articles 87(3) and 88 use different terms to refer to conflicts.
Moreover, in Article 88, no supervisory organ is given the explicit power to annul
legislation for the procedural violations set out in Article 87(5).
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Although Chinese scholars criticized the Legislation Law for failing to provide
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concerns about the other inconsistencies noted here.
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LEGISLATION LAW EXPLANATION, supra note 44, at 231.
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(
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the Application (of Legislation) When Facing Legislative Conflicts], Dec. 19, 2006 (citing
NPSC LAC Director Gu Angran) [hereinafter Discussion of Authority].
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Supervision Law, supra note 38, art. 30.

Jiandu Fa: Maixiang Minzhu Zhengzhi de Zhongyao Yibu (
) [Supervision Law: An Important Step Towards Democratic Politics],
Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Sep. 6, 2006; Baozhang Renda Jiandu
Gongzuo de Zhongyao Jucuo (
) [Guarantee the Important
Role of People’s Congress Supervision Work], Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE], Sep. 15, 2006.
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formal constitutional duties in practice. 109 Although people’s congress
representatives had pressed for the adoption of a detailed Supervision Law for
more than two decades, drafting of the statute did not begin until 2002.110 The
Supervision Law addresses a broad range of issues, including deliberation over
government and judicial work reports, budgetary supervision and auditing,
and the formation of committees of special inquiry. It also expands the filing
and review system.
The Supervision Law expands the scope of filing and review in two
significant respects. First, it mandates the review of a limited range of
normative documents such as “resolutions” and “orders.” Scholars had
criticized the Legislation Law for its failure to address normative documents.
The Supervision Law provides that people’s congress standing committees at
the county level and above shall establish procedures for reviewing and
annulling (1) inappropriate resolutions (
) (jueyi) issued by people’s
congresses and their standing committees at the next lower level and (2)
) (jueding) and orders (
) (mingling) issued by
inappropriate decisions (
people’s governments at the corresponding level. The Supervision Law also
provides the first statutory definition of “inappropriate,” a term that had
generated controversy.111
Second, the Supervision Law provides a statutory basis and procedures for
the review of SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”) judicial
interpretations. The NPC Chairmen’s Council issued internal procedures for
the filing and review of judicial interpretations in 2005.112 The Supervision Law
incorporates requirements for the filing and review of such judicial
interpretations into national law. Article 31 requires judicial interpretations to
be filed with the NPCSC within thirty days of issuance. Article 32 provides that
key state organs may request, and other state organs, citizens, and enterprises
may propose the review of judicial interpretations. Article 33 provides for
consultation with the SPC and SPP and the amendment or annulment of
judicial interpretations that are found to conflict with laws. In establishing
109

Young Nam Cho, From “Rubber Stamps” to “Iron Stamps”: The Emergence of
Chinese Local People’s Congresses as Supervisory Powerhouses, 171 CHINA Q. 724, 731
(2002).
110
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Wang (
) [XINHUA], Aug. 27, 2006.
111

Hu Yuhong (
), Jiandu Fa Dui Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Jizhi de
Wanshan yu Buzu (
)
[Improvements and Deficiencies of the Supervision Law with Respect to the Mechanism
for Filing and Review of Normative Documents], Xuexi Luntan (
) [STUDY
FORUM], no. 23, 2007, at 79.
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these procedures, the Supervision Law treats judicial interpretations as a type
of normative document.113 Although the term “judicial interpretations” is not
defined in the law, Chinese scholars argue that the requirements in the
Supervision Law apply to only a subset of judicial interpretations.114
The Supervision Law represented a significant step in the evolution of the
filing and review system. As discussed below in Part II(E), the law catalyzed
the development of filing and review systems at the local level. However, it
also left key issues unaddressed. Oddly, while bringing certain normative
documents within the scope of review, the Supervision Law contained no
mandates for the filing of such documents. The six provisions related to filing
and review are quite general, do not provide specific time limits or other
requirements for review, and do not address conflicts or inconsistencies
between decisions and orders at the same level.115 The Supervision Law also
opened the door to inconsistent local filing and review systems by providing
only a general mandate to establish procedures for such systems “with
reference to” the Legislation Law. 116 Finally, Chinese scholars viewed the
creation of a specialized constitutional supervision committee as a necessary
step to address persistent capacity problems in the filing and review process.
However, the NPC once again refused to provide for such a committee in the
Supervision Law.117 In grappling with capacity limitations in the filing and
review system, the drafters of the Supervision Law left gaps and created the
potential for some new conflicts and questions.
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D. Supervision Organs, Work Procedures, and Practice at the Central Level
Under current practices, the NPCSC Legislative Affairs Commission (
) (fazhi gongzuo weiyuanhui) (“NPCSC LAC”) and the State Council
Legislative Affairs Office (
) (fazhi bangongshi) (“State Council
LAO”) play central roles in the filing and review process. The NPCSC LAC is a
work organ that consists of ten specialized offices ( ) (shi) and has a staff of
approximately 200 full-time professionals.118 Similarly, the State Council LAO
is an administrative office specializing in legal affairs and staffed by full-time
professionals.119 Both entities provide legal research and opinions and are
heavily involved in legislative drafting.120
In practice, both the NPCSC LAC and the State Council LAO exercise
considerable authority in China’s legislative order. For example, the NPCSC
forwards most requests for interpretations of national law to the LAC.121 The
LAC publishes answers to questions on legal issues and explanations of
statutes that are respected as authoritative in practice.122 It also drafts formal
legal interpretations that are vetted and issued by the NPCSC.123 Neither entity
possesses any formal constitutional authority to order the annulment or
amendment of conflicting lower-level legislation or to issue binding rulings on
legislative conflicts. However, the SPC solicits the opinions of the LAC and
118
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LAO, rather than the full NPCSC and State Council, on some legislative
conflicts.124 These organs also play important roles in managing the filing and
review process and coordinating with promulgating organs to resolve conflicts.
The adoption of the Legislation Law catalyzed the development of filing
and review procedures. At the NPC level, the NPCSC Chairmen’s Council
issued detailed work procedures for legislative review in 2000 and amended
them in 2003.125 In 2005, the NPC Chairmen’s Council revised the Work
Procedures again and also adopted a work procedure for the filing and review
of SPC and SPP judicial interpretations (“Judicial Interpretation Filing and
Review Procedures”). Strangely, while Chinese media described the procedures
in detail, the full texts of the 2005 Work Procedures and Judicial Interpretation
Filing and Review Procedures were never made widely available to the
public.126 Nonetheless, copies of the full text of the 2005 Work Procedures
appeared on several obscure websites.127
In 2004, the NPCSC LAC established a special administrative office called
the Filing and Review Office for Regulations (
) (fagui bei’an
shencha shi) (“Filing and Review Office”). This specialized administrative
office maintains a small staff of thirteen individuals and is divided into two
departments ( ) (chu), one responsible for “active” review of select filed
legislation and the other for “passive” review (review in response to a request
from another state organ or a citizen).128 Despite its name, the Filing and
124

Wang, supra note 122, at § 2(1).

125

Xingzheng Fagui, Difangxing Fagui, Zizhi Tiaoli he Danxing Tiaoli, Jingji Tequ
Fagui Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu (
) [Work Procedures for Filing and Review of
Administrative Regulations, Local Regulations, Autonomous and Separate Regulations,
and Special Economic Zone Regulations] (issued by the NPCSC Chairmen’s Council,
Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Work Procedures]; Quanguo Renda Changweihui
Jinyibu Jiaqiang Fagui Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo (
) [NPCSC Progressively Strengthens Regulation Filing and Review Work],
Xinhua Wang (
) [XINHUA], Aug. 15, 2003.
126

For detailed media discussion of the two procedures, see Quanguo Renda
Changweihui Mingque Weixian Shencha Chengxu (
)
) [BEIJING NEWS
[NPCSC Clarifies Constitutional Review Procedure], Xinjing Bao (
ONLINE], Dec. 20, 2010. In extensive searching, I have not been able to locate copies of
the full texts in any official source or mainstream Chinese legal database.
127

Xingzheng Fagui, Difangxing Fagui, Zizhi Tiaoli he Danxing Tiaoli, Jingji Tequ
Fagui Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu (
) [Work Procedures for Filing and Review of
Administrative Regulations, Local Regulations, Autonomous and Separate Regulations,
and Special Economic Zone Regulations] (issued by the NPCSC Chairmen’s Council,
Oct. 16, 2000, amended Aug. 15, 2003 & Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Work
Procedures].
128

Meeting with Filing and Review Office Officials, June 2012 (on file with author).
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Review Office is not responsible for accepting and registering filed legislation.
The NPCSC General Office performs this function. However, the Filing and
Review Office does take the lead in reviewing filed legislation.129 The work of
the Filing and Review Office lacks transparency, and Chinese experts have
criticized it as an inadequate body that cannot be considered a constitutional
review organ.130 Like the NPCSC LAC, the Filing and Review Office does not
have the formal authority to annul or amend legislation. Prior to the
establishment of the Filing and Review Office, the NPCSC General Office
Secretariat coordinated filing and review work.131
Chinese sources discuss different motivations for the establishment of the
Filing and Review Office. In a 2003 case that attracted national attention, three
legal scholars filed a proposal to review the constitutionality and legality of a
State Council administrative regulation on custody and repatriation for
vagrants and beggars. This event led to public calls for a more robust
constitutional review mechanism. Some Chinese sources suggest that the
creation of the Filing and Review Office was a response to such citizen
demands.132 Other sources argue that the office was established primarily
because the NPCSC, NPCSC LAC, and NPC special committees lack the
capacity to handle active review of even a portion of the legislation reported to

129

Id. For additional discussion of the office, see Cai, supra note 74.

130

Wang, supra note 34, at 277 (noting scholarly criticism and stating that while
the office has enhanced the professionalism of the review process, it exercises no
formal power and has been silent since its establishment); Jiu Fagui Shencha Bei’an Shi
de Sheli Fangtan: Lin Laifan Jiaoshou (
)
[Forum on the Establishment of the Filing and Review Office: Professor Lin Laifan],
Qingnian Shibao (
) [YOUTH TIMES], June 25, 2004 (the office is an early step
toward constitutional review but faces many constraints and limitations) [hereinafter
Establishment of the Filing and Review Office]; Wen & Zhang, supra note 77 (limited
staff cannot review thousands of regulations effectively and the office is not a
meaningful substitute for a constitutional supervision committee); Cai, supra note 74
(filing and review is not constitutional review; work of this office is not new; the office
lacks transparency and the capacity to review all regulations).
131
132

Meeting with Filing and Review Office Officials, June 2012 (on file with author).

Keith Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and
Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TNT’L L.
115, 149–53 (2006) (citing official Chinese news sources that connected the
establishment of the office to the Sun Zhigang case and subsequent calls for
constitutional supervision); Dingjian Cai, Social Transformation and the Development of
Constitutionalism, in CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW: LEGAL REFORM 1978–
2008, 64 (Dingjian Cai & Chenguang Wang eds., 2010) (NPCSC LAC established the
office in response to “social pressure”).
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the NPCSC each year.133 Filing and Review Office officials indicate the office
had been under consideration since 2000 and that no particular event
catalyzed its establishment.134 Regardless of the underlying motivation, it was
promoted as an example of government responsiveness to citizen demands.
The 2005 Work Procedures provide for both active and passive review of
administrative regulations, local regulations, autonomous and separate
regulations, and SEZ regulations. The First Secretariat of the NPCSC General
Office receives regulations for filing and processes requests for review from
key state organs. It then sends the legislation to one of the nine specialized
committees of the NPC and to the NPCSC LAC for study and review.135 The
Filing and Review Office receives and evaluates citizen review proposals and
only forwards them to the NPCSC General Office and specialized NPC
committees for review “if necessary.”136 In practice, the Filing and Review
Office carries out all preliminary review work and attempts to resolve conflicts
through informal consultation with the promulgating organ. If these efforts
are unsuccessful, the conflict is addressed through a complex, multi-stage
process of consultation and progressively higher levels of review. These
procedures are addressed in detail in Part III(D). According to Chinese
sources, the Judicial Interpretation Filing and Review Procedures are nearly
identical to the 2005 Work Procedures.137
As indicated above, the State Council has established its own filing and
review system separate from that of the NPCSC. Following the adoption of the
Legislation Law, the State Council adopted a new Regulation on Filing of
Regulations and Rules (“2001 Filing Regulation”) to replace the 1990 Filing
Provisions.138 The 2001 Filing Regulation was more detailed and conformed the
State Council’s filing and review process to the types of legislation and review
standards established in the Legislation Law.139 However, while the 1990 Filing
Provisions applied to all local and departmental normative documents, the
2001 Filing Regulation applies only to local regulations issued by the people’s
133
Wang, supra note 34, at 277; Wen & Zhang, supra note 77 (citing Filing and
Review Office employees who claim that the 2003 amendment of the Work Procedures
was the turning point for establishment of the office).
134

Meeting with Filing and Review Office Officials, June 2012 (on file with author).

135

2005 Work Procedures, supra note 127, arts. 5, 6.

136

Id., art. 7.

137

Wang, supra note 34, at 301, n. 45; 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 18, 39.

138

Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Tiaoli (
) [Regulation on the Filing of
Regulations and Rules] (promulgated by St. Council, Dec. 14, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter 2001 Filing Regulation].
139

Article 10 of the 2001 Filing Regulation amended the review standards in Article
6 of the 1990 Provisions. The revised provision established standards identical to those
in Article 88 of the Legislation Law.
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congresses of provinces, large cities, and SEZs and to ministry and local
government rules. 140 In place of the earlier provisions on normative
documents, the Regulation directs local people’s governments to strengthen
supervision over rules and other “universally binding decisions and orders”
and to establish corresponding filing and review systems. This change narrows
the scope of State Council filing and review. In an indication of problems with
compliance at lower levels, the Regulation also includes more expansive
language on compliance and supervision.141
The State Council process for filing and review resembles that of the
NPCSC. The 2001 Filing Regulation provides that the State Council LAO
manages the review process.142 In practice, this task is one of many carried out
by the LAO’s Legislative Coordination Office (
) (fazhi xietiao si).143
The Legislative Coordination Office, which has around ten staff members,
undertakes an initial assessment to categorize filed legislation. It then sends
rules to the specialized LAO office that supervises the work of the issuing
ministry or commission, and that specialized office conducts the review. If
there is no appropriate LAO office, or if the item to be reviewed is a local rule
or regulation, the Legislative Coordination Office conducts the review itself.144
Similar to the Legislation Law, the 2001 Filing Regulation establishes a
mechanism for passive review. State organs, enterprises, public organizations,
and citizens may submit proposals to the State Council for the review of rules
or local regulations.145
Due to a general lack of transparency, it is difficult to construct a
comprehensive picture of the operation of the filing and review system in
practice. The China Law Yearbook and annual reports on rule of law
development provide annual overviews of State Council filing and review
work. However, neither the NPCSC nor the State Council publicly posts
requests or proposals for review of legislative conflicts or provides formal
public rulings in response to such proposals. The NPCSC is even more guarded
140

Compare Article 2 of the 1990 Filing Provisions with Article 2 of the 2001 Filing
Regulation.
141

2001 Filing Regulation, supra note 138, arts. 4, 7, 20, 21.

142

Id., art. 10.

143

Fazhi Xietiao Si (Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Shencha Si, Fagui Bianzuan Si)
(
(
)) [Legislative Coordination Office
(Office for Filing and Review of Regulations and Rules, Office for Compiling
Regulations)], Zhongguo Zhengfu Fazhi Xinxi Wang (
) [PRC GOV’T
LEGIS. AFF. INFO. ONLINE], Nov. 8, 2007.
144

Meeting with Legal Scholars A and B, June 2012 (on file with author). These
scholars emphasized that the Legislative Coordination Office is not the equivalent of
the Filing and Review Office.
145

2001 Filing Regulation, supra note 138, art. 9.
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than the State Council in revealing the details of its filing and review work. It
only occasionally publishes fragmentary statistics. Nonetheless, through
relatively complete State Council statistics, fragmentary NPCSC statistics, and
interviews and other materials, we can construct a general picture of filing and
review practices.146
The State Council maintains a heavy filing burden. As Table 1 shows, the
State Council receives from 1,200 to 2,300 regulations and rules annually.147
References to late or incomplete filings suggest that compliance with filing
and review requirements is uneven at best.148 Unlike the NPCSC, the State
Council reports the number (but not the content) of external review proposals
(from state organs, public organizations, and citizens) that it receives each
year. As Table 1 indicates, the State Council received 648 external review
proposals from 2002 to 2011. Other authoritative sources report similar figures
and indicate that individual citizens filed the overwhelming majority of these
review proposals.149
146

The limited statistics on filing and review that are available are sometimes
inconsistent and are not always reported in the same form from year to year. The
statistics presented here provide only a rough measure of filing and review practice.
147

Statistics for 2002 to 2008 are compiled from the CHINA LAW YEARBOOKS for 2003
to 2009. See Zhongguo Falü Nianjian (
) [CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 124–25
(2003); 98–99 (2004); 120–21 (2005); 94–95 (2006); 130–31 (2007); 137–38 (2008); 127–28
(2009). Statistics for the years 2009 to 2010 are compiled from the China Law Society’s
Annual Reports on China’s Rule of Law Construction. Zhongguo Fazhi Jianshe Niandu
Baogao (
) [Annual Report on China’s Rule of Law Construction
2009] (dated June 2010); 2010 (dated June 2011). Xinhua publishes the reports annually.
Statistics for 2011 are taken from the Guowuyuan 2011 Nian Falü Gongzuo Zongshu
(
2011
) [State Council, Summary of Legal Work in 2011],
Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Dec. 29, 2011. For 2009 and 2010, the
Annual Reports document only the total number of “local regulations” that were
promulgated by “local people’s congresses and their standing committees” and reported
to the NPCSC and State Council for filing. These reports do not specifically state that
the figure includes autonomous, separate, and SEZ regulations. The 2010 CHINA LAW
YEARBOOK states that a total of 637 local, autonomous, separate, and SEZ regulations
were reported to the State Council for filing in 2009. See 2010 CHINA LAW YEARBOOK, at
111. Based on this comparison, it is my judgment that the “local regulation” figure
reported in the Annual Report on Rule of Law Construction includes autonomous,
separate, and SEZ regulations. There is a discrepancy between the number of local
regulations reported to the NPCSC in the Annual Report on Rule of Law Construction
for 2011 (Section 1–917 local regulations) and the number of local regulations reported
to the State Council for filing in its Summary of Legal Work in 2011 (666 local
regulations). The reason for the discrepancy is not clear.
148
For example, the State Council reported that seven provincial people’s
congresses, six provincial governments, and 13 State Council ministries and
commissions filed less than half of their legislation on time in 2008, while 30 local
governments and State Council ministries and commissions failed to file items
properly. Zhongguo Falü Nianjian (
) [CHINA LAW YEARBOOK] 128 (2009).

Local / Other
Regulations*
951
611
1145
796
723
662
437
637
737
666
7365

Ministry and
Commission Rules
230
201
302
285
252
206
154
161
161
154
2106

*Includes local, autonomous, separate, and SEZ regulations.

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total

Year

Provincial
Government Rules
736
644
801
649
570
678
603
537
570
579
6367
1917
1456
2248
1730
1545
1546
1194
1335
1468
1399
15838

Total Items Filed

External Proposals
Received
47
53
57
61
63
101
72
82
59
53
648

Table 1: Regulations, Rules, and External Review Proposals Filed with the State Council, 2002–2011
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The NPCSC has a lighter filing burden than the State Council. While the
NPCSC mandated the filing of local regulations in the 1980s and 1990s, the
State Council did not begin systematic filing of its administrative regulations
with the NPCSC until 2000. 150 Although the NPCSC has not consistently
reported the number of regulations and judicial interpretations it receives for
filing each year, local, autonomous, separate, and SEZ regulations are filed
concurrently with the State Council, which does report such statistics. By
adding the State Council’s statistics for regulations filed and the number of
administrative regulations and judicial interpretations issued each year, we
can estimate the total number of annual filings with the NPCSC (Table 2).151 In
recent years, fragmentary NPCSC filing statistics have been published in a
variety of sources. These statistics are presented in the final column of Table
2.152 With the exception of 2010, these NPCSC filing statistics are consistent
with estimates obtained using the methodology above.153

149

See Yuan Shuhong (
), Jiaru Shimao Zuzhi Shinian Woguo Fazhi Jianshe
Huigu he Qianzhan (
) [Reflection on and
Prospects for China’s Rule of Law Construction Ten Years after Entering the WTO], 2
Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan (
) [CHINESE CADRES TRIBUNE] 4
(2012) (reporting 653 external review proposals from December 2001 to November 2011,
including 625 filed by individual citizens).
150

Zhu, supra note 2, at 131.

151

Statistics for 2002 to 2008 are taken from the CHINA LAW YEARBOOK, while
statistics for 2009 to 2011 are taken from the Annual Reports on Rule of Law
Construction. Supra note 147.
152

The 2009 NPCSC Work Report states that the NPCSC received a total of 475
State Council administrative regulations, local regulations, judicial interpretations, and
other normative legal documents for filing in 2008. 2009 Quanguo Renda Changweihui
Gongzuo Baogao (2009
) [2009 NPCSC Work Report], Renmin
Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Mar. 9, 2009. The Annual Reports on Rule of
Law Construction for 2009, 2010, and 2011 reported the total number of items the
NPCSC received for filing and review in those years.
153

The Annual Report on Rule of Law Construction for 2010 is internally
inconsistent. Section 1 reports that the State Council promulgated 17 administrative
regulations and that the NPCSC and State Council received a total of 737 local
regulations for filing. Section 3(3) reports that the SPC and SPP issued a total of 21
judicial interpretations that year. However, Section 6(4) reports that the NPCSC
received a total of 1,743 administrative regulations, local regulations, and judicial
interpretations for filing in 2010. In 2010, the NPCSC began a systematic review of all
State Council administrative regulations. 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 19. The
systematic review and legislative clean-up campaigns that took place in 2009 and 2010
(see infra, Part III(B)) may have resulted in the filing of some previously unreported
items.

951
611
1145
796
723
662
437
637
737
917
7616

Year

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total

State Council
Administrative
Regulations
Promulgated
27
46
24
28
29
30
30
22
17
26
279

*Includes local, autonomous, separate, and SEZ regulations.

Local/Other
Regulations Filed*

Judicial
Interpretations
Promulgated
(SPC/SPP/Joint)
----11/2/1
12/1/5
15/1/3
18/1/3
16/1/4
19/1/4
118
978
657
1169
824
766
710
486
681
775
967
8013

Estimated Total
Items Filed

Table 2: Estimated and Reported Regulations and Judicial Interpretations Filed with the NPC
Standing Committee, 2002–2011

------475
“600+”
1,743
967
--

Reported Total
Items Filed
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The NPCSC does not consistently report the number of requests and
proposals for legislative review that state organs, public organizations, and
citizens file each year. Fragmentary official reports indicate that the NPCSC
received 86 citizen review proposals in 2008 and 98 proposals in 2009.154 A
2011 NPCSC LAC volume states that no state organ has ever filed a formal
review request with the NPCSC. It also states that after the establishment of
the Filing and Review Office in 2004, the NPCSC received a total of “more than
900” citizen review proposals.155 A 2012 article in the Party journal Seeking
Truth reinforces this figure. It states that the NPCSC LAC received 1,004
citizen review proposals from May 2004 to November 2011.156 Taken together,
public reports indicate that from 2000 to the end of 2011, the NPCSC received a
total of about 1,030 citizen review proposals.157
NPCSC work on citizen review proposals is problematic in numerous
respects. According to Filing and Review Office officials, only about one-third
of citizen review proposals fall within the scope of the NPCSC’s review
authority. Many proposals call for the review of rules and are transferred to the
State Council for handling. Many others relate to concrete disputes and do not
involve actual legislative conflicts. These proposals are transferred to letters
and visits offices for handling.158 As discussed in Part III(E), citizens have
criticized the lack of official feedback on review proposals and lack of
transparency in the review process.

154

2009 NPCSC Work Report, supra note 152; 2009 Annual Report on Rule of Law
Construction, supra note 147, § 5(4).
155

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 19.

156

Yuan, supra note 149, § 1(4).

157

Han Dayuan (
), currently Dean of Renmin University Law School and one
of China’s most prominent constitutional law scholars, stated in mid-2004 that the
NPCSC had received “more than 20” citizen review proposals. Xie Yuandong (
),
Shi
Yuequan
Haishi
Hufa:
Zhongzi
Guansi
de
Yiwai
Zhanfang
(
) [Exceeding Authority or Protecting Law: The
Unexpected Blossoming of the Seed Lawsuit], Fazhi Ribao (
) [LEGAL DAILY
ONLINE], Nov. 26, 2003. Thus, the total number of citizen review proposals for the
period from 2000 to the end of 2011 is approximately 1,030.
158

Meeting with Filing and Review Officials, June 2012 (on file with author).
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Rapid Expansion of Local Filing and Review Systems

The English-language literature on Chinese law has largely overlooked
local filing and review systems. China’s thirty-one provincial-level
governments and many city, prefecture, and county-level governments have
established filing and review systems. As at the national level, local filing and
review work involves separate systems and procedures in the people’s
congresses and people’s governments. This section provides a general overview
of local efforts. It provides additional detail on the large interior province of
Hunan as a case study.159
The development of local filing and review infrastructure has evolved in
two principal stages. Provincial-level people’s governments began to establish
filing and review systems in the late 1980s. Following the promulgation of the
State Council’s 1990 Filing Provisions, people’s governments in Hubei,
Liaoning, Hunan, and other provinces enacted simple filing rules and
procedures. 160 Provincial-level people’s government efforts accelerated
following the promulgation of the 2001 Filing Regulation, which explicitly
directed provincial-level governments to establish filing and review systems.161
159

For detailed surveys of filing and review practices at the provincial level, see
Shen Haixing (
), Woguo Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Zhidu Yanjiu
(
) [Research on China’s Filing System for Normative
Documents], in Woguo Lifa Zhidu Shijian Guancha (
) [EMPIRICAL
OBSERVATIONS OF CHINA’S LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM] 260–98 (Xu Xianghua (
) ed., 2011);
2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9. Hunan province provides an interesting case
study. Under Provincial Governor and later Party Secretary Zhou Qiang, Hunan
adopted China’s first provincial administrative procedure regulation and
complementary measures on the creation, management, and review of normative
documents. A discussion of these reforms and Zhou Qiang’s role in them is available in
Peter Witherington, Analyzing the Impact of the Hunan Provincial Administrative
Procedure Provisions (forthcoming 2013, manuscript on file with author). For the
administrative procedure provisions, see Hunan Sheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding
(
) [Hunan Administrative Procedure Provisions] (promulgated by
the Hunan Province People’s Gov’t, Apr. 17, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2008) (Chinalawinfo).
160

See, e.g., Liaoning Sheng Guizhang he Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Banfa
(
) [Liaoning Province Measures on Filing and
Review of Rules and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Liaoning Province
People’s Gov’t, Jan. 3, 1991, effective Jan. 3, 1991) (Chinalawinfo). The emphasis of the
Hunan measure was on filing and not on review. Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu
Guanyu Jianli Guizhang yu Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Zhidu de Tongzhi
(
) [Hunan Province
People’s Government, Notice Regarding the Establishment of a Filing System for Rules
and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Gov’t, Sept.
28, 1992, effective Oct. 1, 1992) (Chinalawinfo).
161

2001 Filing Regulation, supra note 138, art. 31.
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As part of this second wave, the Hunan Provincial People’s Government
replaced its skeletal 1992 provisions with the Hunan Province Measures on
Filing and Review of Rules and Normative Documents (“2004 Hunan
Government Review Measures”) in 2004.162 As of August 2012, all provinciallevel people’s governments had enacted detailed measures on filing and review
of administrative rules and normative documents.163 Additional provisions,
notices, and work procedures often supplement these filing and review
rules.164
Comprehensive filing and review systems in provincial-level people’s
congresses developed more slowly. Several provincial-level people’s congresses
enacted filing and review regulations prior to 2006. Other provincial-level
people’s congresses engaged in limited filing and review pursuant to internal
work procedures.165 The majority of provincial-level people’s congresses did
not enact comprehensive local regulations until after the promulgation of the
162

Hunan Sheng Guizhang Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Banfa
(
) [Hunan Province Measures on Filing and
Review of Rules and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Hunan Province
People’s Gov’t, May 23, 2004, effective July 1, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hunan
Government Review Measures].
163

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 16.

164

For example, see Hunan Sheng Guifanxing Wenjian Guanli Banfa (
) [Hunan Province Measures on Management of Normative Documents]
(promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Gov’t, July 9, 2009, effective July 9,
2009), Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Wang (
) [HUNAN PROVINCE
PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE] [hereinafter Hunan Normative Document Management
Measures]; Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Bangongshi Guanyu Jin Yibu Mingque
Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Youguan Juti Wenti de Tongzhi (
)
[Hunan Province People’s Government Legislative Affairs Office, Notice on Relevant
Concrete Problems in Progressively Clarifying the Work of Normative Document Filing
and Review] (promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Gov’t Legis. Affairs Office,
Jan. 1, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Hunan Notice on Filing and Review
Problems]; Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Bangongshi, Guizhang Guifanxing
Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu Guiding (
) [Hunan Province People’s Government
Legislative Affairs Office, Provisions on Work Procedures for Filing and Review of Rules
and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Gov’t Legis.
Affairs Office, Nov. 14, 2005, effective Nov. 14, 2005) (State Council Website)
[hereinafter Hunan Government Review Work Procedures].
165

Examples of early people’s congress filing and review regulations include Fujian
(1991), Shaanxi (1997), Henan (2003), and Anhui (2003). 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra
note 9, at 285–89, 294. The Shanghai People’s Congress is an example of a provinciallevel people’s congress that carried out review work under an internal procedure prior
to adopting a formal filing and review regulation in 2012. Interview with Senior
Shanghai Legislative Official, July 2012 (on file with author).
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Supervision Law.166 Hunan followed this general pattern, with the provincial
people’s congress adopting the Hunan Province Regulation on Filing and
Review (“Hunan People’s Congress Review Regulation”) in 2007. 167 The
Chairmen’s Council of the Hunan People’s Congress Standing Committee
issued a filing and review work procedure the following year.168 As of August
2012, thirty of China’s thirty-one provincial-level people’s congresses had
enacted local regulations on filing and review, implementing regulations for
the Supervision Law that address local filing and review issues, or both.169
Many basic elements of local filing and review systems mirror those at the
national level. For example, provincial-level people’s congress standing
committees review the rules and normative documents of people’s
governments at the same level and of local people’s congresses and their
standing committees at the next lower level, while provincial people’s
governments review normative documents issued by their departments and by
people’s governments at the next lower level. 170 At the provincial level,
people’s government legislative affairs offices (
) (fazhiban) and people’s
congress legislative affairs commissions (
) (fagongwei) typically oversee

166

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 137.

167

Hunan Sheng Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Tiaoli (
) [Hunan Province Regulation on Filing and Review of Normative
Documents] (promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Cong. Standing Comm.,
Nov. 30, 2007, effective Mar. 1, 2008) (State Council Legislative Affairs Office Website)
[hereinafter Hunan People’s Congress Review Regulation].
168

Hunan Sheng Renda Changweihui Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha
Gongzuo Chengxu (
) [Hunan Province
People’s Congress Standing Committee Work Procedures on Normative Document
Filing and Review] (promulgated by the Hunan Province People’s Cong. Standing
Comm. Chairmen’s Council, Dec. 4, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hunan
People’s Congress Review Work Procedures].
169

For a summary of local regulations on filing and review and related work in each
province, see 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 104, 279–96. The Shanghai
Municipal People’s Congress did not promulgate a comprehensive local regulation on
filing and review until April 2012. In March 2012, the Beijing Municipal People’s
Congress deliberated on a draft filing and review regulation. Beijing Shi Chushen
Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Tiaoli Cao’an Jiang Youxiao Luoshi Gongmin de
Shencha Jianyi Quan (
) [Beijing Municipality Undertakes Preliminary Deliberation on the Regulation for
Filing and Review of Normative Documents, Draft Will Effectively Implement Citizen
Proposal Rights], Fazhi Ribao (
) [LEGAL DAILY ONLINE], Mar. 31, 2012.
170

Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 88; Local Organic Law, supra note 21, arts.
44, 59; Hunan People’s Congress Review Regulation, supra note 167, arts. 3, 4.
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filing and review work. Many of these provincial-level work organs have
established specialized filing and review offices.171
Hunan province has adopted this basic structure. The Hunan People’s
Government Legislative Affairs Office oversees filing and review work and
established a Filing and Review and Translation Examination and Approval
Department (
) (bei’an shencha he yishen chu) in August
2005. This department has three staff members and carries out most filing and
review functions. 172 On the legislative side, the Hunan People’s Congress
Standing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission manages filing and review
work and established a Filing and Review Department (
) (bei’an
shencha chu). This department is staffed with three to five employees at any
given time.173 Unlike its provincial government counterpart, the Filing and
Review Department only reviews normative documents to confirm that they
fall within the scope of the Regulation and conducts preliminary examinations
of citizen review proposals. Hunan People’s Congress special committees
171

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 51, 137; Qin Peihua (
), Bei’an
Shencha Cong Yuantou Baguan “Hongtou Wenjian” (
“
”)
[Filing and Review Controls “Red Hatted Documents” at the Source], Renmin Ribao
(
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Nov. 4, 2009 [hereinafter Filing and Review Controls
Documents] (as of October 2008, twenty provincial-level people’s governments had
established filing and review organs).
172

2004 Hunan Government Review Measures, supra note 162, art. 3; Hunan Geji
Zhengfu Dui Benji Guifanxing Wenjian Shixian “San Tongyi” (
“
”) [Hunan Governments at All Levels Implement the “Three
Unifications” for Normative Documents], Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Wang (
) [HUNAN PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE], Dec. 30, 2008 [hereinafter
Hunan Implements “Three Unifications”]; Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi
Bangongshi Caiqu Deli Cuoshi Jiaqiang Guizhang Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha
Gongzuo (
)
[Hunan Province People’s Government Legislative Affairs Office Adopts Beneficial
Measures to Strengthen Rule and Normative Document Filing and Review Work],
Guowuyuan Fazhi Bangongshi Wang (
) [THE STATE COUNCIL
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE ONLINE], June 29, 2006, at § 2 [hereinafter Hunan Adopts
Beneficial Measures]. Among other review-related tasks, this department is responsible
for (1) reporting provincial government rules to the State Council and Hunan People’s
Congress for review; (2) registering and reviewing all normative documents filed with
the provincial people’s government; (3) handling all citizen review proposals; (4)
issuing opinions on conflicts; and (5) coordinating with promulgating organs to resolve
conflicts. The department is also responsible for legislative clean-up and translation
work. Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Bangongshi Zhineng Peizhi, Neishe Jigou
he Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding (
) [Hunan Province People’s Government Provisions on Legislative Affairs
Office Organization, Internal Organs, and Personnel Allocations] (promulgated by the
Hunan Province People’s Gov’t, July 14, 2004, effective July 14, 2004).
173

Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, June 2012 (on file with author).
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actually review rules and normative documents and raise opinions for
correction.174
The scope and standards for local filing and review systems are broader
than those at the national level. For example, the 2004 Hunan Government
Review Measures apply to normative documents of people’s governments and
their departments at the county level and above that (1) affect the rights or
duties of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations; (2) are applied
repeatedly within set time periods; and (3) have universal binding affect.175
Government review organs may take action to correct normative documents
that violate higher-level legislation or WTO rules, are inappropriate, are
inconsistent and require “coordination,” exceed the lawful authority of the
promulgating organ, or are issued in violation of relevant procedure. The
scope of review in the Hunan People’s Congress filing and review system is
similar to that in the provincial people’s government system. In contrast to the
central level, however, the provincial people’s congress standing committee
reviews some normative documents issued by the subordinate departments of
the people’s government at the same level and by the people’s governments of
autonomous prefectures and counties. 176 Terms such as “inappropriate,”
“violate,” and “inconsistent” are not defined, an omission that leaves review
organs with some discretion. Interestingly, although people’s courts other than
the SPC are prohibited from issuing “judicial interpretations,” some provincial
people’s congresses require local courts and procuratorates to report their

174

Id.; Hunan People’s Congress Review Work Procedure, supra note 168, arts. 3, 4.
A Shanghai official described a similar procedure and allocation of responsibilities
within the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress. Interview with Senior Shanghai
Legislative Official, July 2012 (on file with author).
175

Some internal working documents and notices are excluded from the system.
2004 Hunan Government Review Measures, supra note 162, art. 2.
176

Under the Regulation, the following documents are reported to the local
people’s congresses at the corresponding level: provincial people’s government and
Changsha city people’s government rules; normative documents of the provincial-level
people’s government and its subordinate departments, the Changsha city people’s
government and its subordinate departments, and the people’s governments of
autonomous prefectures and counties that are issued pursuant to a grant of authority
in local, separate, or autonomous regulations; and decisions or orders of people’s
governments or documents of people’s government general offices at the county level
or above that touch on the rights or obligations of citizens and are universally applied.
Resolutions or decisions of local people’s congresses and standing committees at the
county level and above are reported to the people’s congress at the next higher level.
Review organs may take action to correct normative documents that are issued in
violation of lawful authority; restrict citizen rights or increase obligations; are in
conflict with laws or regulations; or are “inappropriate.” Hunan People’s Congress
Review Regulation, supra note 167, arts. 3, 4, 7.
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“normative documents” for filing. 177 Such provisions are a tacit
acknowledgement that local courts and procuratorates are issuing binding
documents that alter citizen rights and duties in practice.
Some provincial-level organs have developed filing and review
innovations. For example, some local filing and review provisions mandate
electronic filing and review systems or establish procedures through which
promulgating organs may formally appeal an adverse ruling on their
normative documents. 178 Others provide for solicitation of opinions from
outside experts or the general public during the review process.179 Many local
177

See, e.g., Anhui Sheng Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui
Shixing Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha de Guiding (
) [Anhui Province Provisions on People’s
Congress Standing Committees at All Levels Implementing Filing and Review of
Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Anhui Province People’s Cong. Standing
Comm., Apr. 27, 2007, effective July 1, 2007) (State Council Legislative Affairs Office
Website), art. 2(4); Heilongjiang Sheng Shishi “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geji
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Jiandu Fa” Banfa (
) [Heilongjiang Province
Implementing Measures for the PRC Law on Supervision by the People’s Congress
Standing Committees at All Levels] (promulgated by the Heilongjiang Province
People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Apr. 13, 2007, effective June 1, 2007) (State Council
Legislative Affairs Office Website), art. 51.
178

For examples of Internet systems, see Hainan Sheng Guifanxing Wenjian
Zhiding yu Bei’an Dengji Guiding (
) [Hainan
Province Provisions on Promulgating, Filing, and Registering Normative Documents]
(promulgated by the Hainan Province People’s Gov’t, May 23, 2005, effective Sept. 1,
2005) (State Council Legislative Affairs Office Website), art. 24; Shanghai Shi
Xingzheng Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding he Bei’an Guiding (
) [Shanghai Municipality Provisions on Promulgating and Filing
Administrative Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal
People’s Gov’t, Jan. 19, 2010, effective May 1, 2010), art. 30. For appeals procedures in
people’s government filing and review work, see Shen, supra note 159, at 287–88.
179

Zhejiang Sheng Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guifanxing
Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Guiding (
) [Zhejiang Province Provisions on Filing and Review of Normative
Documents by People’s Congress Standing Committees at All Levels] (promulgated by
the Zhejiang Province People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Nov. 23, 2007, effective Jan. 1,
2008) (State Council Legislative Affairs Office Website), art. 14 [hereinafter Zhejiang
Filing and Review Provisions]; Yunnan Sheng Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu
Weiyuanhui Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Guiding (
) [Yunnan Province Provisions on Filing and
Review of Normative Documents by People’s Congress Standing Committees at All
Levels] (promulgated by the Yunnan Province People’s Cong. Standing Comm., July 30,
2010, effective July 30, 2010) (Dayang Net), art. 9; Shanghai Shi Renmin Daibiao Dahui
Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha de Guiding
(
) [Shanghai Municipality Provisions
on People’s Congress Standing Committee Filing and Review of Normative Documents]
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systems also establish robust provisions that set out legal responsibility for
violations of filing and review requirements.180
Nearly all provincial-level filing and review systems establish citizen
review proposal mechanisms. People’s government rules in 27 provinces
contain provisions that empower citizens to raise proposals for the review of
normative documents. Similarly, 29 provincial-level people’s congress
regulations establish citizen proposal mechanisms.181 Unlike the NPCSC and
State Council provisions, however, some provincial-level systems mandate that
review organs provide citizens with written notice of the review result within a
set time period or issue public reports on review work.182 People’s government
rules in 17 provinces and people’s congress regulations in 21 provinces require
filing and review organs to provide some form of feedback on citizen review
proposals.183 In Hunan, both the people’s government and people’s congress
(promulgated by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Apr. 19,
2012, effective July 1, 2012) (Eastday), art. 7.
180

For more robust responsibility systems, see generally Shen, supra note 159, at
288–98; 2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 104; 2004 Hunan Government Review
Measures, supra note 162, arts. 14, 18–19.
181

I have consulted citizen review proposal provisions in the current provinciallevel people’s government and people’s congress rules and regulations on filing and
review. On the people’s government side, Chongqing, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia do
not provide for citizen proposals. On the people’s congress side, Shanghai does not
provide for such proposals in its filing and review regulations. Beijing’s draft people’s
congress regulation on filing and review provides for citizen proposals, but as of August
2012, the regulation had not yet been promulgated. Some provincial-level units may
provide for citizen proposals in internal working procedures. For an extensive but
incomplete survey of citizen review proposal mechanisms in current legislation, see
Wang Chunye (
), Falü Wenjian Shencha de Gongmin Qidong Yanjiu
(
) [STUDIES ON CITIZEN INITIATION OF REVIEW OF LEGAL
DOCUMENTS] 67–76 (2012).
182

See, e.g., Zhejiang Filing and Review Provisions, supra note 179, arts. 18–20
(requiring the relevant organs to inform citizens of the review result within 15 days of
concluding the review process and mandating the publication of annual reports on
review work); Fujian Sheng Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui
Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Guiding (
) [Fujian Province Provisions on Filing and Review of
Normative Documents by People’s Congress Standing Committee at All Levels]
(promulgated by the Fujian Province People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Dec. 3, 2007,
effective Jan. 1, 2008) (State Council Legislative Affairs Office Website), arts. 10, 21
(requiring the relevant organs to inform citizens of the review result within ten days of
concluding the review process).
183

Feedback is not required in the people’s government review process in Beijing,
Hainan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Xinjiang, and
Tibet, and in the people’s congress review process in Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei,
Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and Tianjin. Where feedback is required in some form,
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filing and review systems allow citizens and state organs to submit review
proposals. The Hunan systems require filing and review offices to confirm
acceptance of such proposals, review them within set time periods, and inform
citizens of the result of the review in writing.184 Despite such provisions, the
number of citizen proposals in Hunan is relatively small. The Hunan People’s
Congress has received only about twenty citizen review proposals since 2008,
while the Hunan People’s Government received sixteen per year in 2010 and
2011.185
Hunan provides an example of a local filing and review system that must
be considered in the context of broader administrative law reforms. Hunan
requires the LAOs of administrative organs to review all normative documents
for legality prior to publication. People’s governments must review and
approve all departmental normative documents that touch on the “basic
interests of the masses,” “matters that have attracted great interest in society,”
and other sensitive issues prior to publication.186 Hunan has also decreed that
the type of feedback varies. In Heilongjiang, for example, a reply is required only if the
people’s congress declines to conduct a full review of the proposal. In some provinces,
review itself is discretionary. In others, provisions on time periods appear to leave room
for delay.
184

2004 Hunan Government Review Measures, supra note 162, art. 14; Hunan
Government Review Work Procedures, supra note 164, art. 9; Hunan Notice on Filing
and Review Problems, supra note 164, art. 5; Hunan Normative Document Management
Measures, supra note 164, art 22(2). For the relevant provisions on the legislative side,
see Hunan People’s Congress Review Regulation, supra note 167, arts. 9, 17; Hunan
People’s Congress Review Work Procedures, supra note 168, arts. 4, 12 (requiring review
opinions to be raised within twenty days of receipt and citizens to be informed in
writing within ten days of completion of the entire review process).
185

Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, July 2012 (on file with author).
For proposals filed with the provincial government in 2010 and 2011, see Hunan Sheng
Zhengfu Fazhi Bangongshi 2010 Nian Gongzuo Zongjie he 2011 Nian Gongzuo Anpai
(
2010
2011
) [Hunan Province
People’s Government Legislative Affairs Office, Work Summary for 2010 and Work
Arrangements for 2011], Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Wang (
) [HUNAN PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOV’T LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE ONLINE], Jan. 27,
2011; Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Bangongshi 2011 Nian Gongzuo Zongjie he
2012 Nian Gongzuo Anpai (
2011
) [Hunan Province People’s Government Legislative Affairs Office Work Summary
for 2011 and Work Arrangements for 2012], Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Wang (
) [HUNAN PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE], Feb. 6, 2012.
186

Hunan Normative Document Management Measures, supra note 164, arts. 13,
19. Similarly, Hunan People’s Congress officials noted that many lower-level organs
report rules or normative documents to the relevant local people’s congress prior to
issuance, allowing problems to be identified before such rules and normative
documents become effective. Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, June
2012 (on file with author).
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all normative documents automatically expire after five years and must be
reissued, a requirement that ensures that pre- and post-promulgation review
processes are repeated periodically.187 Government reports note that these and
other measures are designed to address some of the deficiencies of a “pure”
filing and review system and boast that Hunan has significantly decreased
both the number of normative documents issued and the number of
conflicts.188
Local statistics are neither comprehensive nor consistent, and individual
provinces vary in their level of reporting. Based on the scattered statistics
available, we can construct a partial picture of filing burdens and conflicts
uncovered at the provincial level. State Council documents report that China’s
thirty-one provincial-level people’s governments received a total of 11,124 items
for filing and found 269 problems in 2009.189 Statistics in documents on
provincial people’s government filing and review work in 2010 and 2011 report
from 125 (Qinghai, 2011) to 431 (Sichuan, 2011) normative documents received
for filing and review.190 In recent years, the Hunan People’s Government has
received more than 1,000 documents for filing and review annually.191 Despite
this heavy filing burden, the Hunan People’s Government requires review of all
filed documents, multiple levels of review within the Filing and Review and
Translation and Examination Department, and the timely correction of all
problems identified.192 With only three staff members, it seems doubtful that
187

“Temporary” or “trial” normative documents expire after two years. Hunan
Administrative Procedure Provisions, supra note 159, art. 51; Hunan Normative
Document Management Measures, supra note 164, art. 26.
188

Hunan Implements “Three Unifications,” supra note 172; Zhengfu Fazhi Gongzuo
(
) [Administrative Legal Affairs], Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi
Wang (
) [HUNAN PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOV’T LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
OFFICE ONLINE], Sept. 24, 2009.
189

Annual Report on Rule of Law Construction (2009), supra note 147, at § 5(4).
The People’s Daily Online reported that from 2004 to mid-2008, provincial-level
people’s governments received a total of 38,892 normative documents for filing and
corrected problems in 1,971 of them. Filing and Review Controls Documents, supra note
171.
190

Other examples include Gansu 2011 (234); Guizhou 2011 (288); Qinghai 2011
(125); Shaanxi 2010 (201); Shandong 2010 and 2011 (261 and 305); Sichuan 2011 (421);
Shanghai 2010 and 2011 (209 and 259).
191

From August 2005 to December 2008, the provincial government reportedly
received 3,096 normative documents for filing, identified 210 problems, and corrected
176 of the problems. Hunan Implements “Three Unifications,” supra note 172. It received
a total of 1,874 and 1,136 documents for filing in 2009 and 2011, respectively.
192

(

Hunan Implements “Three Unifications,” supra note 172; Yin Pingsheng
), Sheng Zhengfu Fazhiban Bei’an Shencha he Yishen Chu (
) [Provincial Government Legislative Affairs Office Filing and Review and
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the Filing and Review and Translation and Examination Department reviews
and corrects all normative documents in practice.
Data obtained from local legislative officials and 2012 provincial people’s
congress work reports suggest that filing burdens are more modest on the
people’s congress side. These sources report filing burdens ranging from 15 or
16 items (Shanghai, Qinghai) to 221 items (Anhui) annually.193 The Hunan
People’s Congress receives about 120 rules and normative documents for
review annually. It currently reviews all filed rules and normative documents
(although it is not required to do so) and finds only a small number of
problems.194 According to one local legislative official in Shanghai, the number
of government rules received for filing decreased significantly after the NPCSC
adopted the Administrative Licensing Law (which restricted the power of local
people’s governments to create license and fee requirements). 195 When
statistics on legislative conflicts identified or citizen review proposals are
reported in provincial people’s congress documents, the numbers are generally
small.196
Information on filing and review infrastructure at the sub-provincial (city,
prefecture, and county) level is limited. A 2011 volume reports that local
Translation and Examination Department], Hunan Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Fazhi Wang
(
) [HUNAN PROVINCE PEOPLE’S GOV’T LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE
ONLINE], June 9, 2008.
193

The Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress received 50 to 60 government rules
for filing and review prior to 2007. Since 2007, the number has dropped to 15 or 16 rules
annually (a total of 88). Interview with Senior Shanghai Legislative Official, July 2012
(on file with author). The Gansu Province People’s Congress received 591 items for
filing and review from the end of 2008 to May 2011 (roughly 240 items per year). Quan
Sheng Shi Zhou Renda Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Gongzuo Huiyi Zhaokai
(
) [Meeting on Normative Document
Filing and Review Work in Province, City, and County People’s Congresses Opens],
Gansu Sheng Zhengfu Fazhi Xinxi Wang (
) [GANSU PROVINCE
PEOPLE’S GOV’T. LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE INFO. ONLINE], Aug. 26, 2011. Provincial-level
People’s Congress Standing Committee Work Reports from the following provinces
reported the number of items received for filing and review in 2011: Anhui (221);
Guizhou (67); Jiangsu (33); Shanxi (103); Qinghai (16); Yunnan (56). These reports may
be located using a simple Internet search for “Sheng Renda Changweihui Gongzuo
Baogao 2012.”
194

Officials responsible for filing and review noted that the provincial people’s
congress reviews all documents because the number filed is relatively small. They also
stated that the people’s congress could shift to passive review if the number were to
increase. Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, June 2012 (on file with
author).
195

Interview with Senior Shanghai Legislative Official, July 2012 (on file with
author).
196

This is apparent from a review of the reports cited above. Wang Kai makes a
similar observation. Wang, supra note 34, at 309–13.
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people’s congresses in about 20% of the 300 cities and prefectures with
districts in China have established filing and review offices, while an additional
66% have assigned filing and review work to an existing organ. Some major
cities with authority to issue legislation have issued their own filing and review
regulations.197 Of 2,800 county-level people’s congresses, only about 2% have
established filing and review offices, while 60% have designated an existing
organ to carry out review work. Many sub-provincial governments lack
specialized organs, and filing and review offices at local levels are often shells
with only one or two employees and minimal budgets. As such, filing and
review work at the local level is problematic.198 The capacity limitations of subprovincial units pose a significant challenge for the system because the
number of normative documents reviewed at the sub-provincial level is
significantly larger than that at the provincial level.199
Consistent with reform in China generally, the filing and review system
has evolved in a piecemeal manner. While this complex, multi-level system
has addressed some deficiencies, it is still a work in progress. Local filing and
review systems remain undeveloped, and key legislative issues remain
unresolved. In the words of Professor Wang Kai, the system’s “complexity is a
kind of disordered complexity full of vagueness, chaos, and uncertainty . . . an
‘excessive complexity’ that leads to unsatisfying implementation results.”200
Part III examines key features of this system as products of capacity
challenges.

KEY FEATURES
CHALLENGES

III.

OF THE

FILING

AND

REVIEW SYSTEM

AS

PRODUCTS

OF

CAPACITY

Part III analyzes five features of the filing and review system in greater
detail, including its bifurcated, multi-level structure; the limited capacity of
the filing and review system to address constitutional conflicts and normative
documents; the emphasis on consultative practices, consensus building and
self-correction; and the creation of citizen review proposal mechanisms. This
Part also analyzes China’s large-scale legislative “clean-up” campaigns as a core
supplement to the filing and review process. Most of these features have either
been ignored or have generated confusion in the English-language literature
on Chinese law. While these features are not the product of any single factor,
197

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 15.

198

Id. at 138–40. See, e.g., Hunan Adopts Beneficial Measures, supra note 172.

199

In Hunan, for example, sub-provincial governments received around 20,000
normative documents for filing and review from August 2005 to the end of 2008.
Hunan Implements “Three Unifications,” supra note 172.
200

Wang, supra note 34, at 313.

192

Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 26 (2013)

the problem of capacity shapes all of them. By exploring them through the
lens of capacity, we can explain what appear to be aberrations in the day-today operation of the filing and review system, identify important limitations in
this formal system, and better understand the ways in which the roles of
courts and citizens have expanded to help the system cope with these
limitations.

A. Fragmented Filing and Review Structure
In theory, the NPC and its Standing Committee exercise final authority to
supervise all lower-level legislation. Under China’s constitutional structure,
the NPC is the supreme organ of state power. The NPC and NPCSC are
charged with supervising the enforcement of and interpreting the Constitution
and law. The Constitution and Legislation Law provide that the NPCSC
exercises the power to amend or annul administrative regulations, decisions,
and orders and local, autonomous, and separate regulations. However,
Chinese scholars confirm that as the supreme organ of state power with
general supervisory authority, the NPC theoretically has the authority to
review, annul, and amend all legislation in the Chinese political-legal system,
including ministry and local rules.201
In both structure and practice, however, legislative power is fragmented.
At the national level, the bifurcation of legislative power between the NPC and
State Council is readily apparent.202 The Constitution and Legislation Law
establish a very general framework for administrative lawmaking.203 Within
this general framework, the State Council issues its own detailed procedures
and guidelines for the classification of legislation within the administrative
system, the promulgation of administrative regulations and rules, and the
implementation of campaigns to “clean up” outdated or conflicting

201

Fan, supra note 21, at 40, 43; E-mail from Shen Kui to Keith Hand and Neysun
Mahboubi, posted to the China Law List, June 21, 2011 (on file with author). Article 37 of
the NPC Organic Law provides that the work of special committees includes
examination and reporting of items that conflict with the Constitution and national
law. The list of items includes the normative documents of State Council ministries and
commissions and provincial-level people’s governments. NPC Organic Law, supra note
67, art. 37.
202

An argument could be made that legislative power at the central level is actually
trifurcated, as the Supreme People’s Court legislates in all but name when it issues
some judicial interpretations. See infra, Part IV(A).
203

For example, while the Legislation Law provides detailed procedures on the
promulgation of laws, it merely directs the State Council to issue its own procedures for
promulgating rules “with reference to the provisions of Chapter III of this Law.”
Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 74.
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legislation. 204 The State Council and its subordinate ministries and
commissions also exercise the authority to interpret administrative regulations
and rules.205 Senior legislators emphasize that people’s congresses and their
standing committees should not interfere unduly in the work of administrative
organs.206
Legislative supervision authority is consistent with this bifurcated
structure. Thus, the NPC exercises supervision over NPCSC laws. The NPCSC
exercises supervision over State Council administrative regulations, local
regulations, and SPP or SPC judicial interpretations. The State Council issues
procedures on the filing and review of ministry and provincial rules and
exercises the authority to resolve conflicts between rules. The bifurcated
supervision structure is embedded to such an extent that even NPCSC LAC
sources indicate that it is “not suitable” for people’s congresses to directly
204

Guowuyuan Guanyu Fabu “Guojia Xingzheng Jiguan Gongwen Chuli Banfa” de
Tongzhi (
) [State Council
Notice on Issuance of Measures for Handling State Administrative Documents]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 24, 2000, effective Jan. 1, 2001), Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu (
) [THE
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE]; Guowuyuan Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli
(
) [State Council Regulation on Procedures for Formulating
Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu (
) [THE
CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE]; Guowuyuan Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli
(
) [State Council Regulation on Procedures for
Formulating Administrative Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16,
2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu
(
) [THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOV’T ONLINE].
205

Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falü
Jieshi Gongzuo de Jueyi (
)
[Resolution of the NPCSC on Strengthening Legal Interpretation Work] (promulgated
by the Nat’l People’s Cong. Standing Comm., June 10, 1981, effective June 10, 1981)
(Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter 1981 Resolution on Interpreting Law], art. 3; Guowuyuan
Bangongting Guanyu Xingzheng Fagui Jieshi Quanxian he Chengxu Wenti de Tongzhi
(
) [State Council General Office,
Notice on Problems Related to the Limits of Authority and Procedure for Interpreting
Administrative Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council Gen. Office, May 10, 1999,
effective May 10, 1999) (Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter State Council General Office
Interpretation Notice].
206
As Wang Hanbin has noted, “with respect to the daily work of the government,
the people’s congress and their standing committees do not intervene and do not
exceed their functions by meddling in the affairs of others in order to avoid interfering
in the government’s exercise of its official power as provided in the Constitution.” Song
Wei (
), Difang Guojia Zhengquan Tizhi de Zhongda Gaige (
) [Major Reform in the System of State Political Authority at the Local Level],
Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], July 29, 2006.
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supervise government departments and review their rules and normative
documents.207 As discussed in Part III(D), the ability of the NPCSC to exercise
its basic constitutional authority to amend or annul problematic State Council
administrative regulations is limited in practice.
There is one partial exception to the flow of supervision authority at the
national level. Provincial-level people’s congresses file local regulations with
both the NPCSC and the State Council. Both entities may review these
regulations for consistency with other legislation. 208 However, the State
Council has no power to amend or annul local regulations. In the event it finds
a conflict between a local regulation and a ministry rule and determines that
the rule should be applied, the conflict must be submitted to the NPCSC for a
final decision.209 Similarly, if the State Council finds that a local regulation
conflicts with an administrative regulation, it may only report the finding to
the NPCSC for a final decision.210 At least on paper, this mixed supervision
authority preserves the formal constitutional supremacy of the people’s
congresses. As the exception demonstrates, the authority to amend or annul
legislation is related to but distinct from the authority to accept legislation for
filing and review it.
Legislative supervision authority is also multi-level in nature. As discussed
in Part II(E), the bifurcated structure above is replicated, with minor
variations, at progressively lower levels of the system. Chinese sources refer to
this as a system with “four levels of government and three levels of
supervision.”211 The resulting system establishes a kind of belt and suspenders
structure in which people’s governments at lower levels of the system are
subject to both vertical and horizontal lines of supervision authority.
This supervision structure makes sense in a system in which the political
capacity of the NPCSC and lower-level people’s congresses is limited. While
formally subject to the supervision of the NPC and NPCSC, the State Council
exercises considerable political power and sometimes disregards its
constitutionally inferior position in practice.212 Similar disparities between the
207
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[PEOPLE’S DAILY], Dec. 29, 2007, at § 4.
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formal constitutional authority of people’s congresses and the actual political
power exercised by administrative organs exist at lower levels of the system.213
Moreover, the State Council exercises direct “leadership relations” (
)
(lingdao guanxi) over its ministries and commissions and over provincial
people’s governments. 214 Identifying “leadership relations” is important in
understanding the exercise of power in China’s political-legal system. 215
People’s governments that exercise direct leadership relations over
subordinate departments or lower-level people’s governments may be more
effective in implementing the law and ensuring compliance on issues related
to conflicts. In this context, the State Council is granted wide latitude to
review legislation issued by administrative organs.
Perhaps more importantly, filing and review organs lack the
organizational capacity to review all legislation in China’s multi-level system.
A weak and organizationally constrained NPCSC cannot even review all of the
local regulations that provincial-level people’s congresses file annually. It
simply lacks the capacity to review an additional 700 to 1,000 ministry and
provincial-level rules and the even larger number of normative documents
that administrative organs issue each year. Similarly, the State Council does
not have the capacity to monitor all local normative documents. The only
practical solution to these capacity issues is to divide responsibility for
supervising this large body of legislation.
While this multi-level structure helps central organs manage some
capacity challenges, it also creates new ones. As discussed in Part II(E), many
documents are found at the sub-provincial level. Although this filing and
review burden is spread over thousands of jurisdictions, the capacity problems
that central or provincial-level filing and review organs face are also magnified
at the sub-provincial level. Many sub-provincial jurisdictions lack specialized
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 75, 79–81 (2000); Wang,

supra note 34, at 291, note 33;

TANNER, supra note 20, at 47–49, 121, 129.
213
Paler, supra note 6, at 310; Young Nam Cho, Local People’s Congresses in China:
Development and Transition 44–45, 158, 164 (2009).
214
Similarly, local people’s governments exercise leadership relations over their
subordinate departments.
215
Constitution, supra note 9, art. 89(3)–(4), 108. For the importance of leadership
relations, see KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA 186–88 (2004). It should be noted
here that people’s congresses and their standing committees enjoy “supervision” and
“guidance” relations, not direct “leadership” relations, with lower-level people’s
congresses. This status implies that people’s congresses exercise more limited control
over lower-level people’s congresses than people’s governments exercise over their
subordinate ministries and departments. For a discussion of these different types of
relationships, see Song, supra note 206; Shenme Shi Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu?
(
?) [What Is the People’s Congress System?], Zhongguo Renda
Wang (
) [THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. ONLINE], Dec. 7, 2000.
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filing and review offices, offices responsible for filing and review tend to be
weak and understaffed, and the technical capacity of officials responsible for
this work is limited. In addition, central and provincial legislative organs must
work to build the capacity of local filing and review organs and monitor their
work, a significant task that adds to their existing burdens.

B. Legislative “Clean-Up” Campaigns
Campaign-style legislative clean-up (
) (qingli) work is an important
supplement to the filing and review process. In a legislative clean-up
campaign, state organs and their subunits undertake systematic and
comprehensive review of their own legislation and amend or annul provisions
that conflict with higher-level legislation, are out of date, or are
inconsistent.216 The goal of clean-up work is to preserve the unity of the legal
system and to facilitate the codification of Chinese legislation.217 Although
legislative clean-up work is similar to filing and review in some respects, the
two processes are distinct.218
China has engaged in periodic legislative clean-up campaigns throughout
the reform era. Central organs initiated a comprehensive campaign in 1987 to
clean up laws and administrative regulations issued prior to the reform era.219
Beginning in 2008, the NPCSC launched a system-wide legislative clean-up
campaign as a core component of the effort to establish a “socialist legal
system with Chinese characteristics” by 2010. This campaign was
216

Cai, supra note 5, at 56; Zhao Xibin (
), Guanyu Fa de Qingli de Jige Wenti
(
) [On Several Problems in Cleaning-up Law], Zhongguo Renda
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) [THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. ONLINE], Aug. 24, 2009. With regard to
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Yang (
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) [China
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Codification of the Law], Zhongguo Renda Wang (
) [THE NAT’L PEOPLE’S
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unprecedented in its scale.220 Subsequently, the State Council, local people’s
congresses, and the SPC undertook a comprehensive review and clean-up of
their own normative documents and those of their departments.221 This effort
reportedly resulted in the annulment or amendment of over 2,000 items.222
China has undertaken periodic targeted clean-up campaigns following the
adoption of important legislation such as the Administrative Punishment Law
or to implement new treaty obligations such as its WTO commitments.223
Provincial governments have also undertaken their own clean-up
campaigns.224

220

Kaizhan Falü Qingli Gongzuo, Quebao Lifa Mubiao Shixian (
) [Develop the Work of Cleaning-up Law, Ensure that Legislative Goals
Are Realized], Zhongguo Renda Wang (
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Large Scale Clean-up, supra note 217.
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) [State
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) [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY ONLINE], Dec. 24, 2011.
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For example, specialized clean-up campaigns were initiated in 1996 to examine
legislation for conformity with the Administrative Punishment Law; in 2000 to review
legislation for conformity with WTO commitments; in 2003 to review legislation for
conflicts with the Administrative Licensing Law; after 2006 to implement the
Supervision Law; and in 2011 to ensure conformity with the 2011 Administrative
Coercion Law. See Zhu, supra note 2, at 162–63; Linian Lai An Guowuyuan Youguan
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Ribao (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Mar. 28, 2007; Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui
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Renmin Zhengfu (
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Mar. 19, 2012, at § 1(3).
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Legislative clean-up campaigns focus on mobilizing state organs at
progressively lower levels of the system to identify and root out legislative
conflicts. Higher-level organs issue general instructions for state organs under
their supervision to clean up conflicting legislation and report results by set
deadlines.225 In some cases, supervision organs may enlist lower-level organs in
their own clean-up efforts. In 2008, for example, the NPCSC directed state
organs such as the State Council and the SPC to assist it in reviewing more
than 200 national laws.226
The number of items reviewed in the course of comprehensive clean-up
campaigns may be significantly larger than the number of documents filed for
review in a given year. For example, in the 2007 clean-up campaign, State
Council ministries and commissions reportedly reviewed 12,695 central
government rules and amended or annulled 1,898 of them.227 In October 2008,
Hunan government entities engaged in a massive campaign to clean up more
than 76,600 effective normative documents, a campaign that reportedly
resulted in the annulment of more than 35,600 documents.228 While it is
doubtful that all of these documents were reviewed in detail, it is clear that the
scale of some of these campaigns is quite large.
The continued implementation of legislative clean-up campaigns
highlights capacity limitations in the filing and review system. If filing and
review were an effective method of supervising legislation, clean-up campaigns
would be largely redundant. Even after two decades of development, review
organs cannot detect and correct most of the conflicts in the legislation they
receive for filing. To address these gaps, the central government has little
choice but to initiate periodic campaigns to mobilize lower-level organs to
police their own legislation. Notices initiating clean-up campaigns refer to

225
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such work as “urgent” or of “great importance.”229 Similarly, Chinese scholars
and officials emphasize that frequent, systematic legislative clean-up work
must be undertaken to maintain the unity of the legal system.230 Legislative
clean-up campaigns provide an important supplement to a filing and review
system plagued by capacity problems.

C.

Gaps at the Highest and Lowest Levels of the Legislative Hierarchy

The filing and review system contains gaps at both the highest and lowest
levels of the legislative hierarchy. On paper, the Constitution is “fundamental
law” and has “supreme legal effect.” The Legislation Law confirms this status
and provides for review of legislation for consistency with the Constitution.231
Interestingly, the NPCSC LAC’s explanation of the Legislation Law indicates
that early drafts of the law did not include the Constitution in the provisions
on legislative hierarchy. The Constitution was added after participants in the
drafting process argued that it would be improper to exclude it.232 As this
source suggests, the Constitution was included largely for theoretical and
political reasons.
The filing and review system was not intended as an embryonic form of
constitutional review. Some commentators have characterized it as such, and
Chinese citizens filed a series of early review proposals with the NPCSC in the
hopes of establishing constitutional review precedents. However, NPC laws are
not subject to review by any state organ.233 In theory, the NPC supervises
NPCSC laws, but it has not carried out this function in practice. The
Legislation Law makes no provision for citizens or other state entities to
request review of NPCSC laws.234 Moreover, only the NPCSC exercises the
power to interpret the Constitution. NPC work organs and special committees
are responsible for managing filing and conducting initial reviews, but they
229
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[N. LEGAL SCI.], Feb. 2, 2010, at § 2.
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have no formal power to annul or amend conflicting legislation or interpret
the Constitution. Their work cannot be considered “constitutional review” of
legislation. 235 As noted above, legislators rejected proposals to include
provisions for a constitutional supervision committee in the Legislation Law
and the Supervision Law.
The NPCSC lacks the political capacity to resolve sensitive constitutional
conflicts through the filing and review process. As I have argued elsewhere,
there are tensions between constitutional provisions on Party leadership and
those on citizen rights and the legal supremacy of the Constitution. These
tensions are the subject of ongoing contention in China’s political-legal
system. In this context, every act of interpreting and applying the Constitution
implicates fundamental and unresolved political questions. The NPCSC is
poorly positioned to resolve such constitutional conflicts through an
adjudicative process. In the current political-legal environment, constitutional
conflicts are more likely to be resolved through the political process.236
Gaps also exist at the bottom of the hierarchy. Some normative documents
do not fall within the scope of the filing and review system. The Supervision
Law’s major contribution was to expand filing and review to include a limited
range of normative documents. The law does not address certain normative
documents.237 For example, the law does not mandate the filing and review of
administrative department “orders” and “decisions.” In some cases, provinciallevel filing and review provisions cover a broader range of normative
documents. 238 However, many normative documents with general binding
legal effect have been excluded from the process.
235
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Administrative organs may also manipulate the system to evade review.
For example, some administrative organs fail to issue normative documents
according to standard State Council classifications. In practice, administrative
organs have the flexibility to shield some normative documents from review.239
Chinese administrative agencies also enforce laws or regulations pursuant to
internal guidance documents that can alter the effect of the legislation they
purport to enforce.240 These documents do not fall within the scope of the
State Council’s 2001 Filing Regulation and thus are not subject to the filing and
review process.241
The exclusion of many normative documents from the filing and review
process is in part the product of capacity issues. Given the vast quantity of
such documents, incorporating all of them into the filing and review process is
not feasible. As Chinese scholars acknowledge, lower-level filing and review
organs would quickly be overwhelmed.242
A third and final unresolved issue is review of Party normative documents.
Senior legal scholar Ying Songnian has noted that the lack of a system for
review of Party normative documents is a significant shortcoming.243 In some
cases, courts have grappled with Party documents that conflict with formal
legislation.244 There are signs of tentative steps to address this issue. Several
rights or obligations of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations.” Hunan People’s
Congress Review Regulation, supra note 167, art. 3.
239
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locales in China have reportedly experimented with limited review of Party
documents.245 More significantly, the Hunan Province Party Committee issued
a document in 2011 that called for the establishment of a filing and review
system within the Party structure.246 Articles published on the NPC website
have also noted the need for local people’s congresses to review normative
documents jointly issued by local governments and Party committees. 247
Although it is too early to assess the impact of such efforts, review of Party
normative documents is clearly a subject of discussion and an ongoing gap in
the filing and review system.

D. Emphasis on Consultation, Consensus Building, and Self-Correction
Both central and local filing and review practices place heavy emphasis on
consultation, consensus building, and self-correction by promulgating organs.
The NPCSC’s 2005 Work Procedures establish a complex, multi-stage review
and consultation process.248 In practice, the Filing and Review Office conducts
an initial review of filed legislation. If it detects a problem, it drafts a report
that is submitted to NPCSC officials. Upon approval of this report, the Filing
and Review Office consults with the promulgating organ on the problem and
encourages self-correction. If the organ refuses to self-correct, the NPCSC LAC
or NPC special committees may invite the promulgating organ to present its
views and discuss disagreements. 249 The goal of these consultations is to
persuade the promulgating organ to amend or annul the conflicting legislation

(declining to uphold a local administrative decision because it was based on a 1962
Party document that conflicted with a 1995 State Council department rule).
245
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on its own.250 In many cases, promulgating organs correct problems after these
early stage consultations.251 The amendment or repeal of some legislation after
the filing of external review proposals provides indirect evidence of such
practices.252
If this process is unsuccessful, the NPC special committee charged with
review may issue a written opinion on the conflict to the NPCSC General
Secretary. The conflict is then elevated in multiple stages to progressively
higher-level NPC subunits, including the Law Committee, the NPCSC
Chairmen’s Council, and the full NPCSC. Throughout this complex process,
the promulgating organ has numerous opportunities to engage NPC decision
makers in consultations, provide feedback, work to suspend further
consideration of a conflict, or engage in self-correction.253 A decision by any of
the various committees or officials not to advance the matter effectively ends
the review process and leaves the challenged legislation standing.254
NPC organs have exhibited a reluctance to exercise their coercive powers.
As indicated in one authoritative Chinese source, no NPC special committee
has ever issued a written review opinion on a legislative conflict (an early stage
in the review process).255 Numerous Chinese sources confirm that the NPCSC
has never exercised its authority to forcibly amend or annul lower-level
250
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legislation.256 The preference for consultation and self-correction is so strong
that if, after consultations, the promulgating organ refuses to amend or annul
conflicting provisions, the NPCSC sometimes drops the matter.257 As such
practices suggest, the emphasis of the central filing and review system is still
on “filing” and has only shifted to “review” in a limited sense. Although
commentators agree that consultation is necessary, some complain about the
inefficiency of this process and argue that the NPCSC should do more to
establish its authority.258
The State Council typically identifies only a few dozen problematic pieces
of legislation each year. For example, from March 2003 to the end of 2007, the
State Council reportedly identified a total of 323 problems among the more
than 8,000 pieces of legislation filed.259 The 2001 Filing Regulation emphasizes
LAO consultation and coordination with promulgating organs to resolve
conflicts.260 In the event a conflict is not resolved through coordination, the
LAO submits its opinion to the State Council for a formal ruling. Although the
emphasis on consultation is similar to that in the NPCSC process, the State
Council review process has fewer steps. In most cases, promulgating organs
amend offending legislation after coordination with the LAO. References to
formal State Council rulings on conflicts are rare, and it is unclear whether the
State Council has ever forcibly annulled or amended any legislation.261 Local
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Ren Jin).
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In detailed discussions of State Council filing and review work published in the
China Law Yearbook, there are no explicit references to forced amendments or
annulments. Other Chinese sources indicate that the State Council annuls a few items
annually. Fan, supra note 21, at 47 (citing two examples where the State Council issued
a formal decision on a conflict). However, these examples appear to involve formal
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filing and review organs also establish multi-stage procedures that emphasize
consultation and self-correction.262
A constellation of mutually reinforcing factors contributes to these
dynamics. Chinese political culture places strong emphasis on consultation,
bargaining, and consensus building.263 Chinese sources acknowledge that filing
and review organs avoid exercising their formal powers to annul legislation
because doing so would damage the face and authority of the promulgating
organ and because China’s tradition is to resolve conflicts through political
channels.264 Even formal communications between internal working organs
can raise such concerns. 265 As such, it is not surprising that informal
consultative practices are prominent in the filing and review process. Many
legislative conflicts are not clear and instead involve value judgments,
evaluations of legislative intent, and issues of interpretation.266 These softer
conflicts may give promulgating organs room to argue that conflicts do not
exist or to resist correction. In discussions on review procedures, NPCSC LAC,
Hunan, and Shanghai legislative officials with knowledge of filing and review
practices all placed heavy emphasis on such consultations. None of these
officials could recall a specific instance in which legislation had been forcibly
262
2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 21, 56, 66. For examples, see 2004 Hunan
Government Review Measures, supra note 162, arts. 10–14; Hunan People’s Congress
Review Regulation, supra note 167, arts. 11–15. Local organs find only a handful of
conflicts per year and rarely exercise formal powers to annul or amend such legislation.
Wang, supra note 34, at 309–12.
263

For an excellent Chinese statement on this issue, see Liu Songshan (
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Difang Renda Ji Qi Changweihui Baozhang Xianfa Shishi de Diwei he Zuoyong (
) [The Status and Functions of Local
People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees in Ensuring Implementation of the
Constitution], Faxue Luntan (
) [LEGAL FORUM], no. 3, 2009, at 89.
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Huang Li (
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) [Can the Constitution Be Cited in Citizen Rights Defense?], Nanfang Zhoumo
(
) [SOUTHERN WEEKEND ONLINE], Jan. 15, 2009; Interview with Senior Shanghai
Legislative Official, July 2012.
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A Shanghai legislative official recalled one case in which the Shanghai
Municipal People’s Congress Filing and Review Department identified a conflict and
consulted with the people’s government LAO to resolve it. After the LAO resisted, the
Filing and Review Department sent a letter to the People’s Congress Standing
Committee Chairmen’s Council, which in turn sent a letter to the Shanghai People’s
Government General Office. The General Office addressed the problem with the LAO
immediately. However, it then requested that the Chairmen’s Council handle such
matters in a less formal manner in the future. Interview with Senior Shanghai
Legislative Official, July 2012.
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Cai & Li, supra note 258, at 2 and 3 (comments of Cai Dingjian, Wu Gaosheng).
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annulled.267 In a published statement, the Director of the NPCSC Filing and
Review Office noted that the NPCSC is “solemn” and “careful” in exercising its
formal authority to annul, emphasized the effectiveness of consultative
approaches, and provided several examples of the successful resolution of
conflicts through consultation.268
Consultative conventions are intertwined with Party ideology and
interests. Consultation upholds the image of state institutions working
harmoniously under the leadership of the Party.269 As Chinese legal scholar
Jiang Shigong has argued, the settlement of intrastate disputes through
consultation (rather than through formal review) is a manifestation of the
principle of democratic centralism and a convention that must be recognized
to understand China’s constitutional framework.270 In contrast to most other
statutes, both the Legislation Law and the Supervision Law incorporate
explicit language emphasizing Party leadership. Such language reinforces the
Party’s central role in the processes addressed therein.271 Moreover, since
2004, senior Party leaders have prioritized Party loyalty, ideological training,
and Party leadership over formal constitutional and legal processes.272 The
public exercise of formal powers to annul or amend legislation undermines the
narrative of unity under Party leadership. In addition, if state institutions
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Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, June 2012; Meeting with Filing
and Review Office Officials, June 2012; Interview with Senior Shanghai Legislative
Official, July 2012.
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See, e.g., Yang Jingyu (
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)
[PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Nov. 24, 2006 (report of NPCSC Filing and Review Office
Director Yang Jingyu).
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China, § 10(5). I am indebted to Professor Xin He for his reference to this provision.
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Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the
Study of Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12, 31–37 (2010). For an
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centralism, see Xin He, The Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, 42 H.K.
L. J. 73 (2012).
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Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 3; Supervision Law, supra note 38, art. 3. In a
report on the Supervision Law, Yang Jingyu, Director of the NPCSC Filing and Review
Office, emphasized Party leadership as the first principle that must be respected in the
exercise of supervision powers. Yang, supra note 268.
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See generally Willy Lam, The Politicisation of China’s Law-Enforcement and
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began exercising such powers frequently and effectively, the Party’s role in
mediating and resolving intrastate disputes might gradually be marginalized.
Power relationships reinforce these dynamics. The post-Mao political-legal
system has been characterized by a fragmentation of political authority.
Competition among different bureaucracies and power centers generates
intense bargaining and reinforces consultative dynamics. 273 As Tanner
demonstrates in his classic study of the PRC lawmaking process, the Party
sometimes fails to signal clear intentions on legislative drafting issues because
Party leaders themselves cannot reach consensus, lack the expertise or
capacity to understand and resolve the issues, or are preoccupied with other
matters. In this context, competing state organs (and their leaders) bargain to
defend their interests. State organs or leaders dissatisfied with legislative
compromises may engage in a “second campaign” over content when
implementing regulations and rules are enacted. Such post-promulgation
battles may generate new conflicts between higher-level legislation and lowerlevel implementing legislation.274 Similar to conflicts that arise in the drafting
stage, these post-promulgation conflicts must be resolved through
consultation, bargaining, and consensus building.
In some cases, state organs may have formal authority to annul legislation,
but the actual balance of political power among institutions or particular
leaders of institutions may make it difficult to exercise this authority in
practice. In the past, people’s congresses had difficulty exercising supervision
over people’s governments at the corresponding level because people’s
government leaders outranked their people’s congress counterparts in the
Party hierarchy. Even when both people’s congress chairmen and people’s
government leaders sit on Party Committees, formal rankings may not reflect
the actual balance of political power. For example, one official Chinese source
acknowledges the NPCSC’s “impotency” in exercising its legislative supervision
powers over the State Council.275 Organizational capacity deficiencies within
273

For discussions of fragmentation, consultative norms, and bargaining dynamics,
see David Lampton, A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest, and Bureaucratic Politics
in China, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISIONMAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 33–58
(Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton eds., 1992); TANNER, supra note 20, at 24–
25, 50–54, 132, 220–25. Ironically, NPC delegates hoped that the Legislation Law would
help to “terminate the endless cycles of bureaucratic bargaining and democratic
consultation” in the lawmaking process. Paler, supra note 6, at 308.
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See, e.g., TANNER, supra note 20, at 24–25, 50–54, 132, 220–25.

The Legislative System of China, supra note 1 (“Legislative Procedures of the
NPC Standing Committee” - “The thinking of the ‘NPC is merely a rubber stamp’ dies
hard. Under such thinking, it is difficult for the NPCSC to nullify any documents of law
enacted by the central and local governments.”) See also Wang, supra note 34, at 291
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the people’s congresses contribute to these disparities. Concerns related to
face and authority may be heightened in such situations. To navigate these
political obstacles, people’s congresses avoid confrontation and emphasize
strategies of communication, consultation, and consensus building with
people’s governments to secure their cooperation.276 Kevin O’Brien and Yong
Nam Cho have found that local people’s congresses are also careful to cultivate
Party support in exercising their supervisory powers.277
Some of these power dynamics have evolved in recent years. For example,
the Legislation Law and Supervision Law bolstered the authority of people’s
congresses. Recent studies conclude that local people’s congresses have
become more assertive in carrying out their lawmaking and supervisory
functions.278 In many jurisdictions, the chairman of the local people’s congress
standing committee now serves concurrently as chairman or vice-chairman of
the Party Committee at the corresponding level. This structure may resolve
issues related to rank (at least on paper), but it generates other complexities.
Local people’s governments often vet major decisions and legislation with
Party Committees. In some cases, they may issue legislation in order to
implement Party policies. As such, the local people’s congress chairman may
already have reviewed and approved legislation in his capacity as a Party
leader at the corresponding level. In this context, it would be awkward for the
same people’s congress leader to later approve the forced annulment or

position.”) Even formal Party ranking may not reflect the actual balance of political
power. At the central level, former NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo and former Premier
Wen Jiabao both held the “full state” bureaucratic rank, and both sat on the Politburo
Standing Committee (PBSC). Although NPCSC Chairman Wu technically outranked
Wen on the PBSC, it is questionable whether Wu exercised greater political power in
practice. In the new Party leadership announced in late 2012 and early 2013, Premier Li
Keqiang ranks second in the Party hierarchy, behind only General Secretary and
President Xi Jinping. In the past, many local people’s congress chairmen did not serve
as voting members of the powerful Party Committees that supervised the work of all
state institutions at the corresponding level. For a discussion of these power dynamics
at the local level, see CHO, supra note 213, at 44–45, 158, 164.
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local people’s congresses “have been strongly influenced by their earlier legislative
institutions and experiences.” Id. at 164.
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It should be noted that both O’Brien and Cho discuss people’s congress
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communication with the Party. Liu, supra note 263, at 89.
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amendment of such legislation.279 Reaching negotiated resolutions may be the
best way to mitigate this awkwardness. In sum, official ranks, power dynamics,
and Party roles and interests all reinforce entrenched preferences for
bargaining, consultation, and consensus building in the filing and review
system.
Several authoritative statements on legislative supervision capture these
complex dynamics. NPCSC Chairman Li Peng made one statement during
deliberations over the Supervision Law in 2002. Li first emphasized that state
organs should divide responsibilities and cooperate under the leadership of
the Party, and that the NPC is not in an adversarial relationship with other
state organs. He then addressed the annulment of conflicting legislation.
The NPC exercises the authority to annul administrative
regulations (regulations and decisions) of the State Council,
but in reality annulment would produce [(
) (zaocheng)]
major impacts. The NPC has never annulled [such legislation].
Therefore, engaging in advance consultation is very
important. With regard to State Council administrative
regulations, we can’t possibly pay close attention to each one.
We are only able to pay close attention to the focal, central,
and major problems that the masses care about. The NPCSC
can also raise requests on its own initiative and require that
the State Council consult with the NPC before it promulgates
administrative regulations, thereby avoiding the need for
annulment after promulgation.280
Li’s use of the Chinese word “zaocheng” suggests that the consequence of
formal annulment would be undesirable. He also acknowledges that the
NPCSC lacks the capacity to review all State Council legislation. Li’s statement
could be interpreted as an admission that the NPCSC will refrain from
exercising its formal power to annul State Council legislation and instead will
work to address concerns during pre-promulgation consultations.
The second statement appeared in a 2011 NPCSC LAC volume on the filing
and review system. It explained the emphasis on consultation and selfcorrection as follows:
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Party Politburo member and Vice Chairman of the NPCSC
Comrade Wang Zhaoguo, in a speech before the Tenth
National Conference on Local Lawmaking, clearly specified,
“With regard to problems discovered during the work of filing
and review, there must be timely communication,
consultation, and appropriate resolution with the relevant
organs. I think that a common opinion should be reached
through consultation and that the relevant department or
locale should make corrections on its own initiative.
Normally, we need not adopt the method of the NPCSC
declaring annulments.” The reason is that China’s state
organs, including organs that promulgate normative
documents and those that engage in filing and review, are all
under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party,
cooperate closely, and carry out their work through
coordination and consensus. When problems exist in
normative documents, the vast majority of them can be
resolved through communication and consultation. At the
same time, the technique of communication and consultation
in resolving problems in normative documents is advantageous
for ensuring the promulgating organ’s initiative, mutual
cooperation between filing and review organs and organs that
promulgate normative documents, and the effectiveness of
carrying out work together. Therefore, communication and
consultation is a kind of important work technique in the
mechanism for filing, review, and correction of normative
documents. It is an important method for resolving the
problems of illegality and inappropriateness in normative
documents (emphasis added).281

In a subsequent passage, the NPCSC LAC volume expanded on the preference
for this approach:
With regard to the problem of filing and review organs using
the method of annulment to correct normative documents,
although [this method] is simple and direct, it produces
relatively large social and political impacts and even social
shocks. Whether it is annulling the normative document of a
promulgating organ at the same level or at a lower lever,
whether it is annulling a particular provision in a normative
document or the entire normative document, [such action]
will impact the authority and public credibility of the
281

2011 FILING AND REVIEW, supra note 9, at 64–65. The term “normative documents”
here refers to all legislation.

Understanding China’s System for Addressing Legislative Conflicts

211

promulgating organ. As the number of annulments increases,
the impact also increases. Therefore, positive cooperation has
always been a principle upheld in filing and review work.282
As these passages indicate, consultative review practices are the product of
both political conventions and capacity problems. In a system in which Party
leadership is paramount and formal constitutional-legal authorities may not
reflect the actual balance of political power, filing and review organs may lack
the political capacity to exercise their formal powers. Moreover, overwhelmed
filing and review organs depend on promulgating organs under their
supervision to comply voluntarily with filing requirements, address conflicts,
and self-police conflicts during legislative “clean-up” campaigns. In this
context, while exercising formal powers to annul or amend lower-level
legislation may resolve conflicts when a recalcitrant organ refuses to selfcorrect, there may be a high price for achieving this result. A legislative organ
that loses face because its legislation was forcibly annulled may be less willing
to engage in the self-reporting and policing that is essential to the operation of
the legislative system as a whole. It may also adopt a more confrontational
stance when future conflicts are identified. By emphasizing consultative
approaches to maintain the “initiative” and “cooperation” of lower-level organs
and setting aside some intractable disputes, filing and review organs may
ultimately ensure that many other conflicts are identified and corrected.

E.

Priority Review of Selected Legislative Conflicts and Citizen Review
Proposals

The Legislation Law was intended to establish a system of “passive” review
of legislation. Specifically, the NPCSC and its subunits would respond to state
organ requests or citizen proposals for the review of legislative conflicts. The
2000 Work Procedures established an entirely passive review process. 283
However, in the initial years after the Legislation Law was promulgated, the
NPCSC did not receive a single review request from another state organ and
received only a handful of citizen review proposals. 284 To address such
282

Id. at 72.
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The Work Procedures did not explicitly exclude active review, but they provided
only that rules and regulations filed with the NPCSC should be sent to the relevant
special committees. Article 7 provided that upon (1) receipt of a state organ request or a
citizen proposal for review and (2) approval by the Secretary of the NPCSC General
Office, the matter should be forwarded to NPC special committees to engage in review
(jinxing shencha). 2000 Work Procedures, supra note 125, arts. 5, 7.
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Wen & Zhang, supra note 77; Cai and Li, supra note 258 (comments of Chen
Jianwen).
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problems, the Chairmen’s Council amended the Work Procedures in 2003 to
provide for a combination of passive and active review. This approach allowed
NPC special committees to engage in modest active review and was preserved
in the 2005 Work Procedures.285
Given the large volume of legislation filed annually, neither the State
Council nor the NPCSC has the capacity to conduct a comprehensive review of
all filed legislation. Both organs prioritize review of external review requests
(passive review) and select a few key areas for active review on their own
initiative.286 In 2008, for example, the NPCSC focused on reviewing local
regulations related to supervision work. In 2010, it began progressively
reviewing all effective State Council administrative regulations.287 The State
Council focused its active review efforts on local custody and repatriation
regulations in 2003 (following a decision to repeal a related national
regulation). In 2004 and 2005, following the adoption of the Administrative
Licensing Law, it focused on regulations and rules that established
administrative licenses and fees.288 Local people’s governments and people’s
congresses take different approaches depending on their capacity, with some
engaging in active review of all filed documents, some emphasizing passive
review, and some adopting a mix of approaches.289
This coping mechanism is not surprising given the capacity limitations of
these organs. The State Council LAO and the NPCSC LAC each has only a
small staff to conduct review work. These offices must process incoming
legislation, and personnel must be familiar with a vast field of effective
legislation in order to identify conflicts. Filing and review offices are too small
to carry out this complex task for all legislation.290 As an NPCSC LAC volume
on filing and review acknowledges:
Filing is not only creating a file, but also providing review. All
[legislation] should be actively reviewed. But presently,
because the number of filed documents is too large, review
285
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structures are imperfect, and personnel allocations are
insufficient, it is impossible to engage in mandatory review of
all documents.291
Even if filing and review offices were to expand their capacity, it would still be
difficult for them to identify many conflicts through abstract review. Some
conflicts simply do not become clear until legislation is implemented. As Cai
Dingjian concluded, abstract review is like “fishing for a needle in the
ocean.”292 The solution to these capacity problems is to rely heavily on passive
review.
The creation of citizen review proposal mechanisms should be understood
in this context. State organs rarely raise review requests. By contrast, over the
past decade, citizens have sent more than 1,000 review proposals to the NPCSC
and more than 650 review proposals to the State Council. Review proposals
allow filing and review offices to leverage the eyes, experience, and expertise of
China’s enormous population and in turn help them address their capacity
deficiencies. “1.3 billion people participating in supervision is of greater use
than adding organs or increasing personnel allocations,” concludes Filing and
Review Office Vice Director Xu Anbiao, “[i]t creates a comprehensive, multilevel supervision effect.”293 The NPCSC LAC volume on filing and review
expresses a similar sentiment. “Experience proves that it is difficult to discover
problems only through active review. Only by mustering the enthusiasm of the
masses . . . can we discover unlawful normative documents and take measures
to correct them in a timely manner.”294 By relying on citizen review proposals
to identify most conflicts and then prioritizing a few key areas for active
review each year, filing and review offices are able to focus their work at a
more manageable level.
Despite the importance of citizen review proposal mechanisms, central
filing and review organs and their subordinate offices never formally respond
to such proposals. In some cases, central government organs have responded
indirectly by amending regulations and rules challenged in such proposals,
291
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making statements in the media that acknowledge receipt of proposals or
validate concerns raised, or inviting citizens who have raised proposals to
consultations on possible legal reforms.295 However, neither the NPCSC nor
the State Council has ever issued a formal public response to or ruling on a
citizen review proposal. Citizens have criticized the failure to respond and a
general lack of transparency in the handling of review proposals.296 Legislative
sources suggest that such problems may be weakening citizen confidence in
the review system.297 If citizen review proposals are such a crucial resource,
why do central filing and review organs refuse to respond to them in a formal
way?
Three factors closely intertwined with capacity issues explain this
institutional silence. First, the citizen review proposal mechanism was
designed primarily as a one-way information channel and governance tool,
rather than as an enforceable citizen right to constitutional and legislative
review. The NPCSC LAC’s explanation of the Legislation Law indicates that the
review proposal provision was designed to increase the efficiency of review
work and to “broaden the channels for NPCSC supervision of legislation.”298
295

See generally Keith Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang
Incident and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in
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maintenance fees); Huang, supra note 236, at 133–35 (discussing indirect responses and
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citations to Chinese sources, see Hand, supra note 236, at 121–24.
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Such characterizations are consistent with the discussion of capacity problems
here. The explanation also notes that the mechanism ensures the right to
“participate in management of the state” and “raise criticisms and
proposals.”299 Professor Jiao Hongchang characterizes the proposal mechanism
as a “political right” rather than a “litigation right.”300 Jiao’s characterization is
reinforced by the text of the Legislation Law itself, which does not provide any
right to a reply, feedback on, or formal review and resolution of citizen review
proposals. In addition to serving as an information channel for the Party-state,
such public participation and complaint mechanisms act as a kind of pressure
release valve and, in the view of some Chinese observers, as an alternative
form of “democratic” participation. 301 For a government obsessed with
preserving stability and delaying broader political reforms, citizen review
proposals also provide a channel for identifying legislative conflicts that are
generating public anger.
Second, issuing a response to a citizen review proposal could be perceived
as a formal public rebuke of the promulgating organ. As discussed above,
unwritten conventions and dependence on lower-level organs limit the
political capacity of review organs to issue formal rulings to annul conflicting
legislation. Filing and review organs avoid issuing formal responses to citizen
review proposals for the same reasons they handle nearly all conflicts through
internal communication and consultation: responses validating citizen claims
would damage the face and authority of promulgating organs and undermine
the narrative of unity under Party leadership.302
Third, the NPCSC and State Council lack the political capacity to resolve
the types of claims that are often incorporated into review proposals at the
central level. Many citizen review proposals to the NPCSC and State Council
involve constitutional rights claims or claims for review of legislation on
sensitive issues such as the residence registration system or re-education
through labor. In many cases, such proposals are advanced by legal elites with
broad political-legal reform agendas.303 As discussed above, the NPCSC lacks
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See generally Wang, supra note 233 (discussing citizen review proposals as a
form of constitutional review); Huang, supra note 236 (review of 48 citizen review
proposals finds many are advanced by legal elites, incorporate political or
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the political capacity to address the sensitive and unresolved political
questions that many of these claims implicate. Even if some review proposals
do not involve sensitive issues, central filing and review organs fear creating
precedents and an expectation of formal rulings that might encourage a wave
of more sensitive claims that they cannot handle.304 By contrast, local filing
and review organs, which are more likely to handle mundane technical
conflicts involving normative documents,305 have been more willing to require
responses to citizen review proposals.

F.

Summary

China’s filing and review system is plagued by fundamental problems of
capacity. Even a bifurcated, multi-level filing and review system that relies
almost entirely on targeted priority review, consensus-building, and voluntary
compliance must be supplemented by legislative “clean-up” campaigns. An
appreciation of the magnitude of these capacity challenges provides a
foundation for understanding the role that courts play in addressing legislative
conflicts.

PEOPLE’S COURTS AND LEGISLATIVE CONFLICTS

IV.

China’s thousands of people’s courts encounter legislative conflicts at all
levels of the system. However, people’s courts do not exercise any
constitutional authority to invalidate legislation that conflicts with the
Constitution or higher-level legislation. As discussed above, filing and review
organs are incapable of discovering and handling most legislative conflicts on
their own. In this context, how do people’s courts address the problem of
legislative conflicts in the day-to-day work of adjudication? This Part explores
formal and informal practices that have emerged to address this basic
problem. First, the NPCSC has granted the SPC limited authority to issue
“judicial interpretations” on the application of legislation in concrete cases.
Second, people’s courts at all levels engage in a form of limited judicial review.
They do so by evaluating many legislative conflicts internally and then
deciding to apply higher-level legislation (and to disregard conflicting lowerlevel legislation) according to the conflicts rules set out in the Legislation Law.
constitutional claims, or focus on legislation related to sensitive issues). My own review
of more than 120 citizen review proposals is consistent with these findings.
304

Wang, supra note 233, at § 4; Huang, supra note 236, at 135–36; Liu Renwen
(
), Gongyi Shangsu zhi Gaijin (
) [Improving Public Interest
Petition System], Jiancha Ribao (
) [PROCURATORIAL DAILY ONLINE], Sept. 27,
2006.
305

Huang, supra note 236, at 137.
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Although this practice creates modest tensions in China’s constitutional
framework, other legal actors have accommodated it as a necessary
supplement to the formal filing and review system. An exploration of these
judicial practices highlights an important layer in China’s legislative
supervision system and reveals both opportunities and likely limitations in
efforts to expand the role that courts play in addressing legislative conflicts.

A. Judicial Interpretations
For several decades, the SPC has issued judicial interpretations on issues
related to the application of national law. Judicial interpretation is one tool
that the SPC uses to address the problem of legislative conflicts. In a legislative
system that is riddled with ambiguities and inconsistencies, and in which filing
and review organs are incapable of resolving most legislative conflicts, SPC
judicial interpretations provide an important supplement to the work of the
NPCSC and other legislative organs.
The SPC practice of issuing judicial interpretations is the product of an
NPCSC delegation of power. Under China’s constitutional structure, the
NPCSC exercises the formal power to interpret national law.306 Neither the
Constitution nor the Legislation Law explicitly provides that the SPC may
interpret law. In a 1981 resolution, however, the NPCSC authorized the SPC to
issue interpretations related to the “specific application of law in court
adjudication work.”307 The NPC later confirmed this delegation of power in the
Organic Law of the People’s Courts.308 The SPC is the only court that may issue
judicial interpretations.309 Moreover, the resolution only empowers the SPC to
interpret national law. The SPP and the State Council are authorized to issue
306

Constitution, supra note 9, art. 67(4); Legislation Law, supra note 21, arts. 42–

307

1981 Resolution on Interpreting Law, supra note 205, art. 2.

47.

308

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa (
) [PRC Organic Law of the People’s Courts] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s
Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Sept. 2, 1983, Dec. 2, 1986, Oct. 31, 2006) art. 32, 2006
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 691.
309

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Difang Geji Fayuan Buyi Zhiding Sifa Jieshi
Xingzhi Wenjian Wenti de Pifu (
) [Reply on the Issue of the Inappropriateness of Local Courts at
All Levels Promulgating Judicial Interpretation-Type Documents] (promulgated by the
Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 31, 1987, effective Mar. 31, 1987) (Chinalawinfo). In practice,
provincial-level higher people’s courts issue official documents that have the effect of
interpretations. See supra note 177 and accompanying text; Nicolas Calcina Howson,
Corporate Law in the Shanghai People’s Courts 1992–2008, 5 E. ASIA L. REV. 303, 334–37
(2010).
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interpretations related to the concrete application of law in procuratorial and
administrative work, respectively, and the State Council exercises the power to
interpret its own administrative regulations.310
Judicial interpretations take several different forms.311 Under current SPC
provisions, judicial interpretations include “interpretations” (
) (jieshi),
“provisions” (
) (guiding) and “replies” (
) (pifu).312 Interpretations are
lengthy documents that address general issues in the application of national
law. Provisions, which resemble interpretations in form, are internal
instructions to courts. The SPC issues replies in response to requests for
instructions from lower courts. Replies are shorter documents that address
legal issues that arise in the context of specific cases. Judicial interpretations
are formulated in accordance with concrete procedures, and the SPC’s
Adjudication Committee must approve them. They are binding on lower-level
courts and may be cited in judgments.313 The SPC issues numerous judicial
interpretations and other official documents each year.314
Judicial interpretations are a necessary supplement to the work of
legislative organs and provide one tool for coping with legislative conflicts.
Chinese sources express concern that the NPCSC has not exercised its formal
legislative interpretation authority efficiently or effectively.315 As noted in Part
310

Provincial-level people’s congress standing committees interpret local
regulations, while provincial-level people’s governments interpret local rules. 1981
Resolution on Interpreting Law, supra note 205, arts. 2, 3, 4. Ministries interpret their
own rules. State Council General Office Interpretation Notice, supra note 205.
311

For excellent discussions of the range of SPC interpretations and official
documents, see Howson, supra note 309, at 330–34; CHEN, supra note 24, at 161–166;
Wang, supra note 34, at 285–87.
312

Guanyu Sifa Jieshi Gongzuo de Guiding (
) [Provisions
on the Work of Judicial Interpretation] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 23,
2007, effective Apr. 1, 2007), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., May 1, 2007, at 25 [hereinafter 2007
Provisions on Judicial Interpretation]. A fourth form called a “decision” is used to
amend or repeal other judicial interpretations.
313

See generally, 2007 Provisions on Judicial Interpretation, supra note 312.

314

The SPC and its specialized tribunals issue a variety of other official documents
to lower courts. Such documents provide instructions or guidelines on legal issues, but
they are not adopted in accordance with the procedures for judicial interpretations.
Nonetheless, lower courts may consider them authoritative in practice.
315
See, e.g., The Legislative System of China, supra note 1 (“Legislative Procedures of
the NPC Standing Committee”) (NPCSC has failed to exercise its power of
interpretation efficiently or satisfactorily); Cai, supra note 5, at 58–59 (the NPCSC,
which meets every two months, lacks the capacity to interpret law effectively); Faxue
Jie Guanzhu Lifa Fa (
) [Field of Legal Studies Pays Attention to the
Legislation Law], Fazhi Ribao (
) [LEGAL DAILY ONLINE], Mar. 9, 2000
(comments of Jiang Bixin, who notes that the NPCSC cannot possibly carry out the task
of issuing the many legal interpretations needed in China). Albert Chen suggests that
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II(D), while the NPCSC LAC issues informal interpretations that have
significant weight in the legal system, its interpretations are not binding. In
this context, judicial interpretations provide a way to address some
ambiguities, gaps, and inconsistencies in legislation and to guide the work of
lower courts when they encounter such issues in concrete cases. Chinese
jurists emphasize that judicial interpretations play a crucial role in unifying
the legal system and ensuring consistency in the application of law.316 Part
IV(C) references numerous examples of SPC replies that perform these
functions.
Although courts have no constitutional power to legislate, some SPC
judicial interpretations are legislative in nature. Interpretations (
) (jieshi)
are abstract. Like laws and regulations, they are organized into sections and
articles and have general binding effect.317 In some instances, interpretations
the NPCSC has expressly exercised its power to interpret law on only a handful of
occasions. CHEN, supra note 24, 155–56. However, in a 1997 article, Michael Dowdle
concluded that the NPCSC had exercised its interpretation authority more frequently
(at least up to that point). Dowdle argued that many documents identified as
“resolutions,” “supplemental regulations” and “supplemental amendments” should be
considered NPCSC legislative interpretations. Dowdle, supra note 24, at 82–85 (notes
and accompanying text). Cai Dingjian occupies a middle ground. He states that the
NPCSC “seldom” exercises its power to interpret law, but he also acknowledges that
many documents are not clearly labeled as “legislative interpretations.” Cai Dingjian,
Functions of the People’s Congress in the Effective Implementation of Law, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 38 (Jianfu Chen et. al eds.,
2000).
316

See, e.g., Xiao Shiwei (
), Zuigao Fayuan Sifa Jieshi de Luoji ji Yingxiang
(
) [Logic and Influence of SPC Judicial Interpretations],
in Zuigao Fayuan Yanjiu (
) [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. STUDIES] 337, 344–346 (Zuo
Wemin [
] ed., 2004) (unifying the legal system is the most important function of
judicial interpretation in practice); Cai, supra note 315; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa
Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jiaqiang Falü Shishi Gongzuo de Yijian de Tongzhi (
) [SPC,
Notice on Issuance of “Opinions on People’s Courts Strengthening the Work of
Implementing Laws”] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 1, 2011, effective Aug.
1, 2011), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Sept. 1, 2011, at § 12 (we shall strengthen judicial
interpretation and unify the application of the law); Xingzheng Susong Zhong de Falü
Shiyong (
) [APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LITIGATION] 234 (Cai Xiaoxue [
] et al eds., 2011) (discussing a reply in which the
SPC addressed a conflict through judicial interpretation); Yang Linping (
),
Zhongguo Sifa Shencha Xu Guanzhu de Wu Ge Wenti (
)
[Five Issues that China’s Judicial Review Must Pay Attention To], Zhongguo Fayuan
Wang (
) [CHINA COURTS ONLINE], Jan. 7, 2004 (noting that to ensure unified
implementation of the law, only the SPC issues interpretations).
317

See, e.g., Guanyu Zhixing “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa”
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (
“
”
) [SPC

220

Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 26 (2013)

may include provisions that alter the effect of the laws they are based on.318
Judicial interpretation procedures provide for the circulation of draft
interpretations to other courts, the NPCSC LAC, the State Council LAO, state
organs, and the public for comment.319 Interpretations are legally binding on
lower courts and must be cited in judgments. Thus, they are a de facto source
of law.320 Finally, like formal legislation, interpretations are subject to filing
and review requirements. Chinese commentators acknowledge that in issuing
interpretations, the SPC is legislating in effect.321
While some scholars have questioned the SPC’s judicial interpretation
practices, other scholars and legal actors have accepted them as a necessary
component of China’s constitutional order. For example, some Chinese
scholars have expressed concern that the SPC has exceeded the NPCSC’s
delegation of authority and encroached on the legislative power of the people’s
congresses in practice.322 The drafters of the Legislation Law attempted to
resolve such concerns by providing for judicial interpretation in early drafts of
the law. However, the subsequent deletion of these provisions renewed
questions about the appropriateness of the SPC’s judicial interpretation
practices. 323 A statement by Justice Jiang Bixin of the SPC captures these
tensions well:
With regard to the issue of the SPC’s judicial interpretation
power, the Legislation Law does not make clear provisions.
Article 42 provides that ‘the power to interpret law belongs to
the NPCSC . . . This provision does not preclude the SPC’s
judicial interpretation power. However, the SPC’s judicial
interpretation power is that of interpretation for application.

Interpretation on Several Issues in Enforcing the “PRC Administrative Litigation Law”]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2000, effective Mar. 10, 2000), SUP.
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Mar. 1, 2000, at 87 [hereinafter SPC 2000 ALL Interpretation].
318

Fan, supra note 21, at 40. For example, a 2000 judicial interpretation of the
Administrative Litigation Law arguably altered the scope of review established under
the ALL. Xiao, supra note 316, at 346.
319

2007 Provisions on Judicial Interpretation, supra note 312, arts. 9–23; Yang, supra
note 316, at § 3.
320

2007 Provisions on Judicial Interpretation, supra note 312, arts. 5, 27; Fan, supra
note 21, at 423.
321

Wang, supra note 34, at 13; CHEN, supra note 24, at 165–66.

322

For examples, see Xiao, supra note 316, at 335–36 (in practice, SPC has long
exceeded delegation of authority); Hu, supra note 111, at 79; Wang, supra note 34, at 13;
CHEN, supra note 24, at 165–66; LIN FENG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA 222 (2000).
323

Li, supra note 83, at 138.
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It must be loyal to the original intent and spirit of legislation
and may not infringe on the NPC’s power to interpret law.324
With such considerations in mind, judicial sources take pains to distinguish
judicial interpretations from legislative interpretations and legislation more
generally.325 The SPC avoids confrontation with legislative organs by seeking
the opinion of the NPCSC LAC and State Council LAO on many
interpretations.
Within this framework, the SPC has continued to issue judicial
interpretations in an expansive manner. Other legal actors have accepted and
accommodated SPC practices. 326 The incorporation of some judicial
interpretations into the filing and review system provides both tacit
recognition of this constitutional reality and a mechanism for ensuring that
judicial interpretations remain within acceptable boundaries. 327 An
understanding of these judicial interpretation practices provides a useful
foundation for thinking about judicial review of legislation in China. As
discussed below, China’s limited form of judicial review creates constitutional
tensions. However, like the practice of judicial interpretation, it is viewed as a
necessary supplement to the work of legislative institutions.

324

Jiang Bixin (
), Lifa Fa Shi Renmin Fayuan Shiyong Falü Guifan de Jiben
Zhunsheng (
) [The Legislation Law Is the
Basic Yardstick for People’s Court Application of Legal Standards] Xingzheng Faxue
Yanjiu (
) [ADMIN. L. STUD.], no. 3, 2000, at 12–13.
325

As one article in the People’s Court Daily emphasizes, “[w]hat must be explained
is that the SPC’s judicial interpretations are only judicial interpretations for the
concrete application of law and administrative regulations and are not legislative acts.”
Yang, supra note 316, at § 2.
326

See, e.g., Hu, supra note 111, at 79 (noting Hu’s personal view that judicial
interpretations are unconstitutional, but discussing them because they are a reality in
the current system); Wang, supra note 114, at 13 (arguing that while interpretations
encroach on legislative power and should be used sparingly, they cannot be completely
eliminated).
327

Hu, supra note 111.
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B. Judicial Commentary on the Validity of Legislation

We can begin our exploration of the limited power of people’s courts to
review legislation by confirming what people’s courts may not do. It is clear in
theory, law, and practice that people’s courts may not declare legislation
invalid. The people’s courts are subject to the supervision of people’s
congresses at the corresponding level, and the Constitution and Legislation
Law vest legislative organs with the authority to amend or annul conflicting
legislation. The 1989 Administrative Litigation Law empowers courts to review
the legality of concrete administrative acts. By contrast, courts may not review
abstract administrative acts such as the formulation of regulations and rules.328
As prominent constitutional law scholars maintain, judicial decisions to
invalidate legislation are inconsistent with a constitutional system in which
people’s congresses are the organs of state power. Among Chinese jurists,
there is overwhelming consensus in support of the proposition that Chinese
courts may not declare legislation invalid.329 Local courts have tested the
boundaries of this consensus on at least four occasions. In three of the four
cases, they faced significant legislative backlash. In response, the SPC
prohibited courts from making explicit determinations on the validity of
legislation in judicial judgments.
Although foreign observers are most familiar with the celebrated Luoyang
Seed Case, that case was not the first in which a people’s court generated
controversy by openly commenting on the validity of a local regulation. An
earlier case was decided in Qinyang city, Henan province in 1998. In the
Qinyang case, a local branch of the State Commission of Industry and
Commerce seized products that had been mislabeled and did not meet quality
standards.330 A Henan local regulation authorized the seizure of sub-standard
328
Xingzheng Susong Fa (
) [Administrative Litigation Law]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) arts. 11, 12
(Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law or ALL].
329

Statements in this regard are too numerous to cite comprehensively. For
examples, see Jiang, supra note 324, at 12; Cai and Li, supra note 258; Wang Lei (
),
Faguan Dui Falü Shiyong De Xuanze Quan (
) [The Power of
) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 4, 2004, at
Judges to Decide on Application of the Law], Faxue (
126–127; Yang, supra note 316; HAN DAYUAN (
), Xianfa Xue Jichu Lilun (
) [BASIC THEORY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LEGAL STUDIES] 385–87 (2008); Wang, supra
note 122, at § 4(2); Feng Xi (
), Xingzheng Falü Guifan Chongtu Zhong Sifa Quan de
Xiandu yu Yunxing (
) [Limits and Function of
Judicial Power When Administrative Legal Norms Conflict], Guangzhou Shenpan Wang
(
) [GUANGZHOU TRIAL ONLINE], June 6, 2011, at § 2(3).
330

Unless otherwise provided, this account of the Qinyang case is based on Zi Nan
& Fan Fu (
&
), Fagui Da Haishi Fayuan Da?—Guanyu Qinyang Shi Fayuan
Fouding Difangxing Fagui Xiaoli de Diaocha yu Sikao (
—
) [Do Local Regulations or Courts Control?
Investigation and Reflection on the Qinyang City Court Denying the Validity of a Local
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products as an administrative punishment. In adjudicating an administrative
lawsuit challenging the seizure, the Qinyang People’s Court canceled the
punishment decision and ordered the return of the seized property. The court
cited the PRC Product Quality Law, which does not provide for seizure of
property as an administrative punishment, and the PRC Administrative
Punishment Law, which provides that local regulations may only establish
administrative punishments within the scope set out in laws or administrative
regulations. The court concluded that the local regulation exceeded the scope
of national law and refused to uphold (
) (bu zhichi) the administrative
punishment decision.
In available reports on the Qinyang case, there is no indication that the
court explicitly declared the Henan local regulation invalid. Nonetheless, after
researching the case, Henan legislative officials determined that there was no
conflict and that the court’s judgment amounted to a declaration that the
Henan regulation was invalid. At a meeting to discuss the case, the Henan
People’s Congress Standing Committee severely criticized the court:
With regard to the method of the Qinyang People’s Court, if it
were allowed to go unchecked, the consequences would be
unimaginable. The rest may be inferred. May courts
determine that laws violate basic laws, and that basic laws in
turn violate the Constitution? This kind of misplaced legal
determination will inevitably damage and disrupt the
principles of China’s socialist legal system. . . [T]he political
and professional quality of the Qinyang People’s Court is not
high, its constitutional consciousness is weak, and it does not
have a correct understanding of China’s people’s congress
system.
Following this meeting, the Henan People’s Congress Legislative Affairs
Commission issued a document stating that the local regulation was valid and
must be enforced. The Henan Higher People’s Court also circulated a notice to
provincial courts. This notice criticized the Qinyang court for “incorrectly”
reviewing a local regulation and confirmed that people’s courts “[h]ave no
authority to directly determine that local regulations are unlawful and
invalid.”331 A people’s congress journal also criticized the court for violating
the Constitution.332

Regulation], Renda Jianshe (
1998, at 3–4.
331

) [CONSTRUCTION

OF THE

PEOPLE’S CONG.], no. 6,

Henan Renda Zhi Luoyang Zhongyuan Rending Difang Fagui Wuxiao Shi
Yanzhong Weifa (
) [The Henan LPC
Charges that the Luoyang Intermediate Court Determination that a Local Regulation Is
Invalid Is a Serious Violation of Law], Zhong Xin Wang (
) [CHINA NEWS ONLINE],
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A similar case emerged a year later in Jiuquan, Gansu province. In an
administrative case, the Jiuquan Intermediate People’s Court considered an
appeal of a basic-level people’s court decision to overturn a fine. The local
technology supervision bureau had levied the fine against a repair company for
operating without the proper license.333 In upholding the lower court decision,
the intermediate people’s court determined that the provisions of the Gansu
local regulation that the bureau relied on were “contrary to (
) (you bei
yu) Article 11(2) of the PRC Administrative Punishment Law . . . and may not
constitute a basis for the administrative fine.”334 Shortly after the case was
decided, a judicial clerk published an article confirming that the local
regulation exceeded the scope of national law and “could not constitute a basis
for implementing an administrative punishment.” While the court does not
appear to have stated explicitly that the local regulation was “invalid,”
academic commentary on the case indicates that the court was perceived as
having made such a determination in its judgment.335
As in Qinyang, these actions sparked a political backlash. The Gansu
People’s Congress disputed the court’s determination that a conflict existed
and, after holding a meeting to discuss the case, stated that the court had
“seriously violated the legislative power of the local people’s congress standing
committee endowed by the Constitution and Local Organic Law” and
“exceeded the limits of judicial power.” It concluded that the decision was a
“serious violation of the law . . . rarely seen in the entire country” and
demanded that the Gansu Higher People’s Court cancel the judgment, publicly
criticize the intermediate people’s court, and sanction the individuals
Nov. 8, 2003, reprinted on Renmin Wang (
) [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE]; Han Junjie
(
), Henan Li Huijuan Shijian Zai Qi Bolan, Jiedao Huiyuan Gongzuo Tongzhi
(
,
) [Henan Li Huijuan Incident Again
Makes Waves: Work Notice to Return to Court Received], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao
(
) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY ONLINE], Feb. 6, 2004 [hereinafter Henan Li Huijuan
Makes Waves].
332

Zi & Fan, supra note 330.

333

This account of the Gansu case draws on three sources: Zhongguo Xianzheng
Wenti Yanjiu Fanlun (
) [GENERAL SURVEY OF ISSUES IN THE STUDY
OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM] 183–86 (Su Yue [
] ed., 2008); Wang, supra note 122,
at § 1; Jiuquan Fasheng Fayuan Wushi Difangxing Fagui Shijian (
) [Court Disregards Local Regulation in Jiuquan], Renda Yanjiu
(
) [PEOPLE’S CONG. STUD.], no. 10, 2000.
334

GENERAL SURVEY OF ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 333, at 183. Specifically, the court determined that the PRC Product Quality Law
did not endow product quality supervision departments with the authority to levy
administrative penalties against those engaged in repair activities.
335

Id. (referring to the case as “Gansu Jiuquan Intermediate People’s Court Cancels
[Feichu] Provincial People’s Congress Legislation”); Wang, supra note 329, at 126.
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responsible. It argued that the court should have reported the conflict to the
provincial people’s congress or to higher-level judicial organs (and in turn to
the NPCSC) for a ruling. In the view of the legislative officials, the court should
not have engaged in “arbitrary criticism or interpretation” or determined that
the local regulation was invalid. In canceling the judgment, the Gansu Higher
People’s Court noted that while the court’s determination of the facts was
correct, “it was an error to directly criticize the validity of the local regulation.”
A third case, decided in 1999, involved a dispute over a land use contract
in Shanxi province. A local hotel company signed a contract with the Datong
Land Administration Bureau for the right to use state-owned land.336 At that
time, it paid both earnest money and a portion of the fee for the transfer of the
land use right. When the company failed to perform the land-use contract and
pay the remaining transfer fee, the bureau revoked the contract. A Shanxi
Provincial People’s Government rule provided that when parties that obtain
the right to use state-owned land fail to fulfill their contractual obligations,
they are not entitled to the return of state land use fees. As such, the bureau
refused to refund the earnest money and the partial fee payment. In a first
instance judgment, the Datong Intermediate People’s Court, relying on the
General Principles of Civil Law and a State Council administrative regulation,
decided that the company had a right to the return of the land use fee less the
earnest money. On the basis of this analysis, it ignored the conflicting Shanxi
rule. On appeal, the Shanxi Higher People’s Court upheld the judgment and
stated explicitly that because the Shanxi rule conflicted with an administrative
regulation, it was “invalid (
) (wuxiao).”337
It is unclear whether this Shanxi judgment generated significant
controversy. Because the case involved a conflicting provincial rule rather than
a conflicting provincial people’s congress regulation, the court’s declaration of
invalidity did not involve a constitutional conflict with the local people’s

336

This discussion of the case is based on a detailed summary and commentary
that appeared in the Supreme People’s Court Gazette. Taifeng Da Jiudian Youxian
Gongci Su Datong Shi Tudi Guanli Ju Tudi Shiyongquan Churang Jiufen An (
) [Taifeng Hotel Co. Suing the
Datong City Land Administration Bureau in a Case Involving a Dispute Over the
Transfer of Land-Use Rights], Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao (
)
[SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ.], no. 4, 2000 (Chinalawinfo).
337

Id.
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congress.338 The SPC also published a discussion of this case in a 2000 issue of
the Supreme People’s Court Gazette.339
The fourth and most famous case involving a judicial declaration on the
validity of legislation was the Luoyang Seed Case. In adjudicating a 2003 civil
case over a seed contract, Judge Li Huijuan of the Luoyang Intermediate
People’s Court determined that a Henan local regulation provided a standard
for seed pricing that conflicted with a standard set out in the PRC Seed Law.340
Judge Li not only applied the Seed Law but also declared the Henan local
regulation “naturally invalid” (
) (ziran wuxiao). Chinese sources
reported that the municipal government, the local Party political-legal
committee, and leaders of the Luoyang court were consulted and approved the
decision.341
The Luoyang decision sparked a national controversy. Similar to several of
the cases above, the Henan People’s Congress reacted furiously and declared
that Judge Li had no power to declare a local regulation invalid.342 The People’s
Congress General Office claimed that there was no legislative conflict, that the
court had unlawfully reviewed the local regulation, and that the court’s
“serious illegal action . . . violated China’s people’s congress system and
encroached on the official powers of an authoritative state organ.” It
demanded that the municipal people’s congress supervise the court, correct
the illegality, and sanction both the judge responsible and her superiors. The
General Office then issued a formal notice to the Henan Higher People’s Court
referencing the earlier judicial notice in the Qinyang case, accusing the
338

Unlike local people’s congresses, people’s governments do not exercise formal
constitutional authority to supervise the work of courts at the corresponding level.
Moreover, under the Administrative Litigation Law, courts are only required to
“consult” administrative rules. See infra Part IV(C).
339

Professor Peng Yan’an indicates that this was the first time the Gazette
published a case in which a court declared a piece of lower-level legislation invalid.
Peng Yan’an (
), “Zixing Panjue,” “Jinshen Biaoshu,” (
) [SelfAdjudication, Cautious Expression], Faxue [LEGAL SCI.], no. 3, 2007, at 119. I am grateful
to Professor Peng for his reference to this case.
340

This account draws on Otto Malmgren, Fragile Constitutionalism in China (Aug.
31, 2010) (unpublished ms.), at 7–8 (and sources cited therein); GENERAL SURVEY OF
ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF CHINESE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 333, at 186–89; Henan Li
Huijuan Makes Waves, supra note 331.
341

Henan Zhongzi An—Fayuan yu Renda Guanxi (
—
)
[Henan Seed Case—The Relationship Between Courts and People’s Congresses], Xianfa
Xue (
) [CONST. L. STUD.], Apr. 12, 2006; Qiu Feng (
), Cong Li Huijuan Dao
Fagui Shencha Bei’an Shi (
) [From Li Huijuan to Legislative
Review and Recording Office], Nanfang Wang (
) [SOUTHERN ONLINE], June 24,
2004.
342

2005.

Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China’s Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
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Luoyang court of a knowing violation of law, and demanding that the court
“earnestly and severely deal with this serious illegal action.” Following these
criticisms, court leaders suspended the judicial credentials of Judge Li and the
vice-head of the civil tribunal in which the case was adjudicated.343 Although it
upheld the substantive result in the case on appeal, the Henan Higher People’s
Court criticized Judge Li for declaring the local regulation invalid.344
The strong legislative backlash in these cases not only confirmed that
courts may not declare legislation invalid, but also that courts should refrain
from commenting on the validity of legislation. Writing in 2004, Peking
University Professor Wang Lei noted that while it is preferable for courts to
explain their reasoning, in the present environment, it is not appropriate for
courts to discuss the validity of legislation.345 According to Guangzhou judge
Feng Xi, courts have no authority to comment on (
) (pingshu) the validity
of legislation. Feng concludes that courts should avoid language that suggests
they are doing so.346 Other judicial commentary confirms that courts should
not make statements on the validity of legislation.347
343

Han, supra note 331.

344

Yardley, supra note 334.

345

Wang, supra note 329, at 126. The cases discussed above leave some uncertainty
regarding the scope of these conventions. In contrast to the court in the Seed Case, the
courts in Qinyang and Jiuquan do not appear to have explicitly declared local
regulations invalid. In the Qinyang case, the court observed that the Henan local
regulation exceeded the scope of national law and that it could not uphold the
punishment decision. In the Jiuquan case, the court observed that the local regulation
was “contrary to” national law. Local people’s congresses appear to have interpreted
these statements as declarations on the validity of the legislation at issue.
346
347

Feng, supra note 329, at §§ 2(3), 3(2).

Shanghai Shi Di Er Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Shanghai Dongzhao Huagong
Youxian Gongsi Su Shanghai Shi Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Jing’an Fenju
Xingzheng Chufa An Shengming (
) [Declaration of the Administrative
Punishment Case of the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate Court, Shanghai Dongzhao
Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Shanghai City Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce
Jing’an Branch], Shanghai No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct., July 19, 2004 (Chinalawinfo)
(supplemental commentary of Wang Caojun, Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s
Court, stating that courts may not directly determine that a provision violates the
Legislation Law and is invalid); Zhongguo Youse Gongcheng Sheji Yanjiu Zongyuan yu
Beijing Yifang Wuye Guanli Youxian Zeren Gongsi Wuye Fuwu Hetong Jiufen Shangsu
An (
) [Appellate Case of the Service Contract Dispute Between the China Youse
Project Design Main Office and Beijing Yifang Property Management LLC], Beijing No.
1 Interm. People’s Ct., Oct. 30, 2008 (Chinalawinfo) (case judgment stating that “the
people’s court does not have the power to amend or cancel lower-level legislation that
conflicts with higher-level legislation”).
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The SPC has affirmed these constitutional understandings both directly
and indirectly. In its replies to requests from lower courts for instructions on
legislative conflicts, the SPC sometimes notes a lack of consistency in
legislation and directs lower courts to apply certain legislation. However, it
generally refrains from making statements on the validity of the legislation
that is not applied.348 More importantly, the SPC issued a directive on the
citation of legal documents in 2009 that provides:
When the normative legal documents that a people’s court
truly must cite to in formulating judgment documents
conflict with each other and the court cannot select which one
to apply according to the Legislation Law and related legal
provisions, it should submit [the matter] to the organ with
decision-making authority for a ruling in accordance with
law, and is not permitted on its own to make a determination
on the validity of the normative legal document in its judgment
document (emphasis added).349
Although there is some ambiguity in the language of this provision, a senior
judge has confirmed that it was intended to prohibit courts from making
explicit statements on the validity of legislation in all cases.350

C.

Choice in Application of Legislation as Limited Judicial Review

The discussion above may prompt some readers to conclude that Chinese
courts may not review legislation. However, if we think of judicial review of
legislation as encompassing a spectrum of acts and authorities, it is clear that
Chinese courts engage in a weak or limited form of judicial review. As the
Luoyang Seed Case suggests and the following discussion will demonstrate,
Chinese courts may internally evaluate and decline to apply conflicting lowerlevel legislation. Over the course of the reform era, this convention has
348

Wang, supra note 122, at § 4(2). The SPC replies and documents cited in Part
IV(C) provide numerous examples of this approach.
349
350

SPC Provisions on Legal Citation, supra note 35, art. 7.

This provision could be interpreted to mean that courts are only prohibited
from making a determination (
) (rending) on the validity of legislation in a
judgment if they cannot determine which of two or more conflicting provisions to
apply. In the context of PRC practice, the controversy over the Seed Case, and the
resolution of the constitutional dispute the Seed Case generated, it is my judgment that
the ambiguity here is the product of poor drafting. One senior judge confirmed this
conclusion by emphasizing that the 2009 provision was a definitive statement on the
issue of courts including determinations of validity in their judgments. Interview with
Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author).
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gradually become embedded in Chinese practice. This subsection explores the
evolution, operation, and boundaries of the convention.
Judicial review comes in different varieties.351 For example, we might
consider differences in the “strong form” judicial review that American courts
exercise and the “weak form” of review that courts in other common law
systems exercise. 352 Within the “weak form” jurisdictions, variants can be
found. For example, the New Zealand Bill of Rights instructs courts to
interpret legislation to be compatible with the Bill. It does not give courts any
power to make declarations of incompatibility or refuse to apply conflicting
statutes. The U.K. Human Rights Act authorizes courts to declare statutes
incompatible with fundamental rights, but these determinations are not
binding on the parties and courts do not exercise the power to invalidate
statutes. Under Article 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights, the Canadian
Parliament may insulate statutes from a judicial finding of incompatibility
with the Charter.353 Even in the United States, courts may limit the impact of
their review of legislation in certain situations.354
Civil law jurisdictions have also embraced a range of judicial review
models. Traditionally, civil law jurisdictions were hostile to judicial review of
legislation. For example, the Dutch Constitution prohibits courts from
reviewing the constitutionality of treaties and acts of parliament. In practice,
this provision has been interpreted to mean that Dutch courts may evaluate
and make pronouncements on, but may not refuse to apply, acts of parliament
that conflict with the Constitution. They may review and refuse to apply
lower-level legal norms that conflict with the Constitution.355 Swiss courts may
351

See, e.g., Mauro Capelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. L.
REV 1017 (1970); Gustavo Fernandes de Andrande, Comparative Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review, 3 J. CONST. L. 977 (May 2001); Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of
Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 278, 278–86 (2003); GERHARD VAN DER SCHYFF, JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE
NETHERLANDS, AND SOUTH AFRICA (2010).
352

Tushnet, supra note 351, at 278–86; VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 351.

353

Tushnet, supra note 351, at 278–85; VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 351, at 19–22,
184–89.
354

For example, courts may determine that legislation is facially invalid and thus
null and void in all circumstances or that it is invalid as applied to the facts of a specific
case. For an argument that the Supreme Court is responsive to congressional
preferences in making this choice, see generally Stephanie Lindquist & Pamela Corley,
The Multiple Stage Process of Judicial Review: Facial and As-Applied Constitutional
Challenges to Legislation Before the US Supreme Court, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 467 (June 2011).
Tushnet has explored varieties of weak form review in the United States. Tushnet,
supra note 351, at 278, 279–98.
355
Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Constitution of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands], Feb. 17, 1983, art. 120; VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 351, at 4, 23–33,
189–94. In addition, courts may refuse to apply, but may not invalidate, acts of

230

Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 26 (2013)

review and disregard cantonal laws that conflict with higher law, but they may
not review or disregard acts of parliament. Ordinary Italian courts must
disregard administrative regulations that conflict with statutes, but they must
refer questions regarding the constitutionality of legislation to a central
constitutional court. Scandinavian courts review and disregard laws that
conflict with the Constitution, but they exercise this authority with significant
restraint.356 To conclude that Chinese courts do not review legislation because
they do not enjoy the “strong form” review powers of American courts is to
ignore the rich variety of judicial review models that have evolved in different
jurisdictions.
In thinking about the authority that Chinese courts do exercise with
respect to legislative conflicts, it is helpful to disaggregate the power to review
legislation into a spectrum of acts and authorities. Chinese scholar Pan Aiguo
disaggregates judicial review into the authority to evaluate and discover
conflicts and the authority to make review decisions, with the authority to
choose the applicable law in a concrete case falling somewhere in between.357
In thinking about China’s experience and the variants noted above, we might
further disaggregate this spectrum of authorities into (1) the authority to
evaluate legislation in the context of concrete cases; (2) the authority to
determine internally that a conflict exists; (3) the authority to choose the
applicable law in a concrete case (i.e., to apply higher-level legislation and
decline to apply conflicting lower-level legislation); (4) the authority to
request that authoritative organs annul conflicting legislation; (5) the
authority to comment or make declarations on the validity of conflicting
lower-level legislation; and (6) the authority to cancel the effect of the
conflicting legislation in a manner that binds other courts and political actors.
In practice, Chinese courts exercise authorities one through four on this
spectrum. As the following analysis will demonstrate, the SPC even exercises a
limited form of the sixth authority (invalidation), as its replies on conflicts
bind lower courts in practice.
Support for these practices is not universal in China. Some commentators
argue that people’s courts have no power to engage in even limited review of
legislation. Under this interpretation of China’s constitutional framework,
when people’s courts encounter conflicts between two effective legal
provisions, they may not choose the legal provision to apply on their own
initiative. Instead, they must suspend adjudication of the case, request a ruling
on the conflict from an authoritative legislative organ, and apply the

parliament that are inconsistent with treaties or international resolutions. However,
such decisions do not formally bind other courts.
356

For a discussion of the Swiss, Italian, and Scandinavian models, see Capelletti,
supra note 351, at 1035–49; de Andrande, supra note 351, at 978.
357

Pan, supra note 256, at 129, 133–34.
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legislation in accordance with the legislative ruling.358 A statement by Beijing
Municipal People’s Congress Standing Committee Vice-Chairman Li Xiaojuan
echoes that of the local people’s congress in the Jiuquan case and highlights
the pressures that courts face in such situations:
It does not work in practice for Beijing courts to not apply the
local regulation when there are conflicts between local
regulations and laws. Foreign countries have separation of
powers. China has a system of democratic centralism. Courts
are created by people’s congresses and are responsible to
them. [Local courts] exceed their authority when they act in
this way.359
Although many Chinese jurists have adopted a more flexible approach on this
issue, they acknowledge that it is controversial and that juristic opinion is not
uniform.360 Even Cai Dingjian and Jiang Ming’an, leading legal scholars who
have advocated for an expansion of judicial roles, note that suspending cases
and applying for a ruling from legislative organs is technically the correct
procedure.361
National law instructs courts to apply for a ruling in a number of
circumstances. Under the Administrative Litigation Law and the Legislation
Law, when courts find inconsistencies between ministry and local people’s

358

For statements on this conservative approach, see the Gansu Jiuquan case
discussed above; Lüshi Jianyi Quanguo Renda Dui “Luoyang Zhongzi An” Jinxing Lifa
Shencha (
“
”
) [Lawyers Propose that the
NPC Undertake Legislative Review of the “Luoyang Seed Case”], Zhongguo Fayuan Wang
(
) [China Courts Online], Nov. 30, 2003 [hereinafter Lawyers Propose
Review] (citing Jiang Ming’an statement); Xie Yuandong (
), Shi Yue Quan Haishi
Hu Fa: Zhongzi Guansi de Yiwai Zhanfang (
:
)
[Exceeding Authority or Protecting Law: The Unexpected Blossoming of the Seed
Lawsuit], Fazhi Ribao(
) [Legal Daily Online], Nov. 26, 2003 (statement of Yu
An); Cong Li Huijuan An Kan Zhongguo de Sifa Shencha (
) [Looking at Judicial Review in China from the Li Huijuan Case], Nanfang Zhoumo
(
) [Southern Weekend Online], Sept. 9, 2004 [hereinafter From the Li Huijuan
Case]; Wang, supra note 122, at § 4(1) (noting the view of some scholars).
359

Cai & Li, supra note 258 (statement of Li Xiaojuan, Vice Chairman of the Beijing
LPCSC).
360
361

See, e.g., Wang, supra note 122, at § 4; Jiang, supra note 8, at 1076–77.

Lawyers Propose Review, supra note 358 (citing Jiang Ming’an statement); Judge
Sows Seeds of Lawmaking Dispute, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 24, 2003 (citing Cai Dingjian
statement).
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government rules, they must apply to the State Council for a ruling. 362
Similarly, when provisions of local regulations conflict with ministry rules, or
when there are inconsistencies between new general and old special provisions
of legislation with equal rank in the hierarchy, courts must apply to legislative
organs for a ruling.363 As noted below, the SPC has issued guidelines that give
courts limited discretion to apply conflicting legislation in these situations
without a formal legislative ruling.

i. Judicial Review Prior to the Legislation Law
Legislative and judicial statements on court authority to review conflicting
legislation and choose the legislation to apply appear as early as the 1980s. In a
1986 Reply to the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court, the SPC stated that courts
may cite local, autonomous, and separate regulations “that do not conflict
with the Constitution, law, or administrative regulations.” It also authorized
courts to consult (but not to cite) a range of rules and normative documents,
provided that such documents “do not conflict with the Constitution, law, or
administrative regulations.”364 This SPC document implied that courts must
conduct an internal review of the legality of such legislation before citing or
consulting it in cases.365
Legislative entities expressed tacit approval of these judicial practices in
the Administrative Litigation Law and other official documents. Under the
ALL, courts may not review and annul “abstract” administrative acts such as
the formulation of regulations and rules.366 However, the drafters of the ALL
362

Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 328, art. 53; Legislation Law, supra
note 21, art. 86. See also Guanyu Bumen Guizhang Zhijian Guiding Buyizhi Shi Ying
Ruhe Duidai Wenti de Fuhan (
)
[SPC Administrative Tribunal, Reply Letter on the Issue of Addressing Provisions of
Department Rules When They Are Inconsistent] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct.
Administrative Tribunal, Oct. 16, 1991, effective Oct. 16, 1991).
363

Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 86(1)–(2). For confirmation of these
requirements, see, for example, Jiang, supra note 324, at 12; Cai & Li, supra note 258
(statement of Cai Dingjian).
364
The “other” normative documents referred to in this 1986 reply included orders,
notices, and rules of State Council ministries; decisions and resolutions of local people’s
congresses at the city and county level; and decisions, orders, and rules of local people’s
governments. Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zhizuo Falü Wenshu Ruhe Yinyong Falü
Guifanxing Wenjian de Pifu (
) [SPC Reply on How to Cite Legal Normative Documents in Formulating Legal
Documents] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 28, 1986, effective Oct. 28, 1986)
(Chinalawinfo).
365

Wang, supra note 329, at 125–26.

366

Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 328, arts. 11, 12.
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contemplated that courts would undertake an internal review of legislation
that provides the basis for concrete administrative acts and refrain from
applying legislation that conflicts with higher-level law. For example, the ALL
provides that courts may “consult” administrative rules. In an authoritative
explanation of the draft ALL, former Vice Chairman of the NPCSC Wang
Hanbin confirmed that courts may apply rules if they are consistent with
higher-level legislation.367
A 1989 NPCSC LAC explanation expands on this view. In response to an
SPC query, the NPCSC LAC validated the SPC’s opinion that “if people’s
courts, when adjudicating administrative cases, discover that there are
conflicts between a local regulation and a law promulgated by the highest
organ of state power, they should enforce the law promulgated by the highest
organ of state power.”368 Thus, in adjudicating administrative cases, courts
must undertake a review of legislation that constitutes the basis for the
concrete administrative act at issue.
Several SPC documents issued after consultation with legislative organs
reinforced these understandings. In a 1993 reply often cited in the Chinese
legal literature, the SPC grappled with a Fujian Higher People’s Court request
for instructions. The case involved the seizure of a fishing vessel. While a
Fujian local regulation authorized this administrative action, the PRC Fisheries
Law did not. After consultation with the NPCSC LAC and State Council
Legislative Affairs Bureau (the predecessor to the LAO), the SPC replied,
“When people’s courts are hearing administrative cases, with regard to local
367

During the drafting process for the ALL, the issue of applying administrative
rules as a basis for judicial judgments generated controversy. The compromise was to
provide that courts need only “consult” rules. Wang Hanbin, Guanyu “Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa” (Cao’an) de Shuoming (
(
)
) [Explanation on the PRC Administrative Litigation
Law (Draft)], Mar. 28, 1989. A 2000 SPC interpretation provides that courts may refer to
other normative legal documents if such documents are consistent with higher-level
legislation. SPC 2000 ALL Interpretation, supra note 317, art. 62; Wang, supra note 114,
at 15.
368

The case that sparked this query to the NPCSC LAC involved a conflict between
administrative penalty provisions in the PRC Land Administration Law and a Liaoning
local regulation. Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Guanyu
Ruhe Lijie he Zhixing Falü Ruogan Wenti de Jieda (Yi) (
( )) [NPCSC LAC, Answer on Several
Issues in Understanding and Interpreting the Law (No. 1)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Legislative Affairs Commission, Apr. 25, 1988, effective Apr.
25, 1988) (Chinalawinfo). The Administrative Litigation Law provides that courts must
take “laws, administrative regulations, and local regulations” as the basis for deciding
cases. Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 328, art. 52. The ALL contains no
express provisions on how courts should resolve conflicts between one of the binding
sources of law identified in Article 52 and higher-level legislation. The NPCSC LAC
confirms that courts should apply the higher-level legislation in such cases.
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regulations that are inconsistent with provisions of law and administrative
regulations, the provisions of law and administrative regulations should be
enforced.”369 In a reply the following year, the SPC addressed a similar conflict
involving the State Council’s Highway Administration Regulation and a
Liaoning provincial government rule. After consulting the State Council
Legislative Affairs Bureau, the SPC replied that the local rule “lack[ed] a basis
in law and regulation.” It then stated, “When people’s courts are hearing
concrete cases, they should apply the relevant provisions of the PRC Highway
Administration Regulation.”370 Other SPC statements on legislative conflicts in
the 1990s, judicial interpretations, judicial surveys, and accounts of early cases
are consistent with this position.371
369

Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Dui Difangxing Fagui de
Guiding yu Falü he Xingzheng Fagui Bu Yi Zhi de Yingdang Zhixing Falü he Xingzheng
Fagui de Guiding de Fuhan (
) [Reply Letter Providing
that People’s Courts Should Enforce the Provisions of Laws and Administrative
Regulations When Hearing Administrative Cases and Local Regulations are Inconsistent
with Laws and Administrative Regulations] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan.
13, 1993, effective Jan. 13, 1993) (Chinalawinfo) [hereinafter 1993 Fujian Fisheries Reply].
370

The provincial rule authorized the seizure of driver and vehicle licenses for
failure to pay certain road fees in a timely manner. Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Shenli
Xingzheng Anjian Dui Quefa Falü Yiju de Guizhang de Guiding Ying Ruhe Canzhao
Wenti de Dafu (
) [Reply on the Issue of How to Consult the Provisions of Rules that Lack
a Basis in Law and Administrative Regulation When Hearing Administrative Cases]
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 13, 1994, effective Jan. 13, 1994)
(Chinalawinfo).
371

For additional SPC statements, see, for example, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Xingzheng Shenpanting Dui Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu Ying
Zezhong Su Xixia Xian Jiaotongju Xingzhen Qiangzhi Cuoshi An De Falu Wenti de
Qingshi” de Dafu Yijian (
) [SPC
Administrative Tribunal’s Reply Opinion on the Henan People’s Court’s “Request for
Instructions on Legal Issues Regarding the Administrative Coercive Measure Case of Yin
Zezhong v. Xixia County Traffic Bureau”] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct.
Administrative Tribunal, Dec. 27, 1998, effective Dec. 27, 1998) (Chinalawinfo)
(agreeing with Henan Higher People’s Court that relevant provisions of PRC Highway
Law should be enforced); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Shenpanting Dui “Guanyu
Shenli Gongzheng Xingzheng Anjian Zhong Shiyong Fagui Wenti de Qingshi” de Dafu
(
)
[SPC Administrative Tribunal’s Reply to “Request for Instructions Regarding Issues in the
Application of Laws in Hearing Administrative Cases on Notarization”] (promulgated by
the Sup. People’s Ct. Administrative Tribunal, Aug. 16, 1999, effective Aug. 16, 1999)
(Chinalawinfo) (stating that where the PRC Temporary Regulations on Notarization
and the Shanghai Notarization Regulations are inconsistent, the “people’s courts
should apply the former”). For interpretations, see Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Hetongfa” Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi (Yi) (
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ii. Judicial Review After Adoption of the Legislation Law
Legislative, judicial, and scholarly acceptance of these practices over the
first two decades of legal reform provides a foundation for understanding the
conflicts rules in the Legislation Law. As discussed in Part II(C)(ii), the
Legislation Law established three related but distinct mechanisms for
resolving conflicts, including the rules for deciding the legislation to apply in
the event of conflicts. Statements by both legislative officials and scholars
during the Legislation Law drafting process indicate that the legislative
hierarchy and conflicts rules were drafted in part to provide courts with clear
standards for choosing and applying legislation.372 Entities involved in the
drafting process appear to have shared this understanding of the provisions, as
some objected that it would not be appropriate for all “implementing organs”
to apply legislation according to the rules set out in Chapter Five.373 Such
( )) [First Interpretation on Several Problems in Applying
the PRC Contract Law (No. 1)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 19, 1999,
effective Dec. 29, 1999) art. 4, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., Jan. 1, 2000, at 24 (providing that
“after implementation of a contract, if people’s courts confirm that the contract is
invalid, they should take law adopted by the NPCSC and administrative regulations
adopted by the State Council as the basis, and may not take local regulations and
administrative rules as the basis”). According to a senior Chinese judge, this provision
confirmed that higher-level legislation should be applied in the event of conflicts.
Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author). Peter Corne cites
to a 1993 study in which judges were asked how they would handle a conflict between
central and local legislation. Approximately 64% of judges replied that they would
apply the central legislation, while about 28% indicated that they would seek the
guidance of higher judicial organs. Only 5.4% of the judges indicated that they would
apply the local regulation. Corne, supra note 6, at 418–19. For an early administrative
case, see Jiang Yong & Guan Zheng (
&
), Xingzheng Shenpan: Shiwu Wenti
Yanjiu (
) [ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: RESEARCH ON
PRACTICE ISSUES] 189–93 (2009) (describing a 1991 administrative case in which an
intermediate people’s court canceled a fine after determining that the departmental
rule on highway administration on which the fine was based exceeded the scope of a
State Council administrative regulation).
372

The term “implementing organ” (
) (zhixing jiguan) is understood to
include people’s courts. For example, during the drafting process, then NPCSC LAC
Chairman Gu Angran reportedly explained, in reference to the conflicts rules, that
“when implementing organs cannot confirm how to apply [legislation] according to the
level of effectiveness, an authoritative organ should adjudicate the matter of how to
apply it.” Gu’s statement implies that when legislative hierarchies are clear,
consultation with legislative organs is unnecessary. The statement is reported in
Discussion of Authority, supra note 106, § 2. Cai Dingjian argued that the entire point of
setting out a clear legislative hierarchy is to allow implementing organs to
“automatically” choose the applicable law when they encounter conflicts. Cai, supra
note 5, at 56.
373

Legislation Law Roundtable, supra note 10.
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objections apparently were disregarded, as the conflicts rules were retained
without the addition of language expressly providing that only legislative
organs could apply them.
Post-promulgation discussions of the Legislation Law reinforce the
conclusion that the conflicts rules were adopted with this intent. In a 2000
article, Justice Jiang Bixin noted that the Legislation Law standardized both
legislative and judicial conduct. He then stated that courts play a role in
managing legislative conflicts.
Today, as social relations become more complicated by the
day, hoping for tens of thousands of normative legal
documents to be completely consistent and perfect is
impossible. Therefore, we must establish a kind of transitional
or intermediary mechanism to take unconstitutional laws or
bad laws and exclude them from the implementation process.
Judicial organs are an important link in this mechanism. This
requires that judicial personnel, when adjudicating cases, pay
attention to the issue of the applicability of legal standards . . .
One of the great values of the Legislation Law is that it has
provided criteria for deciding whether legal standards are
valid, whether they can be applied, and whether they are
lawful (emphasis added).374
In a nod to legislative power, Jiang emphasized that courts do not exercise
“judicial review” authority and may not choose the applicable legislation with
complete independence. When legislative conflicts are relatively clear, he
explains, courts may apply the conflicts rules themselves. In cases where the
conflict is uncertain or there is no clear hierarchy, courts should consult
legislative organs.375
Legislative officials and scholars expressed similar understandings. The
NPCSC LAC’s explanation of Article 79 states that the provision is intended to
provide standards on “choosing priority application” in the event of
conflicts.376 At a forum on legislative conflicts in January 2001, then Vice
Chairman of the NPCSC LAC State Law Department Chen Sixi was more
direct:
Judicial handling [of legislative conflicts] has many
advantages. Legislative organs themselves do not have the
374

Jiang, supra note 324, at 11.

375

Id. at 12. In a 2011 treatise, Jiang reaffirmed his position that the conflicts rules
are “universally applicable” and were intended to provide guidance to courts. Jiang,
supra note 8, at 1077.
376

LEGISLATION LAW EXPLANATION, supra note 44, at 231–32.
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motivation to resolve them, as they are relatively removed
from the parties [to disputes]. In the end we must still rely on
judicial channels. The rules of application [in the Legislation
Law] leave courts with some space. As for the size of this
space, it will depend on what the courts strive for.377
In a similar statement, constitutional law scholar Wang Chenguang
concluded, “[c]ourts cannot declare laws invalid, but they can decide not to
use them . . . The Legislation Law has provided judicial organs with a definite
space. Its potential is significant.” 378 Chen’s statement that courts must
supplement the work of legislative organs reinforces Jiang Bixin’s
characterization of courts as an “intermediary” mechanism in the process of
addressing legislative conflicts. While validating the idea that courts may
apply the Legislation Law conflicts provisions, all three of these commentators
convey a sense of caution with regard to the limits of this authority in practice.
The resolution of the 2003 Luoyang Seed Case helped to define these
limits. Recall that after finding a conflict between a local regulation and
national law, Judge Li Huijuan declared that the local regulation was “naturally
invalid.” While harshly criticizing Judge Li and announcing that she had no
power to make such a declaration, Henan People’s Congress officials also
acknowledged that she had the discretion to choose which legal provision to
apply. 379 This statement provided a basis for the resolution of the
constitutional dispute. The SPC concluded that in the event of such conflicts,
the court should apply the higher-level legislation to decide the case.380 On the
basis of this reply, the Henan Higher People’s Court criticized Judge Li for
declaring the local regulation invalid, but it upheld the substantive result in
the case. The Henan People’s Congress subsequently retreated from its threat
to sanction the judge and amended the conflicting local regulation.381 As I
have argued elsewhere, the resolution of this constitutional crisis had the
unmistakable imprint of a mediated outcome. 382 While the Seed Case
confirmed the limits of judicial review power, the statements of officials and
377

Cai & Li, supra note 258, at 3 (statement of Chen Sixi).

378

Id. (statement of Wang Chenguang).

379

Yardley, supra note 342.

380

Malmgren, supra note 340, at 8 (citing SPC reply). For general (but not
universal) consensus on this approach, see Zhongguo Xianfa Shili Yanjiu (Yi) (
( )) [STUDIES OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (VOL. I)] 301–02 (Han Dayuan
(
) ed., 2005); Judge Sows Seeds of Lawmaking Dispute, supra note 361.
381
Yardley, supra note 342; Malmgren, supra note 340, at 8. The Henan People’s
Congress adopted the new regulation on April 1, 2004.
382

Hand, supra note 236, at 111.
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scholars also reinforced the authority of judges to internally review legislative
conflicts and apply higher-level legislation.
The SPC took subsequent steps to clarify and expand this judicial
authority. In 2004, it issued an important document titled the “Summary
Record of a Forum on Problems in Adjudicating Administrative Cases” (“2004
Summary Record”). 383 The 2004 Summary Record states that after the
promulgation of the Legislation Law, there was a “major change in the relevant
rules for applying law.” It confirms that when courts encounter legislative
conflicts, “they should make a determination and choose the legal standard to
apply according to the rules on the application of legislation . . . provided in
the Legislation Law.”384 The 2004 Summary Record specifically instructs courts
to examine the legality of lower-level legislation that provides the basis for
concrete administrative acts and, in the event of conflicts, to apply the higherlevel legislation.385
The SPC also expanded judicial authority in several important respects.
The 2004 Summary Record explicitly authorizes courts to comment on the
“legality, effectiveness, reasonableness, and appropriateness” of administrative
interpretations and normative documents.386 It also directs courts to decide
whether to handle some difficult conflicts on their own. For example, in the
event of conflicts involving administrative rules, the Legislation Law provides
that the State Council should determine which rule applies.387 However, the
2004 Summary Record provides detailed guidance to courts on how to choose
the applicable rule in such situations. Courts are directed to suspend
adjudication and consult legislative organs only “if they cannot determine how
to apply” the rules.388 The 2009 SPC Provisions on Legal Citation, which apply
to all cases, reinforced and expanded this principle. That directive provides
383

Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falü Guifan Wenti de Zuotanhui
Jiyao (
) [Summary Record of Forum
on Problems in Adjudicating Administrative Cases] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., May
18, 2004, effective May 18, 2004), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ., June 10, 2004, at 5 [hereinafter
2004 Summary Record].
384

Id. at Introduction, § 2.

385

Id. at § 2.

386

Id. at § 1.

387

Legislation Law, supra note 21, art. 86.

388

2004 Summary Record, supra note 383, at § 2. Similar detailed guidance is
provided for conflicts between new general and old specific provisions promulgated by
the same organ (which, according to the Legislation Law, should be resolved by the
promulgating organ) and between ministry rules and local regulations (which should
be resolved by the State Council and NPCSC in the event it is “difficult to determine
which provisions shall prevail”). For a discussion of court discretion and application of
the detailed Summary Record provisions in these contexts, see Jiang, supra note 8, at
1086–1101.
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that when courts encounter conflicting legal provisions, they should submit
the matter to an organ with decision-making authority when “the court cannot
select which one to apply according to the Legislation Law and related legal
provisions.”389 As these SPC documents indicate, courts exercise discretion in
deciding whether to submit conflicts for a ruling. Notably, the 2004 Summary
Record states that the SPC Administrative Tribunal consulted the “relevant
departments,” an indication that the State Council LAO and the NPCSC LAC
probably reviewed and approved the document.”390
The SPC has reinforced these principles in replies to many postLegislation Law requests for instructions in concrete cases. In one notable
administrative case, local authorities seized property transported without the
required license. A local Chongqing regulation that authorized such seizures
conflicted with two national laws. In its report requesting instructions from
the SPC, the Chongqing Higher People’s Court acknowledged a division of
opinion within its adjudication committee. A majority of the judges argued
that there was a conflict and that the courts should disregard the local
regulation in accordance with the principle that “higher law takes priority over
lower law.” A minority of judges opposed this view. These judges argued that
the power of Chinese courts is limited and that the court had no authority to
disregard the local regulation and find the seizure unlawful. 391 The SPC
concluded that the local regulation exceeded the scope of the relevant national
laws and that “when adjudicating administrative cases,” people’s courts
“should apply the provisions of higher law.”392 The SPC has affirmed these

389

SPC Provisions on Legal Citation, supra note 35, art. 7. The full text of this
provision is provided in Part IV(B).
390

2004 Summary Record, supra note 383, at Introduction.

391

Chongqing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Qin Dashu Bu Fu Chongqing Shi
Fuling Qu Linyeju Xingzheng Chufa Zhengyi Zaishen Yi An Ruhe Shiyong de Qingshi
(
) [Chongqing Higher People’s Court, Request for Instructions on
How to Apply the Law in the Retrial of the Dispute Involving Qin Dashu’s Challenge of
the Administrative Punishment of the Chongqing Fuling District Forestry Bureau], Yu
Gao Fa (
) [CHONGQING HIGHER PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ.], no. 78, 2001, reprinted in
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Qingshi yu Dafu (Shang) (
( )) [SPC
REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS AND REPLIES, VOL. I] 521–24 (2010).
392

Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Dui “Guanyu Qin Dashu Bu Fu Chongqing Shi Fuling Qu
Linyeju Xingzheng Chufa Zhengyi Zaishen Yi An Ruhe Shiyong de Qingshi” de Dafu (
) [SPC Reply to Request for Instructions on How to Apply the Law
in the Retrial of the Dispute Involving Qin Dashu’s Challenge of the Administrative
Punishment of the Chongqing Fuling District Forestry Bureau] (promulgated by the Sup.
People’s Ct., June 23, 2003, effective June 23, 2003) (Chinalawinfo).
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principles in numerous other replies and responses to higher people’s
courts.393
Individual judges have also incorporated these principles into judgments
and commentaries on cases. One Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court case
involved an administrative fine. The court determined that the administrative
regulation that authorized the fine conflicted with the PRC Production Safety
Law. In a commentary attached to this case, a court representative explained:
In hearing this case, the court encountered conflicts between
legal standards. When courts adjudicate cases, may they
determine how to apply the law in accordance with conflict
393

Most of these replies deal with administrative punishments that exceed the
scope of punishments established under national law. For two replies that are often
cited in the Chinese literature, see Guanyu Dui Renmin Fayuan Shenli Gonglu Jiaotong
Xingzheng Anjian Ruhe Shiyong Falü Wenti de Dafu (
) [Reply on the Issue of How to Apply the Law When
People's Courts Hear Highway and Traffic Administrative Cases] (promulgated by the
Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 1, 2001, effective Feb. 1, 2001) (when local regulations are
inconsistent with relevant provisions of the PRC Highway Law, the relevant provision
of the PRC Highway Law should be applied); Dui Renmin Fayuan Zai Shenli Yanye
Xingzheng Anjian Zhong Ruhe Shiyong Guowuyuan “Shiyan Zhanying Banfa” Di Er Shi
Wu Tiao Guiding yu “Henan Sheng Yanye Guanli Tiaoli” Di San Shi Tiao Di Yi Kuan
Guiding Wenti de Dafu (
) [Reply on the Issue of How People's Courts, in Hearing Administrative
Cases on the Salt Industry, Should Apply Article 25 of the “Edible Salt Monopoly
Measures” and Article 30(1) of the Henan Province Salt Industry Management
Regulations] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 29, 2003, effective Apr. 29,
2003) (Lawyee) (acknowledging conflicts between State Council administrative
regulation and local regulation and directing the court to apply the legislation in
accordance with articles 64(2) and 79(2) of the Legislation Law). For more recent SPC
documents, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Shenpanting Guanyu Jiangsu
Gaoyuan Jiu Xu Jikang Bu Fu Nanjing Shi Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Xiaguan
Fenju Kouya Caichan Yi An Qingshi de Dafu (
) [SPC
Administrative Tribunal’s Reply to the Jiangsu High Court’s Request for Instructions
Regarding the Case of Xu Jikang Challenging the Xiaguan Branch of the Nanjing SAIC’s
Confiscation of Property] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Sept. 27, 2006,
effective Sept. 27, 2006) (Chinalawinfo) (Jiangsu local regulation authorizing seizure of
property conflicts with PRC Anti-Competition Law, which does not authorize such
seizures, and the Anti-Competition Law should be applied) [hereinafter 2006 Jiangsu
Property Seizure Reply]; 2011 Jiangsu Salt Case Reply, supra note 13 (the State Council
Salt Industry Management Regulations do not establish administrative punishments for
the salt wholesale business of any enterprise other than salt companies). In accordance
with the SPC reply, a Jiangsu court declined to apply a provincial rule that conflicted
with national law and administrative regulations. For details on the case, see Judicial
Decision Breaks Industrial Salt Administrative Monopoly, supra note 13.
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resolution rules? After the implementation of the Legislation
Law, there is no dispute over this question. It has been
confirmed that the power to choose the legislation to apply is
a proper judicial power.394
In another case, a court overturned a public security decision to revoke a
driver license because the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) rule on which the
decision was based conflicted with the PRC Road Traffic Safety Law. In a
commentary attached to the case, a representative of the district people’s
court explained the application of the Legislation Law conflicts provisions and
recommended that the MPS immediately amend the conflicting rule.395 A
review of case judgments and commentaries available in Chinalawinfo, an
online legal database administered at Peking University, reveals numerous
such examples.396 A 2005 survey of judges in one intermediate people’s court
reinforced these materials. The survey found that the overwhelming majority
394

See Case Summary, Commentary, and Supplemental Commentary in Shanghai
Shi Di Er Zhongji Fayuan, Shanghai Dongzhao Huagong Youxian Gongsi Su Shanghai
Shi Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Jing’an Fenju Xingzheng Chufa An Shengming
(
)
[Declaration of the Administrative Punishment Case of the Shanghai No. 2
Intermediate Court, Shanghai Dongzhao Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Shanghai City
Administrative Bureau of Industry and Commerce Jiang’an Branch], Shanghai No. 2
Interm. People’s Ct., July 19, 2004 (Chinalawinfo). For a similar statement by a judge in
Guangzhou, see Feng, supra note 329, at § 2(1) (Courts “certainly” exercise the power to
assess and correctly apply conflicting legal norms.)
395

Wuxi Shi Chong’an Qu Renmin Fayuan Cai Guoqiang Su Wuxi Shi Gonganju
Jiaotong Xunluo Jingcha Zhidui Xingzheng Chufa An (
) [People’s Court of Chong’an District,
Wuxi City, Case of Cai Guoqiang Suing the Wuxi City Public Security Bureau Traffic
Patrol Police Unit], Wuxi Chong’an Dist. People’s Ct., Dec. 9, 2004 (Chinalawinfo).
396

The annotations to Legislation Law Articles 64(2), 78–83, and 86–87 in
Chinalawinfo contain links to about 50 cases. An examination of these cases reveals
many examples of direct court application of the Legislation Law conflicts provisions.
For two examples, see Wu Qinbao Deng Bufu Fuzhou Shi Fangdichan Guanliju Fangwu
Chaiqian Guanli An (
) [Case of Wu
Qinbao and Others Challenging the Fuzhou City Real Property Management Bureau
Over Housing Demolition and Relocation Management], Fuzhou Interm. People’s Ct.,
Aug. 27, 2004 (Chinalawinfo) (applying Legislation Law Article 79 to address conflict
involving an administrative regulation and a local regulation); Guangzhou Shi Yuhui
Diannao Gongsi yu Liang Jiao Laodong Zhengyi Jiufen Shangsu An (
) [Appellate Case of the Labor Controversy
Between Guangzhou City Yu Hui Computer Ltd. Co. and Liang Jiao], Guangzhou
Interm. People’s Ct., 2010 (Chinalawinfo) (applying Legislation Law Article 83 in
conflict between new specific law and old general law promulgated by the NPCSC)
[hereinafter Guangzhou Labor Arbitration Case].
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of judges simply apply higher-level legislation without commenting on
conflicts.397
An observer might conclude that one of the principal differences between
strong-form judicial review in the United States and limited judicial review in
China is the effect of stare decisis. However, even this distinction is blurred in
Chinese judicial practice. As noted in Part IV(A), SPC interpretations are
binding on and must be cited by lower courts. Although SPC “replies” are
formally binding only with respect to the specific case for which they are
issued, in practice they have de facto binding effect in subsequent cases.398
Lower court judges facing legislative conflicts in subsequent cases and fearful
of professional sanction for wrongful judgments respect SPC replies, other SPC
documents, and higher court judgments (particularly if higher courts have
identified such judgments as models that should be consulted).399
Scholarly opinion has settled firmly in support of these judicial practices.
While noting some divergence of opinion, most Chinese scholars support the
view that courts may choose the applicable legislation in the event of
conflicts.” 400 Some scholars go further and argue that judges have a
397

In the survey, researchers asked judges how they would address legislative
conflicts in judicial judgments. Of 48 valid responses received, the overwhelming
majority of judges (37, or 77% of the respondents) indicated that they would apply the
higher-level legislation without commenting on the conflict in their judgment. Two
respondents indicated that they would apply the lower-level legislation without
commenting on the conflict. Only one respondent indicated that he or she would
declare the lower-level legislation invalid, and only three respondents indicated that
they would state that the lower-level legislation “violated” or was “inconsistent with”
higher-level legislation. The remaining respondents either did not respond or gave
multiple responses. Peng, supra note 339, at 119-20. It should be noted that this survey
was conducted before the SPC issued its 2009 directive that instructed judges to refrain
making statements on the validity of legislation in their judgments.
398

The SPC Provisions on Legal Interpretation do not specify that different types of
judicial interpretations have different legal effect. 2007 Provisions on Judicial
Interpretation, supra note 312, art. 5. In correspondence with the author, Chinese
constitutional law scholars indicated that while replies are formally binding only in the
individual cases for which they are issued, lower courts generally follow them in
subsequent cases. In a discussion with the author, one basic-level judge related a case
along these lines. The case involved a legislative conflict that implicated an important
local interest. Because the SPC had issued a reply to another provincial high court on
the same conflict, the basic-level court felt that it must consider the reply and address
the conflict.
399

For judicial responsibility systems, see Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary
Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N. M.
L. REV. 63 (2009). In 2007, I worked with a Chinese higher people’s court on the issue of
judicial precedent. The Chinese judges participating in the workshop indicated that
they placed great weight on higher court judgments for the reasons discussed here.
400

Wang, supra note 122, at § 4 (some scholars believe that courts must report all
conflicts to legislative organs, but most scholars disagree); Cai & Li, supra note 258
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constitutional duty to apply higher-level legislation in such situations.401 SPP
directives, which require procuratorates to protest administrative judgments
when judges fail to apply Articles 78 to 86 of the Legislation Law, reinforce this
argument.402 Judges also emphasize this point and suggest that legislative
officials have no choice but to accept judicial practice in this regard because
the conflicts rules are grounded in the Constitution itself.403 Indeed, legislative
officials at both the central and provincial levels acknowledged these judicial
practices and expressed acceptance of them.404
In some respects, courts exercise meaningful discretion within this space.
As noted in Part II(A), neither the Legislation Law nor the Supervision Law
provide statutory definitions for terms such as “conflict with,” “contravene” or
“inconsistent.” Although the NPCSC LAC attempted to define “conflict with”
in its explanation of the Legislation Law, the explanation is not binding. The
statutory gap leaves judicial organs with some discretion. Under the language
of Article 86(2), courts exercise discretion in deciding whether conflicts
between local regulations and ministry rules should be submitted to the State
Council for a ruling. The NPCSC LAC has validated this discretion in past
cases.405 Moreover, as noted above, the SPC’s 2004 Summary Record and 2009
Provisions on Legal Citation instruct courts to submit conflicts to legislative
(most scholars at a Qinghua conference believed that when courts identify conflicts
between higher-level and lower-level legislation, they should apply the higher-level
legislation); Discussion of Authority, supra note 106 (acknowledging divergent opinions
on the practice, but arguing that the Legislation Law resolved this problem and that
courts are not required to send all conflicts to legislative organs for a ruling;
precondition for courts sending conflicts for a ruling is that they cannot make a
determination themselves; filing and review and judicial application of legal rules are
not mutually exclusive); Pan, supra note 256, at 133; Wang, supra note 43, at § 1.
401

See, e.g., Yang, supra note 316 (courts have no authority to apply conflicting
lower-level legislation); Feng, supra note 329 at § 2(1)—2(2) (courts have the power and
the responsibility to evaluate the consistency of norms at different levels and must be
loyal to the Constitution and law).
402

Renmin Jianchayuan Minshi Xingzheng Kangsu Anjian Ban’an Guize (
) [People’s Procuratorate Rules for Handling Protests
of Civil and Administrative Cases] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Proc., Sept. 30, 2001,
effective Sept. 30, 2001) art. 37(3), SUP. PEOPLE’S PROC. GAZ., Jan. 1, 2001, at 24.
403

Yang, supra note 316; Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file
with author) (conflicts rules are grounded in the Constitution; to deny them is to deny
the Constitution, so legislative organs must accept these practices).
404

Meeting with Filing and Review Officials, July 2012 (on file with author);
Meeting with Senior Hunan Legislative Officials, July 2012 (on file with author).
405

Wang, supra note 122, at § 3(2) (recounting a 2003 case in which the NPCSC
LAC instructed the SPC that if the court believes it should apply the local regulation, it
should do so).
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organs only if they cannot determine the proper application of relevant
legislation on their own. Courts may also exercise discretion when multiple
Legislation Law rules apply and lead to different results.406 Although courts
may request instructions from higher courts and ultimately the SPC, decisions
on the majority of conflicts are made within the judicial system and without
consulting legislative organs.407 From this perspective, courts not only choose
which legislation to apply, but also decide when a conflict exists and when to
consult legislative organs.
However, in other respects, the position of the courts is fragile. For
example, lower courts do not exercise any formal power to interpret law. The
NPC’s delegation of interpretation power to the SPC applies only to the
interpretation of national law, not to other types of legislation. The process of
determining that a legislative conflict exists may require courts to interpret the
legislation at issue. Although these lines are stretched in practice (in most
cases, the act of applying legislation involves an act of interpretation at some
level), limitations on the formal authority to interpret legislation may
discourage courts from acting too aggressively in identifying conflicts.
Courts are also cautious in disregarding conflicting lower-level legislation.
Senior Party leaders have stated explicitly that China must not blindly copy
Western governance models and does not implement a system of separation of
powers.408 Courts are constitutionally subordinate to people’s congresses at the
corresponding level, which supervise their work and have the power to
appoint and remove senior judges. The cases discussed in Part IV(B)
demonstrate the potential for retaliation against judges who step too far. Local
people’s governments control the finances, salaries, and benefits of courts and
judges at the corresponding level. In dealing with conflicts, courts may find
themselves confronting the entire local Party-state structure. As one
Guangzhou judge notes in discussing legislative conflicts, the Seed Case left
many judges with “lingering fears,” and courts must exercise their authority to
apply legislation cautiously, avoid confrontation, and “strive for balance and a
subtle boundary.”409
Courts employ a variety of strategies to cope with their fragile position.
Some courts find creative ways to avoid confronting legislative conflicts. For
example, judges may dispose of cases on procedural grounds or substantive
406

Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author).

407

Wang, supra note 122, at § 2(2); Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012
(most conflicts are resolved within the judicial system and consultation with legislative
organs takes place in only a small number of cases) (on file with author).
408

See, e.g., We Should Not Copy Western System: Wu, PEOPLES DAILY [ENGLISH
EDITION], Mar. 10, 2009.
409

Feng, supra note 329, at Introduction, §§ 1(1), 1(3), 2(2). As Judge Feng
acknowledges, “[I]n practice there are many departments that censure courts for the
act of correctly applying the law.”
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grounds other than those related to the conflict.410 Another strategy is to
interpret the relevant legislation (sometimes creatively) to avoid finding
conflicts.411 In some cases, courts avoid analyzing conflicts by noting that
legislation has been filed with and (presumably) reviewed by higher-level
legislative organs.412
Courts may also pressure parties to mediate. Although mediation is
prohibited in administrative cases, Chinese courts faced with the difficult task
of ruling against local administrative organs often undertake “coordination” or
“reconciliation” in an effort to encourage settlements.413 In the context of such
“coordination” meetings or even after trials have concluded, judges may
suggest to administrative organs that a rule conflicts with higher-level
legislation and should be amended. Finally, if the conflict touches on an
important local interest and the local promulgating organ persists in its
opinion on the matter, some courts relent and apply the local legislation.414 If
the disputed legislation involves a minor issue rather than a clear conflict,
courts may have some room to maneuver around the conflict. Avoiding
410

Feng, supra note 329, at § 3(1); Wang Jing (
), Cong Xingsu Anjian Kan
Laojiao Zhidu Gaige Lujing (
) [Looking at the Path for
Reforming Re-education Through Labor From Administrative Lawsuits], Guojia
Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao (
) [J. OF THE CHINESE ACADEMY OF
GOVERNANCE], no. 3, 2012, at 97–102 (surveying administrative cases involving reeducation through labor decisions and the creative ways that courts avoid the widely
acknowledged conflict between re-education through labor provisions and national
law).
411

Discussion of Review Standards, supra note 16 (comments of SPC Justice Kong
Xiangjun, who notes that “pure” conflicts are uncommon and that in most cases courts
engage in legal interpretation); Wang, supra note 122, at §§ 3(1), 4(1)–(2); Feng, supra
note 329, at § 3(2); Discussion of Authority, supra note 106, at § 4.
412

See, e.g., Guangzhou Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Guangzhou Zhujiang Niunai
Youxian Gongsi yu Wang Jiafeng Gongshang Baoxian Daiyu Jiufen Shangsu An
(
)
[Appellate Case of the Worker Compensation Benefits Dispute Between the Guangzhou
Pearl River Milk Co. and Wang Jiafeng], Guangzhou Interm. People’s Ct., Nov. 2, 2010
(Chinalawinfo).
413

Feng, supra note 329, at §§ 3(1), 3(2); Hand, supra note 236, at 139–43. For one
discussion of court reluctance to challenge the legality of normative documents
establishing the re-education through system and related efforts to “coordinate” with
public security on difficult re-education through labor cases, see Han Yong, Laojiao
Kunjing Yinfa “Yuhui” Zhihui (
“
”
) [The Re-Education Through
Labor Predicament Triggers “Roundabout” Thinking], Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (
) [CHINA NEWSWEEK ONLINE], Jan. 21, 2008, at 40–41.
414

Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author); Interview
with Legal Scholar C, July 2012 (on file with author).
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conflicts and preserving the face of promulgating organs are clearly first lines
of defense for courts fearful of offending local legislative authorities.
If lower courts cannot avoid conflicts, they often request instructions from
higher courts. In many cases, such requests are elevated to the SPC. Wang
Guisong characterizes the request for instructions as a “golden shield” that
courts use to mitigate risk.415 Because SPC replies to such requests are binding,
they help local courts resist pressure by shifting responsibility for decisions to
the SPC. In theory, such requests should be limited to difficult or complex
legal issues, and SPC replies, once issued, should guide lower courts in
subsequent cases.416 However, there are no specific rules that dictate when a
court may or may not request instructions.417 In practice, some courts request
instructions on legislative conflicts even when the conflict has been addressed
in a previous SPC reply.418
Courts are also cautious with their language. One judge advises courts to
avoid the use of “sensitive” words on the issue of validity. Instead, judges
should apply the law and use “tactful” terms like “inconsistent” or “not in
accord with” to indicate that there is a conflict.419 In the judgments examined
for this study, courts were generally reserved in their discussions of conflicts.
In most cases, courts simply cited the Legislation Law and applied the higherlevel legislation. To the extent that they engaged in more expansive discussion
of conflicts, they did so in case abstracts or commentaries attached to
judgments rather than in the judgments themselves. Even the SPC is careful in
its replies. It is cautious in commenting on most legislation and seems to
reserve more robust language for conflicts involving rules.420 Generally, judges
avoid the suggestion that they are engaging in “constitutional review” or
“judicial review of legislation” and instead emphasize that they are exercising
their “authority to choose the application of the law” (
)
(shiyong falü xuanze quan).421
415

Wang, supra note 122, at § 1. For discussion of a case in which SPC intervention
proved decisive in protecting a local court against legislative backlash, see Randall
Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts: Legalized Governance, Judicialization, and
Dejudicializaiton in China, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 185 (Tom
Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds., 2009).
416

Feng, supra note 329, § 3(2); Wang, supra note 122, § 4(1).

417

Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author).

418

Wang, supra note 122, at § 4(1); Wang, supra note 329, at 127.

419

Feng, supra note 329, § 3(2).

420

Wang, supra note 122, at § 4(2).

421

Feng, supra note 329, §§ 2(2), 3. See also Peng, supra note 339, at 117-21 (results
of 2005 survey indicating that most judges in one court simply apply higher-level
legislation without commenting on conflicts and characterize their actions as either
“choosing application of the legislation” (67%) or interpreting legislation (21%). Only
31% characterize their action as “judicial review”).
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The SPC itself consults with NPCSC and State Council organs on issues
related to conflicts. In cases involving rules or other normative documents, the
SPC typically makes its own decision on conflicts. However, if a conflict relates
to a sensitive matter or to a national law or State Council administrative
regulation, the SPC often (but not always) solicits the opinion of the NPCSC
LAC, the State Council LAO, or both. In almost all such cases, the SPC notes in
its official reply that such consultations took place.422 Once legislative officials
provide their opinion on a conflict, the SPC may handle similar conflicts in the
future without such consultations. Because the NPCSC supervises the
legislation of provincial people’s congresses (and the State Council supervises
the legislation of provincial people’s governments), such consultations help to
insulate courts from backlash.423 They are also consistent with a political-legal
culture that emphasizes consensus building.
In some cases, courts may simply decline to address conflicts or defer to
legislative organs on sensitive legal issues. For example, courts refrain from
applying the Constitution as a legal basis for deciding cases and have not
addressed conflicts with the Constitution by disregarding conflicting lowerlevel legislation. 424 By extension, they avoid problems involving NPC and
NPCSC laws, as the NPC is the highest organ of state power and the
Constitution is the only source of law with higher rank in the legal
hierarchy.425
Courts are also careful in handling conflicts that touch on sensitive issues.
The legality of administrative provisions on the controversial re-education
through labor (RETL) system provides a good example. In a 1999 document on
a conflict between an RETL notice and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the
SPC Administrative Tribunal acknowledged inconsistency but stated candidly:

422

See, e.g., 1993 Fujian Fisheries Reply, supra note 369; 2011 Jiangsu Salt Case
Reply, supra note 13. Occasionally, if there is a division of opinion within the NPCSC
LAC or State Council LAO (or among them), the SPC will not mention the consultation
in its official reply. Interview with Senior Chinese Judge, July 2012 (on file with author).
423

Wang, supra note 122, at § 2(1) (noting with respect to one conflict that the SPC,
NPCSC LAC, and the State Council LAO “joined forces” to deny application of a Fujian
local regulation).
424
425

Id. at §§ 3(1), 4(2).

As Cai Dingjian states, “[t]he ideal method is of course to resolve [legislative
conflicts] through judicial methods . . . But presently, this is not a reality. China’s
system is a people’s congress system. The NPCSC is the highest organ of state power.
Can the SPC refuse to apply law that the NPC has promulgated?” Cai & Li, supra note
258 (see also the comments of Xia Jianlin). In some cases, courts may grapple with
technical conflicts between NPC laws. For example, one court addressed a conflict
between two laws that provided different time requirements for arbitration
applications. Guangzhou Labor Arbitration Case, supra note 396.
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However, before the state standardizes the re-education
through labor system in the form of law, denying the
effectiveness of this notice will generate instability. Therefore,
taking the overall perspective of stability as the point of
departure, people’s courts, when adjudicating administrative
cases on re-education through labor, should still view this
notice as an effective normative document.426

Although many jurists argue that China’s RETL provisions conflict with
national law, lower courts have avoided confronting these conflicts head-on.427
Courts have demonstrated limited willingness to address conflicts between
specific RETL provisions in a manner that benefits citizens.428 However, they
simply cannot address the sensitive issue of whether the provisions that
establish the RETL system violate the Constitution and national law.
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Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Shenpanting Guanyu “Renmin Fayuan Shenli
Laodong Jiaoyang Xingzheng Anjian Shifou Zunxun ‘Xingshi Susong Fa’ Queli de Jiben
Yuanze de Qingshi” de Dafu (
<
>
) [SPC Administrative
Tribunal’s Reply on People’s Courts Respecting the Basic Principles of the Criminal
Procedure Law when Adjudicating Administrative Cases on Re-Education Through
Labor] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. Administrative Tribunal, Oct. 18, 1999,
effective Oct. 18, 1999) (Chinalawinfo).
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For an excellent example, see Henan Sheng Xinxiang Shi Zhongji Renmin
Fayuan Li Xu yu Henan Sheng Xinxiang Shi Renmin Zhengfu Laodong Jiaoyang Guanli
Weiyuanhui Laodong Jiaoyang Jiufen Shangsu An (
) [Appellate Case at
Henan Province Xinxiang City Intermediate People’s Court Involving the Re-education
Through Labor Dispute Between Li Xu and the Henan Province Xinxiang City People’s
Government Re-education Through Labor Committee], Xinxiang City Interm. People’s
Ct., Nov. 15, 2010 (Chinalawinfo) (dodging a citizen argument that that RETL provisions
violate the Legislation Law and noting that the provisions had been reviewed in
legislative “clean up” campaigns). See also Han, supra note 413, at 39–41.
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In 2005, the SPC issued a reply on a conflict between a State Council decision
on the RETL system and a Ministry of Public Security provision on handling RETL
cases. The SPC found that the State Council decision established recidivism as a
condition for sentencing certain individuals who committed theft to RETL. The MPS
provision eliminated this condition. The SPC determined that the MPS provision was
not consistent with the State Council decision and that a first offender could not be
subjected to RETL. Guanyu Nengfou Dui Jin You Yi Ci Daoqie Xingwei de Gongmin
Shishi Laodong Jiaoyang Wenti de Dafu (
) [Reply on Whether RETL May be Imposed on a Citizen Who Has
Committed Theft Only Once] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 21, 2005,
effective July 21, 2005) (Chinalawinfo). For a fascinating discussion of some of the other
creative methods that courts have used to overrule RETL decisions, see generally
Wang, supra note 410.
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Accommodation of limited judicial review is in part the product of an
understanding that filing and review organs lack the capacity to address most
legislative conflicts. Leading legal scholars complain that the process of
submitting conflicts for legislative rulings, which can take as long as two or
three years to complete, is “inefficient” and that it is impractical for courts to
suspend cases and apply for ruling every time they face a conflict.429 Other
scholars note that filing and review is problematic because it is difficult for
review organs to discover conflicts in the abstract.430 Similarly, a People’s Daily
article acknowledged that the “limitations to these methods [filing and review
and clean-up campaigns] are difficult to overcome” and that they are
“insufficient to cope with the demands of judicial practice.”431 While noting
problems with implementing judicial review in China’s constitutional system,
senior scholars argue that allowing courts to play a greater role in managing
legislative conflicts would be a more effective approach.432
The practical solution to these capacity problems is to accommodate a
limited judicial role that creates modest tensions in China’s constitutional
framework but provides a necessary supplement to the work of filing and
review organs. As the discussion above makes clear, in evaluating legislative
conflicts, disregarding conflicting lower-level legislation, and applying higherlevel legislation, Chinese courts are in fact engaging in a limited form of
judicial review. Pan Aiguo captures this idea in a 2011 article:
Because at present review by legislative and administrative
organs has not played the role that it should in practice, the
final backstop of review by judicial organs is extremely
important . . . Because China’s judicial organs do not possess a
complete power to review laws and regulations, this review

429

Cai & Li, supra note 258 (statements of Cai Dingjian, Li Honglei); Lawyers
Propose Review, supra note 358; Discussion of Authority, supra note 106, at § 4.
430

Horizontal Legislative Conflicts, supra note 16 (comments of Wang Fanghua).

431

Xie, supra note 358.

432

Cai & Li, supra note 258 (comments of Cai Dingjian, Wang Lei, and Wang
Chenguang); China Establishes Special Organ, supra note 250 (comments of Jiang
Ming’an and He Weifang); Horizontal Legislative Conflicts, supra note 16 (comments of
Chinese University of Politics and Law scholars Wang Fanghua and Wang Jingbo
noting the limitations of formal legislative supervision mechanisms and arguing that it
would be more efficient to expand judicial roles in addressing legislative conflicts).
Even Li Xiaojuan, the Beijing legislative official who argued that courts must suspend
all cases and seek legislative rulings, acknowledged that while “under the current
system, [legislative conflicts] cannot be resolved through the judiciary . . . this need
really does exist.” Cai & Li, supra note 258.
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power is limited to the “authority to choose the application of
the law . . .”433

Chinese scholars and even China’s Legal Daily have referred to judicial choice
of legislation as “limited,” “incomplete” or “rudimentary” judicial review.434
Most legal actors in China have accepted and even encouraged this limited
form of judicial review. As the reform era has evolved and the limited capacity
of the filing and review system has become more apparent, this convention has
become more deeply embedded in China’s legal system and its boundaries
have been defined more clearly through practice.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PRAGMATIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL REFORM
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

V.

Unwritten conventions shape constitutional dynamics in many legal
systems. As an analysis of the multiple layers of China’s legislative supervision
system demonstrates, such conventions may evolve as responses to practical
problems in law and governance. They may also contribute to such problems.
In the case of legislative conflicts in China, we find practices that on the
surface appear aberrational. Legislative organs possess the formal power to
amend and annul conflicting lower-level legislation. However, despite
widespread recognition that the problem of legislative conflicts is severe, they
rarely (or, in the case of the NPCSC, never) exercise this formal power.
Unwritten conventions that emphasize consultation, consensus building, and
unity under Party leadership limit the ability of legislative organs to exercise
these formal powers in practice. Moreover, supervision organs depend heavily
on the voluntary compliance and cooperation of lower-level legislative organs
to address most conflicts. As such, they cannot afford to alienate these
legislative organs by aggressively applying their formal powers.
Conversely, China’s courts have no formal constitutional authority to
review and invalidate legislation. However, limited judicial review provides an
433
434

Pan, supra note 256, at 133–34.

See, e.g., From the Li Huijuan Case, supra note 358 (using the term “limited
judicial review”); Pan, supra note 256, at 134 (referring to the power alternately as
“incomplete authority to review legislation” and a “rudimentary review authority”);
Channels for Resolving Conflicts, supra note 16 (comments of SPC Judge Liao Fengyun,
noting that the power is “incomplete” and that some scholars refer to it as “roundabout
review”). As discussed in note 421, judges in one court differed in how they
characterized the authority they were exercising, with nearly one-third referring to it as
“judicial review authority.” As Peng Yan’an notes, the overwhelming majority of
scholars view choice in application of legislation as at least “limited judicial review”
and, while some judges may be cautious and characterize the authority they are
exercising as the authority to “choose the application of legislation,” the choice of terms
does not change what courts are doing in practice. Peng, supra note 339, at 117–18, 121.
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important stopgap for addressing legislative conflicts in the context of
individual cases. Judicial organs arguably have a constitutional duty to apply
the provisions on legislative hierarchy in the Constitution and the Legislation
Law. The scope of court authority to interpret law and address conflicts is
contested and fragile. Nonetheless, as we have seen, acceptance of limited
judicial review of legislation has strengthened as the filing and review system
has evolved and its limitations have become clear. Chinese legal actors may
not explicitly identify the court practice of reviewing and disregarding
conflicting lower-level legislation as “judicial review of legislation.” However,
as Tushnet has observed, “allocation strategies may be designed, consciously
or otherwise, to conceal the reality of judicial review . . . to pretend that courts
are permitting the people to be truly self-governing in the areas subject to
weak-form review.435 Even in the United States, strong-form judicial review
evolved only gradually and did not take its current form until the 20th
century.436 While we should not assume that Chinese courts are on a trajectory
toward, or even have a desire to establish, “strong-form” judicial review, it is
also problematic to insist that Chinese courts are not engaging in a limited
form of judicial review in practice.
These observations highlight the need for integrated approaches to the
study of legal problems in China. In the case of legislative conflicts, a
compartmentalized analysis of the filing and review system clearly is
inadequate. China’s system for supervising legislation and resolving conflicts
operates as a multilayered system shaped by capacity challenges. We can think
of these multiple layers as a cascading system of containers, with lower
containers designed to catch overflow from containers above and pumps at
lower levels that recycle selected conflicts back to the top container.
The formal filing and review system is the first container. As we have seen,
filing and review organs and their subordinate departments face an
overwhelming flow of legislation and cannot review, identify, and address
most conflicts. Limited judicial review provides a second container that
catches some of the overflow and supplements the review system. The ability
of courts to assess legislative conflicts internally and apply higher-level
legislation to decide concrete cases provides some parties with remedies. If
courts could not perform this function, many claims would be held up for
years as courts or citizens filed proposals with legislative organs to address
conflicts. Such a result would be problematic. China’s political-legal system
places enormous emphasis on social stability, and unresolved disputes are
potentially destabilizing.437
435

Tushnet, supra note 351, at 2802.
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Tushnet, supra note 351. For a detailed historical account of this evolution, see
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2004).
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See generally Minzner, supra note 272.
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The capacity of the judicial container is also limited and generates its own
overflow. As noted above, courts generally have avoided addressing conflicts
involving the Constitution or sensitive issues such as RETL. Courts fearful of
such sensitive issues or of local government power may leave parties without a
judicial remedy. China has borrowed from the practice of civil law systems,
and a judgment is binding only in the case at hand (at least formally). Court
decisions in concrete cases do not provide remedies for parties facing repeated
contact with the same conflicting legal provisions. Such parties must raise the
conflicts issue anew in each subsequent case.438 In the meantime, they face the
uncertainty of deciding whether to comply with legislation that other political
actors may continue to enforce and assessing the risk that a new court may
view the conflict differently.439 Chinese courts also are hostile to collective
litigation.440 As such, limited judicial review does not provide a remedy for
groups that have collective grievances and seek repeal or amendment of
conflicting lower-level legislation.
Citizen proposal mechanisms provide a third container that catches some
of this overflow from the courts and recycles conflicts back into the top
container (the filing and review system). Filing and Review Office officials note
that many citizen review proposals relate to individual cases, an indication
that some citizens who fail to obtain a remedy in the judicial system (or
through other adjudicative mechanisms such as administrative
reconsideration) are using the review mechanism as an alternative.441 Many
other proposals involve collective claims or attempts to address legislative
conflicts that are chronic or destabilizing. For example, 1,600 Hepatitis B
carriers filed a collective proposal calling for review of legislation that
discriminated against them. Other proposals have called for review of
legislation on property seizures or legislation that discriminates against
citizens with rural residence registrations.442 These are the types of claims that
courts often cannot or will not address in individual cases. As discussed in Part
III(E), while filing and review organs have not issued formal written responses
438

Peerenboom, supra note 7, at 212–13.

439
The prospect of such conflicting decisions is one reason some civil law
jurisdictions have been hostile to the idea of vesting ordinary courts with the power to
review legislation. Capelletti, supra note 351, at 1041–44.
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See generally Jun Xie & Lijuan Sun, Access to Collective Litigations [sic] in
China: A Tough Work, 3 J. POL. & L. 45, 45–55 (Mar. 2010).
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Meeting with Filing and Review Office Officials, July 2012 (on file with author).

For the Hepatitis B proposal, see 1611 Ren Suqing Weixian Shencha Huyu Xiugai
Gongwuyuan Zhaokao Jinling (1611
) [1611
People Appeal for Constitutional Review and Call for Amendment of Ban on
Recruitment and Testing of Public Servants], Xinjing Bao (
) [Beijing News
Online], Nov. 12, 2003. For a discussion of review proposals on property seizures, see
Hand, supra note 236, at 115–25.
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to such proposals, in some cases they have responded with limited legislative
or policy reforms. Citizen review proposals provide a mechanism for
channeling some legislative conflicts back into the formal filing and review
system. Citizen review proposals also help overwhelmed filing and review
organs prioritize their work by alerting them to conflicts that are generating
public anger. To understand how these layers developed and the functions
they perform, they must be evaluated as part of an interactive, multilayered
system.
Even this multilayered system cannot address all conflicts. Constitutional
claims or conflicts involving legislative pillars of Party-state power present
significant difficulty. As discussed in Part III(C), the NPCSC lacks the political
capacity to adjudicate constitutional claims through a formal adjudicative
process. Domestic reformers and international agencies focusing on the
problem of legislative conflicts should recognize that establishing a
meaningful process for constitutional review of legislation probably is not
feasible in the absence of broader political reform. Given the sensitivity of
constitutional review, pressuring filing and review organs or courts to review
the constitutionality of legislation may slow progress on addressing a broader
range of conflicts involving legislation at lower levels of the system. Reformers
may be better served by first improving legislation, institutions, and
procedures for resolving mundane lower-level conflicts and then working from
this foundation to promote constitutional review in the future.443
Despite such limitations, courts and citizens have found ways to leverage
the space created by institutional responses to legislative conflicts and related
capacity problems. In so doing, they have promoted their own interests. As
other scholars have noted, Chinese courts have demonstrated pragmatism and
a capacity for limited reform, innovation, and autonomy in the face of difficult
constitutional and political constraints.444 One Chinese scholar of the SPC
argues that the SPC has used its limited judicial interpretation authority in
subtle but important ways to expand its institutional authority. 445 Such
443

For one Chinese argument along these lines, see Wang, supra note 233, at § 4
(constitutional review may be premature; China should focus on improving legality
review first).
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See, e.g., Benjamin Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 2 (2007), at § IV; Nicholas Calcina Howson, Judicial Independence and the
Company Law in the Shanghai Courts, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR
GLOBAL RULE OF LAW PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010) 134–153; Taisu Zhang,
The Pragmatic Court: Reinterpreting the Supreme People’s Court of China, 25 COLUM. J.
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security and status in China political-legal system); Xin He, Judicial Innovation and
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JOURNAL, Jan. 2013, 20–43.
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Xiao, supra note 316, at 347–49.
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dynamics are evident here. To address capacity limitations, legislative organs
allow courts to interpret law for application in concrete cases and to choose
the legislation that applies in the event of conflicts. Courts have cultivated this
space through cautious implementation, consultation with legislative organs
on both specific conflicts and general guidelines for handling conflicts, and, as
the Seed Case demonstrated, strategic retreat. In some respects, courts have
gently expanded their authority, as the 2004 Summary Record and 2009 SPC
Provisions on Legal Citation illustrate. Although these judicial practices
remain tenuous and subject to continued balancing, other legal actors have
accommodated them. Such dynamics demonstrate that China’s courts have
found space to expand their authority in cautious ways that address concrete
problems and accommodate the interests of, rather than overtly challenge,
other Party-state actors.446
Citizens have also exploited space created by institutional responses to the
problem of legislative conflicts. Legislators may have intended citizen review
proposal mechanisms primarily as one-way information channels designed to
alleviate capacity deficiencies. However, some citizens have treated the
mechanisms more like constitutional litigation procedures and have raised
review proposals in an effort to establish constitutional review precedents. For
example, rights lawyer Xu Zhiyong refuses to refer to review proposals as
“petitions.” As Xu argues, “our constitutional review proposals are not a plea
to some leader, but are legal documents that are raised in strict accordance
with the provisions of the Legislation Law (emphasis added).”447 Others have
used the mechanism as a platform for protest, to advance broad political
claims about rule of law, or to pressure the Party-state to engage in systemwide legal reforms on sensitive issues. Some citizens raise review proposals not
with the expectation of obtaining a concrete legal response but instead as part
of a long-term effort to raise citizen constitutional consciousness and shape
446

Judge Feng Xi’s article on legislative conflicts captures this pragmatism and
caution perfectly. Feng, supra note 329. See also Liebman, supra note 444, at 37–41
(courts have space to innovate because they serve as a safety valve, reflect Party
interests in modest institutional competition, and are not viewed as rival sources of
power); Randall Peerenboom, Between Global Norms and Domestic Realities: Judicial
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TRANSFER 181-202 (John Gillespie ed., 2012) (courts accept some limits on their power
and refrain from challenging other actors in exchange for cooperation that enhances
their authority in other aspects).
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Xu Zhiyong (
), Weixian Shencha Gongmin Jianyi (Gongmin Weiquan Di
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)) [Citizen Proposals for Constitutional Review
(Citizen Rights Defense Part Two)], Gongshi Wang (
) [CONSENSUS ONLINE], Apr. 2,
2011. For a general discussion of this dynamic, see Hand, Citizens Engage the
Constitution, supra note 9, at 224, 226, 230–33, 241; Wang, supra note 233, at §§ 1, 4;
Yang Tao (
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China’s political environment.448 In creating the review proposal mechanism,
Chinese leaders provided citizens with a legal channel that they could use to
disseminate sensitive constitutional arguments and to highlight tensions
between the Constitution and Party-state practice. Citizens are leveraging this
space to advance reform agendas that are not always consistent with Partystate interests.
This article also reveals both potential pitfalls and subtle but important
opportunities for Chinese reformers and international agencies working on
legislative conflicts. Reformers may be tempted to focus on strengthening the
capacity of filing and review offices. There is little doubt that developing the
capacity of this system is one part of the reform picture. Central filing and
review offices with fewer than twenty staff members and provincial offices
with three to five employees and minimal budgets clearly lack the capacity to
carry out even limited review functions effectively. Some offices work with
people’s congress special committees or other departments to conduct review,
but these entities have a host of other duties. Some filing and review
employees lack adequate legal training. Particularly at the sub-provincial level,
specialized filing and review offices are undeveloped (if they exist at all).
Strengthening filing and review organs and their specialized departments is
consistent with capacity development guidelines that emphasize the need to
take account of local contexts and work with existing institutions and
stakeholders. Accordingly, such an approach may appeal to international
development agencies.
The results of efforts to strengthen filing and review organs may be
disappointing, however. Central filing and review organs are unlikely to ever
have the capacity to address legislative conflicts in a comprehensive and
effective manner. NPCSC Filing and Review Office officials estimate that they
would need around three hundred new employees and significant additional
resources to review all legislation that is filed with the NPCSC.449 Expansion on
this scale seems unlikely.450 Even if it were possible, it would only address one
dimension of a multidimensional capacity problem. Filing and review organs
would still face the difficult task of identifying conflicts in thousands of
effective laws and regulations in the abstract. To the extent these technical
capacity challenges could be overcome, filing and review organs would
continue to face problems of political capacity. Bifurcation of filing and review
procedures and replication of these structures at lower levels of the system
help alleviate some capacity problems. However, they also make central filing
and review organs dependent on the lower-level organs they supervise.
448
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Moreover, enhancing the capacity of local filing and review organs and their
subordinate departments would not alleviate review bottlenecks at the
national level. Filing and review organs clearly need more resources and better
trained personnel, but they probably will never have the capacity to effectively
address the problem of legislative conflicts in China’s large and complex
system.
As an alternative, reformers may be tempted to strengthen the authority
of people’s courts to review legislation. Such steps are unlikely to be effective
in the short to medium term and may even be counterproductive. China’s
constitutional system is grounded in a theory of legislative supremacy.
Granting courts the authority to invalidate people’s congress legislation would
require amendments to the Constitution, the Local Organic Law, and other
statutes. 451 Such efforts would almost certainly trigger people’s congress
resistance and a sensitive debate over China’s constitutional structure.452
One alternative might be to expand court authority gradually. Indeed,
Chinese scholars have proposed amendments to the Administrative Litigation
Law that would empower courts to review and invalidate normative
documents and administrative rules.453 However, even this modest reform is
likely to face significant obstacles in practice. Twenty years after the adoption
of the ALL, courts continue to face well-documented problems in exercising
even their limited authority to review concrete administrative acts. 454
Although the ALL prohibits “mediation” of administrative lawsuits, courts
have promoted “reconciliation” and “coordination” of administrative lawsuits
in part to avoid issuing judgments that are difficult to enforce and may anger
local authorities.455 Although the SPC has authorized courts to comment on
451
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the legality of normative documents, judges indicate that they rarely do so.456
As Peerenboom has argued, the recent trend has been to de-judicialize
sensitive or complex disputes.457
These problems will not suddenly disappear if courts are granted the
authority to invalidate rules. Moreover, court action would still be shaped by
conventions that emphasize informal consultation and consensus building as
opposed to formal decisions to annul legislation. If the NPCSC and State
Council refrain from issuing such decisions, it is unlikely that people’s courts
will issue them on a systematic basis. Instead, they are more likely to
“coordinate” such issues. While the possibility of judicial action may give
administrative entities some incentive to self-police, placing local courts in
more direct confrontation with local people’s governments could exacerbate
existing tensions and generate backlash that might ultimately weaken judicial
authority.458
A pragmatic and nuanced approach would seek to leverage and integrate
existing institutional roles and patterns of interaction in ways that enhance
the efficiency, capacity, and effectiveness of the entire multilayered system.
China’s more than three thousand local courts are an important resource for
identifying and analyzing legislative conflicts. Courts regularly confront
legislative conflicts that arise in the context of concrete cases. While the
note 2, at 247. For a discussion of efforts to promote “reconciliation” of administrative
lawsuits, see, e.g., Feng, supra note 329, at § 1(1), (3); Zhang Xiaohua (
), Guanyu
Xingzheng Susong Hejie Zhidu de Sikao (
) [Reflections on
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)
[PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], Mar. 22, 2011; Min Gao Guan: Hejie Chu Shuangying (
) [Citizens Sue Officials: Reconciliation Produces a Double Win], Shanxi
Xinwen Wang (
) [SHANXI NEWS ONLINE], July 4, 2010.
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professional capacity of judges in some basic-level courts is limited, most
judges have legal training and experience in researching and applying complex
legislation. Rather than reallocating constitutional authorities or placing
courts in more direct confrontation with legislators, Chinese reformers and
the international agencies supporting them should explore ways to reinforce
the role that courts play and better integrate it with the work of the filing and
review system.
What steps could be taken to leverage the work of courts? One meaningful
step would be to amend the Legislation Law to validate the authority of courts
to choose the applicable legislation when they encounter conflicts. This could
be achieved with the addition of language to Chapter Five providing explicitly
that judicial and administrative organs shall apply the conflicts rules in
carrying out their respective duties. People’s courts are already doing so, and
other legal actors have accommodated and even encouraged the practice.
However, the lack of an explicit statutory provision leaves courts in a
vulnerable position. An amendment to the Legislation Law would flip a
presumption that lingers among a minority of scholars and legislators, place
the imprimatur of China’s highest organ of state power on existing practices,
and provide courts cover that could help insulate them from local legislative
backlash.
More importantly, reformers should consider ways to improve
communication between people’s courts that identify and analyze legislative
conflicts in their daily work and filing and review organs that have the formal
power to eliminate such conflicts. At the national level, the NPCSC LAC and
State Council LAO are alerted to a small number of conflicts when the SPC
consults these offices prior to issuing replies to lower courts. However, many
conflicts are addressed within the court system and without such consultation.
In my discussions with legislative officials at the national and local level, it was
clear that filing and review offices do not systematically track individual
judgments in which courts disregard conflicting lower-level legislation.
For overwhelmed filing and review organs, the day-to-day work of the
courts provides an important resource that could bolster their review capacity.
The SPC should provide the NPCSC LAC and State Council LAO with copies of
replies that address legislative conflicts and are resolved without their input.
More importantly, legislative and judicial organs should explore ways to
encourage lower-level courts to report legislative conflicts discovered in the
course of adjudication.459 People’s congresses could require such reporting.
However, a more effective approach might be to incentivize courts by
including such reporting in evaluation standards for judges. Reporting of a
legislative conflict that filing and review organs eventually recognize and
resolve could be considered a “plus” factor in evaluations for judicial
459
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promotion or commendation.460 Such reporting would help filing and review
organs identify legislative conflicts that are generating actual disputes and
provide a head start in analyzing them. To insulate local courts from
confrontations with local people’s congresses and people’s governments,
courts could report conflicts vertically through the judicial hierarchy in the
same way that they elevate requests for instructions. The SPC or provincial
high courts could then report the issue to the relevant filing and review
organs.461 Courts might also quietly encourage parties or their lawyers to file
review proposals under the relevant citizen review proposal provisions.
Legislators should also consider inviting judges and scholars to participate
as experts in the analysis of legislative conflicts and consultations to resolve
them. Some local provisions allow filing and review organs or their
subordinate departments to consult outside experts and even the general
public as they analyze conflicts. These provisions might be expanded to
include judges and incorporated into procedures at the national level.
Legislative organs might also consider involving judges in the informal
consultations they undertake to address most conflicts. Judicial involvement
in such consultations could provide a useful mechanism for preventing
misunderstandings, encouraging consensus building, and pre-empting
backlash against courts that identify conflicts. Judicial involvement would also
place the weight of judicial expertise behind the opinion of filing and review
organs on the conflict at issue.
This type of institutional communication and dialogue is consistent with
some existing Chinese practices. For example, the Administrative
Reconsideration Law contains a rudimentary mechanism along these lines.462
In recent years, the SPC has also worked to strengthen the system for “judicial
suggestions” (
) (sifa jianyi) to state organs. Specifically, the SPC has
encouraged courts at all levels to raise “judicial suggestions” on a wide range of
pressing legal and social issues that are discovered in the course of
460
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adjudication work. 463 This effort is part of a broader push to promote a
judiciary that takes the initiative to work with other state organs to resolve
disputes and maintain stability. Courts may send judicial suggestions directly
to the relevant Party organs, people’s congresses, people’s governments, or
people’s government departments. They may also send the suggestions to
higher-level courts for transmission to the relevant organ.464 Xin He’s recent
study of an intermediate people’s court in Jiangsu province demonstrates that
local courts have experienced some success in using carefully drafted judicial
suggestions to “facilitate benign interactions” and rectify unlawful
administrative behavior. The court in He’s study strengthens the impact of
such suggestions by simultaneously sending copies to state and Party
institutions that exercise supervision over the administrative organ in
question.465 The establishment of a system of court notification of legislative
conflicts would be consistent with, and could perhaps even be incorporated
into, judicial suggestion procedures.
This approach is also consistent with practices in other countries. Chinese
scholars argue that people’s court decisions to disregard conflicting lower-level
legislation have a signaling effect and act as a “friendly warning” or “informal
advisory ruling” for legislative organs.466 Similar dynamics are evident in other
jurisdictions with systems of parliamentary supremacy. The Netherlands is an
example of a country with a strong parliament, a weak form of judicial review,
and a political tradition that places heavy emphasis on consultation and
consensus building. There, court commentary on conflicts serves a signaling
function and encourages institutional dialogue.467 Similar observations have
been offered with respect to weak-form judicial review in the United
Kingdom. 468 While Chinese courts may not comment on the validity of
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legislation in their judgments, institutional dialogue could be facilitated
through informal channels appropriate to China’s political-legal context.
With respect to citizen review proposals, some reformers have discussed
requiring central filing and review organs or their subordinate offices to
provide written responses. As discussed in Part III(E), some local people’s
congresses and people’s governments require filing and review organs to
respond to citizen claimants in writing. This practice may be more difficult to
implement at the national level, however. Many review proposals raised with
the NPCSC and State Council involve constitutional or other politically
sensitive claims. Given the sensitive nature of such claims, the NPCSC and
State Council are not likely to publicize review proposals or commit to formal
response requirements.
To avoid such problems, legislators might consider ways to strengthen
citizen analysis of legislative conflicts during the drafting stage. The Chinese
government has aggressively promoted the circulation of draft legislation for
public comment. In some cases, citizens have submitted thousands of
comments on such drafts.469 One provincial-level legislative official noted that
while few citizens have raised review proposals in his jurisdiction, many have
offered comments on draft legislation. 470 Legislative entities might try to
encourage such participation by specifically inviting citizens to analyze draft
legislation for potential conflicts with higher-level legislation. Citizens have
already raised concerns about conflicts in commenting on some draft
legislation.471
There would be several advantages to shifting citizen review to the prepromulgation stage when possible. Legislative entities are likely to be more
flexible on conflicts before they formally promulgate and place their full
authority behind legislation. As discussed in Part III(D), filing and review
469
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organs are reluctant to formally annul legislation because such action may
damage the face and authority of the promulgating organ and because people’s
congress leaders may already have approved such legislation in their capacity
as Party leaders. When legislation is only in draft form, promulgating organs
and Party leaders have a face-saving out and may be less resistant to making
changes.472 In addition, citizens who offer comments on conflicts in draft
legislation are guaranteed at least an indirect form of feedback, as they will
always have the opportunity to review the final legislation and assess whether
changes were made.
Encouraging citizens to identify potential conflicts in the prepromulgation stage is not a comprehensive solution to the problem of citizen
participation and feedback on legislative review proposals. Some conflicts may
not become apparent until legislation is actually implemented in concrete
cases. Some citizens may not be willing to challenge conflicts until their rights
and interests are impacted directly. Moreover, the Party-state may suppress
citizen comments if a conflict is too sensitive.473 However, to the extent that it
is feasible, encouraging this type of citizen participation may ameliorate some
of the problems with post-promulgation review proposals. Such steps would
be consistent with a range of recent legal reforms designed to enhance
government transparency and provide channels for citizen monitoring and
input, including the adoption of China’s Open Government Information
Regulation and broader efforts to encourage citizen comments on draft
legislation.474
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Finally, domestic legal reformers and international agencies should
recognize that it might not be necessary or even desirable to eliminate all
legislative conflicts. China has a history of experimenting with legal and policy
reforms in a few locales before applying them nationwide. In some cases, these
experiments and the normative documents that authorize them violate
existing constitutional and legal provisions. Local experiments on the transfer
of land use rights in the 1980s provide one example.475 While some leading
Chinese scholars have criticized the concept of “benign violations,” others
have argued that some conflicts are an unavoidable and, within limits, a
desirable feature of China’s rapid reform and development. 476 As one
legislative official stated to me, filing and review officials cannot be
“bookworms” who sit in a room and try to root out technical conflicts on
paper. Instead, they need to evaluate conflicts in the context of China’s
broader development and keep the needs of reform in mind.477 Although not
all legislative conflicts are benign, consultative approaches that involve
discussion and consensus building may preserve some flexibility in dealing
with technical conflicts that ultimately help to push Chinese reform agendas
forward.
This final issue provides a useful reminder of the complexity of China’s
evolving political-legal environment. Such complexity must be acknowledged
in considering even the limited reform steps discussed here. A central
argument of this article is that multidimensional problems of capacity have
shaped the evolution and operation of the filing and review system and the
supplemental roles that both courts and citizens play in supervising
legislation. Power dynamics, institutional relationships, and political-legal
conventions limit the capacity of filing and review organs to exercise their
formal powers to annul or amend conflicting legislation. The Party’s role
complicates the exercise of formal constitutional authorities and prompts
legislative organs to resolve intrastate disputes through consultative processes.
In short, the system has evolved as it has, and operates as it does, for complex
reasons.
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In such a political-legal environment, even incremental reforms that
appear simple on paper may be challenging to implement in practice. For
example, the drafters of the Legislation Law may have declined to mention
people’s courts in Chapter Five because the role of courts in applying the
conflicts rules and policing legislation was contested. Even indirect court
reporting of conflicts (for transfer to filing and review organs) may not
adequately alleviate court concerns about local legislative backlash. In the
context of a system that emphasizes face, relationships, and consensus
building, judges may prefer to raise suggestions with promulgating organs
informally, rather than trigger a formal legislative supervision process. 478
Finally, even if the limited steps discussed here were implemented, they would
not address broader concerns related to the inefficiency of the consultative
dispute resolution processes at the core of the filing and review system, lack of
transparency in the review process, the absence of effective constitutional
review mechanisms, and other issues.
While the complexity of China’s political-legal system highlights the need
to approach reform discussions with a healthy dose of humility, it should not
preclude such discussions. The Party-state’s continued emphasis on the
problem of legislative conflicts and its multistage effort to expand the filing
and review system reinforce both the need and desire to improve China’s
legislative supervision system. In China, the problem of legislative conflicts has
been acute in part because the formal institutions and processes for addressing
it lack the capacity to do so effectively. The roles of other actors in the legal
system have evolved over time to address these ongoing deficiencies. As we
work to understand this system, we should think about the roles of filing and
review organs, courts, and citizens in an integrated way. By doing so, we can
begin to make sense of phenomena that appear to be aberrational on the
surface and in turn better understand both the potential for and likely
obstacles to future reform efforts.
Such an understanding highlights subtle but meaningful institutional
synergies and trends that might be reinforced to improve the system. Rather
than trying to alter basic constitutional authorities, roles, and patterns of
interaction that have developed organically over three decades, reformers
should explore pragmatic ways to leverage existing dynamics and shape them
on the margins to make more of their collective potential. As one judge
writing on legislative conflicts candidly observed:
We cannot disregard the rhythm of the judiciary’s slow
maturation. We must be steady but not conservative or rigid,
478
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active but not blindly radical. We must rationally strive for
development and, in the trials of strength and the
competition of all types of authority, seek the middle path of
subtle balance. Sometimes we must take detours, and
sometimes we must advance in a roundabout way either by
reconciling or by relieving pressure. We can only skillfully
work through the brush of improper interference and calmly
cultivate the roots of judicial authority until they are finally
established.479
Although the judge was discussing the role of courts, his admonition is
instructive in thinking about the development of the legislative supervision
system generally. The Party-state has demonstrated an interest in improving
legislative consistency. Gradualism, flexibility, and accommodation may
ultimately be effective approaches in a political-legal framework in which
constraints on more aggressive, system-altering reforms are significant. As the
evolving roles of courts and citizens in this multilayered system suggest, such
gradual approaches may open up unexpected space for a range of legal actors.
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